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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION:

DESCRIPTION OF LASSWELL'S

DECISION-MAKING MODEL AND APPLICATION
TO CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION
BUSING DECISION
This dissertation is a study of the Chicago Board of Education decision to bus children from two predominantly black
schools to eight entirely white schools.
for at least three reasons:

This study is significant

It clarifies the factors involved in

the decision-making process as practiced by the Chicago Board of
Education.

It examines the policies employed by the Board as

alternatives to busing programs.

Finally, the study of this busing

controversy, while considering only the local problems, is of use
for further inquiries into the similarities and differences among
the attempts in conununities throughout the nation to solve the
problems of integration.

These decisions on integration will have

an undoubtedly critical influence upon the future of our democratic
society.
The scheme of analysis which this dissertation will employ
has been suggested by Harold Lasswell.
1

The hypothesis of this

2

dissertation is that the seven categories of functional analysis
suggested by Lasswell will yield a comprehensive and exceptionally
intelligible view of the decision-making process when related to
the Chicago busing decision.

The analytic questions suggested by

the seven functions will direct research to pertinent and valuable
observations.
scientists.

Lasswell remains a controversial figure among social
His attempts to develop propositions governing the

uses of power have been attacked as tending to "end in mechanical
laws which, correctly formulated, would be irrelevant to human
problems, and perhaps quite meaningless." 1

The dissertation

offered here is not so ambitious as 1 to test the validity of this
criticism of Lasswell.

No attempt will be made to apply all of

Lasswell's formulation of the basic concepts and hypothesis of
political science as offered in his work, Power and Society. 2
1rhomas I. Cook, review of Power and Society: A Framework
for Political Inquiry, by Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan,
in the Journal of Philosophy, XVI, February, 1951, p. 697.
2Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society:
A Framework for Political Inquir.z (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1950). Lasswell presented his seven functions in a smaller
work based upon the earlier study. His concern in the latter
study was to develop classifications which would be "serviceable
when they are tentative and undogmatic, and when they guide scholarly activity in directions that are presently accepted as valuable."
Harold D. Lasswell, The Decision Process: Seven Categories of
Functional Analysis (College Park, Maryland: ·Bureau of Governmental Research, University of Maryland, 1956), p. 2.

3

Use of Lasswell's model will help avoid, but not dismiss,
the narrowed frame of reference adopted in numerous studies of the
decision-making process.

Some of these studies have concentrated

on the formal process which considers the status quo to represent
a tension between interest groups.

The status quo is disturbed

when some of these organized interest groups combine to bring about
a change.

Other studies deprecate the role of organizations and

argue that an informal and non-public group of powerful leaders in
a community account for the important decisions which are made.3
The Lasswell model lends itself to an administrative as well
(

as politico-sociological analysis of the decision being considered.
Its seven categories examine the stages in the decision-making
process from the initial information gathering stage through a
termination stage when the decision has been applied, appraised,
and has become an apparent part of the operation of the system
involved.

These seven functions are listed below with analytic

3Ralph B. Kimbrough, Political Power and Education DecisionMaking (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1964). Stephan P. Hencley,
"The Study of Community Politics and Power," and Nelson W. Polsby,
"How to Study Cornmunity Power: The Pluralist Alternative," and
Richard M. Merelman, "On the Nee-Elitist Critique of Community
Power," in The Politics of Urban Education, ed. by Marilyn Gittell
and Alvan Hevasi (New York: Frederich A. Praeger, 1969), pp. 21-

59.

4
questions paraphrased from Lasswell.4
The first category is the intelligence function.

It con-

siders information, prediction, and planning, and implies such
questions as:

How is information that comes to the attention of

the decision-makers gathered and processed?

What studies, reports,

laws, judicial decisions, and community needs were known or available to the decision-makers?

What formal or informal channels

were being utilized in reaching the decision-makers?

To what

extent did the decision-making body control the source of its
information?
(

The second category is the recommendation function.

It

considers promotion of policy alternatives and implies such
questions as:

How are recommendations made and promoted?

alternative decisions were considered?
alternatives?

What

Who advocated these

Why were they rejected, accepted, or compromised?

What audiences were reached by the recommendations?
function was it to recommend?
forming the function?

Whose

What values were considered in per-

To what extent did the information made

available disclose threats or

opportun~ties

pertinent to the

pr_esent. or potential value position of the decision-makers?
4 Lasswell, The Decision Process, pp. 2-19, passim.

Did

5

information made available to those concerned with the decision
alter their views?

Did pressure groups demand a greater partici-

pation in the recommending function as a result of the decision
being considered?
The third category is the prescription function.

It con-

siders the enactment of the general rules and implies such questions
as:

How are rules prescribed?

What was the final decision?

group really made the final prescription?

What

Did any groups involved

in the decision seek prescriptions of their own in order to redress
their grievances as they saw them?
(

The fourth category is the invocation function.

It considers

provisional characterizations of conduct according to prescriptions
and implies such questions as:
cription invoked?
decision?

In reference to whom is the pres-

Who was responsible for administering the

Was the prescription invoked for all cases possible or

only for selected cases?

Was the decision challenged?

How was

the decision challenged?
The fifth category is the application function.
final characterization of conduct according to
implies such questions as:

It considers

prescripti~ns

How was the prescription applied?

were those affected reached and informed?

and
How

Did any groups turn to

other agencies for changes in the enforcement of the prescription?

6

was the prescription violated by any individuals or by the agency
responsible for the application of the prescription?
prescribed policy lead to changes

i~

Did the

values?

The sixth category is the appraisal function.

It considers

assessment of the success and £allure of policy and implies such
questions as:

How is the working of prescriptions appraised?

Whose activities were appraised?

Who did the appraising?

How

effectively and efficiently was the prescription executed?

Did

the structure of the agency lead to inefficient or indifferent
administration of the prescription?

Did the administration of the

(

prescription lead to significant changes in the administrative
agency?
The seventh category is the termination 'function.

It

considers the final arrangements entered into within the framework
of the prescription and implies such questions as:

How was the

prescription integrated into the framework of the organization?
Did expectations change?

What aspects of the prescription, if

any, were abandoned or revised?
This dissertation will use numerous

so~rces

to gather the

informatioq necessary to answer these analytical questions.
histories and community studies will be consulted.

Local

Federal and

state laws, commission studies, and court decisions will be cited.

7

Personal interviews with concerned citizens, teachers, and administrators will help to clarify the meaning and operation of various
policies.

The records of the proceedings of the Board of Education

meetings will be introduced whenever pertinent.

Numerous reports

and studies conunissioned by the Board will be examined.

Local

and city-wide newspapers, a major source of information, will fill
in the flesh and blood missing from public documents.
The role newspapers play in Board matters has been recognized
by a scholar who sat on the Chicago Board of Education.

Joseph

Pois has observed that newspaper reporters often become quite
(

expert on school matters.

Indeed, he discloses, it was not unusual

for a reporter to direct a Board member's attention to details that
might otherwise have gone unnoticed.

The scrutiny of the press

influences Board members to be mindful of their inconsistencies.
Observant reporters are quick to detect the influence of conunitments or cliques upon a member's vote.

Pois observes some short-

comings of the press but states that "the press is by far the principal medium for publicizing the member's position on school issues
as well as for mobilizing support."5
However, for numerous reasons, a newspaper account may be
5 Joseph Pois, The School Board Crisis: A Chicago Case Study
(Chicago: Educational Methods, Inc., 1964), pp. 141-42, 143 (Quote).

8

inaccurate.

This is one reason that multiple citations will be

given in footnotes in order to establish that more than one source
was in agreement on the accuracy of a statement.

When disagree-

ment is found, an analysis will be made in the footnote.

Another

reason for multiple citations rests in the fact that often the
information incorporated in a single sentence or paragraph may be
drawn from more than one source.

As this occurs with considerable

frequency, the multitude of footnotes and explanations would be a
greater irritation to the reader than checking a multiple citation.
\

The basic chronological approach of this study should result

'

in minimal distortion of the Lasswell decision-making model.
Indeed, a chronological sequence demonstrates that the use of the
seven functions does not affect the free form a researcher may
follow.

The functions are useful because they direct attention

to pertinent information when it is encountered.

The classifi-

cations established by the functions are sufficiently broad to
allow for their application to any decision-making body.

An inter-

play does exist between the functions in that it may be necessary
to consider two or more·functions in tpeir relation to a specific
issue.

For example, the intelligence function often requires

consideration of prior decision-making situations so ·that numerous
aspects of the entire seven functions are involved in developing

9

the study of the one function.
Indeed, Lasswell considers the functions as semi-autonomous,
and a study could begin with any one of the functions being considered first.

Thus, the "reform waves" experienced by cities

usually begin with the appraisal function.

Citizens become crit-

ical of past decisions and present activities.

The intelligence

function continues to focus attention on some form of corruption
or mismanagement.

Intelligence agencies, such as the public media,

study the problem and suggest how it has been solved in other
areas.

The reconnnending function develops naturally from the prior
(

process as civic organizations and other clubs begin to espouse
methods of reform.

The prescriptive function may appear in the

form of legislation which alters the public policy.

Indictments

of corrupt officials and challenges to the legislation are aspects
of the invocation function.

The application function encompasses

the various changes and reforms necessary to carry out the prescription.

As time passes, the appraisal function is enforced less

strictly and the cycle terminates with the development of a new

.
corruption
p h ase. 6
The cardinal benefit of Lasswell's model is the systematic
6 Lasswell, The Decision Process, pp. 9-10.

10
organization of concepts concerning the decision-making process.
These concepts help develop a series of analytic questions which
expedite the research of a topic.

Of course, caution is exercised

that the concepts and questions do not serve to exclude other avenues of investigation that emerge during research.

However, there

is no model which should be employed without observing this warning.
Finally, this student concurs with Lasswell's admonition that those
developing a study should be "willing to adopt the goal values of
human dignity as working postulates. 117

This admonition is inter-

preted in this study as a warning against considering the demands
. or pleas of any group encountered
bias.

ls

expressions of prejudice or

The goal to be desired is understanding, not judgment.
The hypothesis of this dissertation is that the seven cate-

gories of functional analysis suggesced by Harold Lasswell will
yield a comprehensive and exceptionally intelligible view of the
decision-making process when related to the Chicago busing decision.
The analytic questions suggested by the seven functions will direct
research to pertinent and valuable observations.

It will now be

shown how the seven functions have been utilized within the framework of the chapters of this dissertation.
7 rbid., pp. 15-21.

11

Lasswell's first step, the intelligence function, has been
expanded in this study in order to consider the Chicago Board of
Education as a decision-making body _and to develop the complex
background of data which served to inform the Board and helped
shape its decision.

Thus,, in chapter ii of this dissertation, the

political influences on the Chicago Board of Education are considered along with the individual perspectives of each Board member
regarding integration.

The changing relationship of the Board

and its Superintendent of Schools is examined as they seek a redefinition of "quality education" when pressure mounts for school
(

desegregation.

The dependence of the Board for information from

the superintendent and his staff is also scrutinized.

The recom-

mendation function appears in this chapter as various factions
develop in the communities demanding that the policies of the
superintendent or his opponents be prescribed.

The demands of

pressure groups contribute to the removal of the superintendent
although the conflict publicly revolves around a conflict over
the separation of intelligence, recommendation, and prescription
functions between the Board and its Superintendent.
Chapter iii expands the intellige·nce function by examining
some legal and judicial incentives for desegregating the· school
system.

The recommendation function is introduced in this chapter

12
as alternatives are offered by a Superintendent of Schools.

The

Hauser and Havighurst reports further develop the recommendation
function as the Superintendent of Schools challenges the right of
individuals outside the school system to usurp his power of
recommending.

Reactions of developing pressure groups to the

reports are investigated as are signs of growing demands for
greater participation in the recommending function.

Alternative

policies for implementing desegregation are considered.
Chapter iv continues to expand the intelligence function as
it considers numerous reports and studies of the demography of
(

'Chicago which were available to the Board when it made its decision.
The recommendation function emerges in this chapter when stabilization is considered as an alternative policy to busing.

Problems

encountered in the use of this alternative are examined in detail.
Policy statements expressing values subscribed to by the Board as
a body are reviewed.

Socio-economic factors in racially changing

communities which helped solidify factions are recognized.

The

chapter continues to develop the recommendation function as it
investigates the developing community organizations and attempts
to establish who speaks for the community.
Chapter v concentrates on the recommendation function.

A

growing t.endency of the Board to challenge the recommendations of

13
the superintendent is noted.

The dissertation continues to trace

the pressures exerted by pro-desegregation groups upon the Board.
~f

A general prescription in the form
new superintendent is analyzed.

a master plan offered by the

The acceptance of the plan by the

Board, however, was not a commitment to implement its specifics.
The full force of the superintendent's recommendation power is
recognized when he submits a set of specific recommendations
calling for busing programs to the Board for its approval.

Again,

the intelligence function of gathering and processing is considered
in its relation to arriving at· the final recommendation.

Finally,

(

the reaction of various pressure groups to the announced plan is
noted.
Chapter vi concentrates on the prescription function.
of political representatives by pressure groups is observed.

Use
The

decision of the Board to hold hearings in the communities is examined in light of the debate on its propriety.

The possibility of

of changing points of view as a result of making information available is noted.
groups.

Motives are sought for the positions of various

Apparent reasons for the decisions not to initiate one
-

plan while accepting another compromise plan are considered.

The

role of the superintendent in defining his reconimending function
and the Board's prescriptive function is examined.

14
Chapter vii encompasses aspects of the invocation, application, appraisal, and termination functions.

Administrative prob-

lems involved in implementing the plan are noted.

Challenges to

the decision are enumerated and their disposition considered.

A

later decision by the Board not to continue a temporary busing
program indicates that busing as an expandable policy is not considered within the framework of present alternatives.

An examin-

ation is made of the continuation of some alternatives and the
development of new prescriptions.

The busing program is appraised

in light of the fate of the area for which the plan was not ulti1

mately prescribed.

Finally, the decision of the Board to open

direct lines of intelligence between itself and the community is
examined.
Chapter viii concentrates on the appraisal function.

The

busing policy is assessed in light of the four goals stated by the
Board of Education.

The evaluations made by the school adminis-

tration are utilized for the data they contain, but the failures
and successes of the operating plan represent the judgments of this
author rather than those of the school administration.

A~pects

of

the termination function are developed as the study reviews those
parts of the busing plan which were abandoned or revised.

The

integration of the prescription into the framework of the school

15
structure is studied.

Finally, changing expectations, both of the

Board and various interest groups, are considered in relation to
the busing prescription.
Chapter ix returns directly to the analytic questions presented in the seven functions described by Lasswell.

This chapter

serves to summarize the significant findings of the dissertation.
However, its prime purpose is to establish the utility of Lasswell's
scheme in studying the decision-making process.

Each function is

restated, and the analytic questions indicated in this introduction
are serially listed.

Brief summaries of the investigation presented
(

in this dissertation are given as answers to the questions.

Chapter

ix, then, demonstrates how the Lasswell model serves to guide
research without prohibiting the development of a chronological
presentation.

The analytic questions function as guides in research

but do not limit the investigation of relevant data as it appears
to shed light on a developing aspect of the problem being studied.
This introduction has, therefore, presented the purpose,
significance and hypothesis of this dissertation.

It has demon-

strated the application of the seven functions within the body of
the work.

A table of contents gives the pagination of each of the

chapters for specific study.

A relevant bibliography is presented.

The Lasswell model is appiied with chapters which are basically

16
chronologically arranged.

The final chapter considers the analytic

questions suggested by the seven functions in light of the entire
study.

I

CHAPTER II
INTELLIGENCE AND RECOMMENDATION FUNCTIONS:
THE CHICAGO BOARD.OF EDUCATION AS
A POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING BODY
The Chicago Board of Education is a political body.

While

its members are appointed rather than elected, the Board's
decisions reflect the numerous pressures which are exerted upon
it.

Over the years the direct influence of politicians on Board

decisions has been well-documented.

In 1917 the Illinois General

Assembly established the Board as q.n autonomous unit in Chicago,
and the State Supreme Court had even backed Board members who
challenged the mayor's right to require undated resignations from
nominees to the Board before appointing them. 1
Despite the letter of the law and its interpretation, Board
members did not remain independent of political influence.
During the terms of Mayor William H. Thompson, charges of corrupt
1
John Albert Vieg, The Government of Education in Metro£Olitan Chicago (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939),
pp. 107-21. Joel Havemann,"Discrepancies in School Land Use as
Early as 1833," Chicago Sun-Times, September 22, 1971, p. 46.

17
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political influences were common.

True bills were voted against

a Board president, vice-president, and an attorney, along with
numerous other political job-holders in the school system.

None

of the indicted were convicted, and, while Thompson lost the next
election to William E. Dever, his return to power in 1927 brought
with him another Board controlled by men of questionable in-

.
2
tention.
By the close of World War II political encroachments and
Board mismanagement brought about strong demands for a thorough
investigation of the public school system.

The Commission for

(

the Defense of Democracy Through Education, a part of the National
Education Association, was induced to begin a study of the Chicago
system.

This body, operating independently of city control,

found numerous violations of the NEA code of ethics.

It was

pointed out that the president of the Chicago Board of Education
dominated not only the other members of the Board, but the
Superintendent of Schools as well.

Relatives of Board members

2John Howatt, Notes on the First One Hundred Years of
£.~icago Schoo~ History (Chicago:
John Howatt, 1946), pp. 51-56.
Vieg, The Government of Education in Metropolitan Chicago;
pp. 118-21, 167-69. The corruption of the Board under Thompson
became a concern of George S. Counts, in School and Society in
Chicago (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1928), pp. 159-63.

19
had been appointed to school positions.

Politicians were found

to be influencing appointments and contracts.

Teachers and

administrators rose in position on the basis of political contacts, and those who were opposed to this system of favoritism
were threatened or punished with transfers.

The public was kept

ignorant of Board policy through the secretive conduct of Board
meetings.3
Attempts by city officials to obscure the findings of the
commission finally proved futile in the face of an aroused public
indignation supported and abetted by such educational institutions
(

as the National Education Association and the North Central
Association.

On April 2, 1946, Mayor Kelly appointed a Mayor's

Advisory Committee consisting of five college presidents and the
president of the North Central Association.

Two reforms suggested

by this group are of particular significance to this present
study.

First, a Conunission on School Board Nominations was

reconunended and established.

Second, the position of the super-

intendent relative to the Board was strengthened by requiring
that all school officials report to the Board through the Office
3Joseph Pois, The School Board Crisis: A Chicago Case
~tudy (Chicago:
Educational Methods, Inc., 1964), pp. 10-13.
Hereinafter referred to as Crisis.
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of the Superintendent.

With the exception of the Board attorney,

who may advise the Board directly, this reconunendation became
law in 1947. 4
The Conunission on School Board Nominations is commonly
credited with upgrading the caliber of Board members.

Represen-

tation on the conunission has been expanded and contracted periodically from its original membership of eleven organizations and
four universities.

The University of Chicago, Northwestern and

Roosevelt Universities were soon included along with the Citizens
Schools Conunittee and the Cook County Physicians Association.

In

(

1966 the Urban League was asked to name a representative.

By 1968

representatives on one of the most controversial nominating commissions came from seven universities, two law groups, two labor
groups, two business groups, two school groups, one Negro organization and one patriotic legion.

Despite this broad array of

interest, the nominating conunittees have been accused of representing top social groups rather than the white working class and
Negro citizens whose children are attending the public schools. 5

4
5

.

Ibid., pp. 13-16.

Pois, Crisis, pp. 60-63. Chicago Sun-Times, March 13, 1964,
p. 4; March 21, 1966, p. 1. Chicago Daily News, May 4, 1968, p. 6.
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The relative independence of the members of the nominating
committee has been questioned by critics who suggest that numerous
considerations may act to limit their discretion.

Joseph Pois,

who served on the Chicago Board of Education between 1956 and

1961, points out that such expedient desires as fear of jeopardizing progress already made, a propensity for compromise, a
concern to protect their own interest, and even the uncertainty
of the public response may influence committee members.

Certainly,

group pressures and the influence of City Hall are factors in the
choice of nominees.

Mrs. Louise Malis, in 1961 a member of the
(

Nominating Commission, criticized the mayor for suggesting that
a name be added to the list of nominees after the commission had
already completed its deliberations and submitted its choices.
The mayor's nomination, however, was added to the list on this
and other occasions.6
That the Mayor of Chicago is the ultimate power in deciding
upon and appointing Board of Education members is most evident
in the fact that he need not heed the recommendation of the
Nominating Commission.

The commission itself has no statutory

sanction, and the mayor is not bound to the list it submits.

6 p o i s, . crisis,
. . pp. 62 - 65 .

22

This point is well illustrated in an incident which followed the
busing controversy of 1967-1968.
The conservative position taken by the President and
Vice-president of the Board of Education regarding busing and
other innovations suggested by the new superintendent, James
Redmond, led a large faction of the Nominating Commission to
oppose the reappointment of Whiston and Murray.

While some

members argued that the commission should not "act in any way
as a superboard or take the mayor's prerogatives away from him
virtually," the commission by a nine to eight vote failed to
(

renominate these men among the sixteen suggested individuals submitted to the mayor for the five vacancies on the Board.

The

mayor's response was to appoint three members to the Board who
were not on the commission's list.

He balanced the reappointment

of the Board 1 s president and vice-president by appointing the
Negro secretary of the Urban League.

The two other Board members

he chose were considered to be liberals, so that a balance was
retained between factions in the city.7
That this balance still remained conservative was evident
7chicago Daily News, April 8, 1968, p. 14; April 30, 1968,
pp. 1, 5; May 4, 1968, p. 6. Chicago Sun-Times,· May 3, 1968, p. 3.
fhicago Tribune, May 1, 1968, p. 1 (Quote).
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in that Frank Whiston and Thomas J. Murray were immediately
re-elected as President and Vice-president of the Board.

When

it was evident two years later that Jack Witkowsky, newly appointed in 1968, would not vote for Whiston again, Mayor Daley
passed over his reappointment and chose a candidate who did vote
for Whiston.

While Board members often deny that the mayor has

any influence on their decisions, Harry M. Oliver, Jr., a Board
member between 1966 and 1969, claims he saw signs that Daley
'.'put pressure on the board not to try experiments with integration
that would be opposed in certain white neighborhoods."

A Chicago

(

·sun-Times reporter has stated that "Insiders believe Daley is
interested in three important areas of school board concern:
labor negotiations; integration; and real estate. 118
This is not to suggest that Board members are pawns of the
mayor.

But they have accepted past political practices and have

challeng·ed these.

Thus, Mrs. W. Lydon Wild, when questioned about

a recent ·controversy regarding wages paid to custodial staff,
8

Jack Witkowsky, "Education of a School Board Member,"
..§__aturday Review, LIV (November 20, 1971), 90. Chicago Daily
News, May 29, 1965, p. 2. Joel Havemann and Douglas P. wo·odlock,
T'Schools Must Be Changed--But Nobody Knows How," Chicago SunTimes, March 22, 1971. p. 4 (Quote).

24

replied,
We've been paying prevailing wage rates for sixty years. It
is nothing this Board of Education made the decision about.
It is nothing the superintendent made the decision about . . .
Now do you take a practice of sixty years and all of a sudden
close up a school system because the BGA [Better Government
Association] thinks it's a great idea?9
There has been no move by. the Board to end such practices
as paying top wages to custodial staff, rental of land to the city
at rates lower than one might expect, and making decisions which
are in accord with established real estate approaches to Negro
expansion~

Those members who might be likely to question these

practices have not gained control of the Board.

Denials by cer-

tain Board members that the mayor influences their decisions are
probably irrelevant.

It seems to be the case that a majority of

the members of the Board are sympathetic to the mayor's political
position and are likely to react in a manner similar to his.

If

they do not, and their vote is crucial, they should not expect
to be reappointed.
Legally, to be eligible for a seat on the Board, one must
be thirty years old and a resident of Chicago for five years prior
to appointment.

The five year terms are staggered so that two

9Mrs. W. Lydon Wild, "At Issue" WBBM News Radio broadcast
interview by Bob Sanders, Bob Crawford, and John Madigan, Chicago,
Illinois, July 18, 1971. (taped).

,...
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members are appointed every year and three on every fifth year.
No compensation is given for service and members are forbidden
to hold any other public office. 10 _Thus, Board membership is
limited to those who can afford to devote the considerable time
and effort required for

~he

often thankless job.

Appointees to the Board in 1968 certainly did not represent
a geographical distribution over the city.

Nine of the eleven

members lived near the lake shore, and none of the members lived
on the northwest or southwest sides of the city where much of the
anti-busing protest was centered.

All the members were of upper
(

or upper-middle class status.
the public schools.

Only three members had children in

The number of Catholics on the Board had

fallen from a previous six to four members.

As this Church has

a parallel school system in Chicago representing over one-fourth
of the total city school enrollment, talk of "escape" into this
semi-private system was an important factor in the busing crisis.
Four members of the Board were septuagenarians--all these four
fell into the conservative block.11
While representation of interest groups obviously varies
lOillinois, Revised Statutes (1965), c. 122, sec. 34--3, 4.
11
Chicago Daily News, March 16, 1968, p. 2.

26
with the appointment of some particular individual, the American
Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations
have always accounted for two of the seats.

Since the early

1960's, two Negroes had been appointed to represent the growing
majority of Negro students in the system.

A candidate of the

Parent-Teachers Association has occupied a Board seat for many
years.

The growing representation of women on the Board had

reached three by 1968.

12

In matters concerning integration the

organizational background of any Board member appears to be quite
secondary to the individual's personal convictions.

Generally,

(

the Board members split into a conservative and liberal faction
with two other members who could be considered as swing voters.
In the conservative block could be found Frank M. Whiston,
Thomas J. Murray, Edward S. Scheffler, and Mrs. Wendell E. Green.
The liberal element consisted of Warren H. Bacon, Harry M.
Oliver, Jr., Bernard S. Friedman, Mrs. Louise A. Malis, and John
D. Carey.

The swing vote often depended upon Mrs. W. Lydon Wild

and Cyrus Adams III.
Frank Whiston had -served on the Board since 1948.

The head

of a real estate management firm, he had handled mainly commercial
12 Chicago Daily News, March 27, 1966, p. 4; April 6, 1966,
PP. 1, 8.
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properties such as the elder Marshall Field's estate before his
death and the city's Civic Center.

Whiston had opposed such

desegregation moves as the Hauser school transfer plan and had
been a major supporter of Superintendent of Schools Benjamin
Willis, whose policies were often criticized by civil rights
leaders.

Whiston became President of the Board when Claire

Roddewig resigned after being picketed by the civil rights groups
in early 1964.

Opposition, even at that time, to Whiston's

leadership of the Board was apparent when he had to vote for
himself in order to win the position.

Murray, who became vice-

'

·president, also found it necessary to vote for himself. 13
Thomas J. Murray at seventy-six was still president of the
Building Trades Council and a powerful influence in the American
Federation of Labor.

A staunch supporter of the neighborhood

school policy, he opposed any form of paid transportation which
would increase the likelihood of successful pupil transfer programs.

His opposition was based on what he felt would be the

13chicago's American, May 26, 1966, p. 3. Chicago Daily News,
June 25, 1964, p. 12. Witkowsky, "Education of a School Bpard 'l-feml>er,,"_ pp. 90-91. B_oard of Education, City of Chicago, Proceedings,
fu>ard of Education, City of Chicago, (Chicago: Board of Education,
May 27, 1964), pp. 2360-64. Hereinafter referred to as Proceedings,
date of meeting, page number.
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prohibitive cost of such a program.

Despite the fact that he was

a Catholic, he also protested that paying transportation costs
would lead to having to pay the costs of transporting parochial
school students as well as public school pupils.

Murray felt that

public opinion was opposed to any breach of the neighborhood
school policy.

When organized resistance to the busing plan of

1967 arose, Murray stated, "The recent weeks prove the extent to
which the public can be aroused over this question, so it becomes
apparent to me that the great majority of the citizens of Chicago
hate to see the neighborhood school policy disappear also. 11 14
(

Edward S. Scheffler, at seventy-one, was a retired judge
in ill health who was frequently absent from meetings.
the Board soon after the busing crisis.

He left

In 1964, protests were

lodged against Superintendent of Schools Benjamin Willis which
demanded, in part, that communities be allowed greater participation in the decision-making process.
opinion

~f

Scheffler, supporting the

Murray, stated, "The thing I object to is everybody

trying to run the school system.

The main trouble is that every

group, whether they have been organized for two weeks or a month
l4chicago Daily News, March 16, 1968, p. 2. Chicago SunTimes, July 12, 1964, p. 30. Witkowsky, "Education of a School
Board Member," pp. 90, 92. Proceedings, February 28, 1968,
P. 1533 (Quote) ; March 4, -1968, p. 1538.
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and whether they have a background in education, is trying to run
the system."

In refusing to support the Redmond Report, which

suggested methods of integration, Scheffler contended,
At present in our large cities in the field of school integration many impractical promises have been made, and the
fulfillment of these promises has been discouraging. The
Chicago Board of Education should not be compelled to make
commitments as suggested in the report until such a time as
we have good reason to believe that we can fulfill them.15
Mrs. Wendell Green, the widow of Chicago's first Negro judge,
at seventy-eight had moved somewhat from the position of her youth
in which she wrote a master's thesis on the pltght of Negroes .
. By 1964 Negro politicians attacked 1-ier reappointment to the Board
as she was considered "totally alienated from the Negro community."
In 1968 a leading Chicago Negro paper characterized her as
"unswervingly consistent in her anti-Hegro attitude."

Much of

Mrs. Green's .difficulty came from her opposition to devices such
as racial head counts and the use of quota systems to plan and
implement desegregation.

She certainly pinpointed a serious

problem for desegregation plans when she noted,
We already have an elementary Negro preponderance. If we
bused in all directions right now, we would end up th~s
evening with every elementary school in Chicago having more
15Chicago Daily News, November 13, 1964, p. 5 (First quote).
Proceedings, August 27, 1967, p. 534 (Second quote). Chicago
Daily Defender, May 5, 1965, p. 15.
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Negro children, or black or Afro-Americans, than white children. So this means that we are setting up a system, a quota
system, which not only discriminates against these Negro[e$]
. . . but also imposes segr.egation because of a 15% quota. 16
Warren H. Bacon was a product"of the Chicago school system
and his children were also attending the public schools.
vice-president of a

life'~nsurance

He was

company and then of a major

steel corporation before being appointed at.the age of forty-one
to the Board of Education in May, 1963.

The second Negro on the

Board, he was committed to integration and openly hostile to the
leadership of Whiston.

His major criticism of community partici-

pation in the decision-making process was that at public hearings
"atl we do is listen and that's the end of it."

Regarding inte-

gration, in 1967 he stated, "There are areas where we can bring
about integration by changing the school boundaries.
have done this years ago, but we failed.

We could

Instead, the board

worked ver·y hard at maintaining seg.regation by ge.rrymandering
schoQl districts. 1117

16 chicago Daily News, April 29, 1964, pp. 1, 10 (First quote).
Chicago Daily Defender, March 5, 1968, p. 13 (Second quote).
Proceedings, March 4, 1968, p. 1539 (Third quote). Witkowsky,
"Education of a School Board Me~ber," p. 91.
17 Chicago Tribune, June 25, 1964, p. 12; January 12., .1968,
pp, 1, 12. Chicago Sun-Times, January 17, 1967', p. 14. Chicago
Qaily News, November 13, 1964, p. 5 (First quote); February 20,
1967, p. 3 (Second quote)~
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Bernard S. Friedman, a research chemist for a major oil
firm, was a resident of the South Shore in Chicago--an area
directly involved in the busing plan (although Friedman lived on
the lake shore and was somewhat geographically removed from the
area involved).

Friedman actively supported the busing plan but

felt that
Good reasons rationally put by organizations could make me
skeptical about the success of the proposed busing program
. . . if we reduce the percentage of Negro students at a
South Shore school from sixty-seven percent to sixty-two
percent, I don't see that we're accomplishing anything.
Friedman shared Bacon's view that the Board was always behind the
times in acting and made its decisions always to respond and never
to initiate.18
Mrs. Louise A. Malis was the wife of a furniture manufacturing representative, a past president of the Illinois ParentTeacher Associat_ion Congress and had served as a member of the
Mayor's Commission of School Board Nominations.

Her children

were, during her tenure with the Board until 1968, students in the
public school system in the northeast area of Chicago.

As a new

Board member in 1964, Mrs. Malis announced that she favored
18witkowsky, "Education of a School Board Member," p. 90.
fhicago Daily News, March 16, 1968, p. 2. Southeast Economist
(Chicago), January 18, 1968, pt. 1, p. l; February 15, 1968,
. pt. 1, p. ·l {Quote).
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adjusting school boundaries to desegregate.

She supported the

Redmond Report, arguing that if the funds to implement it were
not immediately available, the Board should work without delay to
obtain the means to put the plan into effect.

Believing that

integration is beneficial for all concerned, she recognized that
busing was not the answer but saw it as part of the overall
.
19
so 1ution.

John D. Carey was a steelworkers union organizer.

A gradu-

ate of Bowen High School on the south side of the city, he continued to live in South Chicago and his daughter attended the
public schools.

Carey supported both the Redmond Plan and the

busing plan suggested in late 1967.

In one statement he reminded

his fellow Board members that in 1964 the Board had adopted a
resolution stating it would continue "to search for ways to increase the interracial association of students" and accepting "a
)

responsibility to help preserve- as far as possible such associations in areas where they now exist.''

Carey expressed the belief

that the Redmond Plan "contains the essential elements that are
necessary if Chicago is going to solve the massive educational
problem" it faces.

He saw the busing proposal as the first short

19chicago Daily News, March 16, 1968, p. 2. Chicago SunTimes, June 25, 1964, p. 44. Proceedings_, August 27, 1967,
p. 534 . . Northwest Times,- (Chicago), January 18, 1968, p. 6.
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term recommendation evolving from the plan.

Regarding public

hearings he stated, "During these past several weeks I have
attempted to listen to many voices on this proposal, vehement
voices against, moral voices that cry for justice and equality
and muted voices that represent the silent and inarticulate."
Regarding the role that elected figures played in supporting and
attacking the plan, he stated, "I view with regret those political
voices that lack the courage of leadership and I applaud those
political voices who would lean in the face of adversity."

For

Carey, "Racial isolation in the schools cannot produce quality
education. 1120

.(

Harry M. Oliver, Jr., a bachelor and socialite, was vicepresident of an insurance brokerage firm.

While Oliver served

only a little over two years between 1966 and 1969, he became one
of the most outspoken critics of the Chicago Board of Education.
Envisioning the schools' role as interacting with the community,
he introduced a resolution backing fair housing and supported a
resolution in which the Board promoted Project Good Neighbor, an
attempt of the Leadership Council for Open Housing to educate
20 chicago Daily News, April 27, 1966, pp. 1, 8; March 16,
1968, p. 2. Proceedings, February 28, 1968, pp; 1533-34 (Quotes).
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residents of Metropolitan Chicago regarding matters of inte.
21
gration.
Despite the unanimous approval by the Board of numerous resolutions opposing segregation, Oliver became frustrated at what he
felt was a failure of the Board to take any concerted action to
implement desegregation.

He was especially critical of the fact

that the Board had
as its vice-president a powerful labor union president whose
members are employed by the school system and as its president
a man who in every instance supports tha position of organized
labor although doing so has often meant taking away from education for our children and throwing us into a budget deficit.
(

'Oliver felt that salary concessions made to the Chicago Teachers
Union were especially responsible for failure to implement education and desegregation plans which would require large expenditures. 22
The failure of Board members to respond to various community
organizations was another source of aggravation to Oliver.

He

felt a credibility gap had developed between the Board and communities as Board members were telling organizations "one thing and
21 Chicago Daily News, April 27, 1966, p. 1, 8; March 16,
1968, p. 2. Chicago Sun-Times, May 25, 1967, p. 3.
22chicago Daily News, April 1, 1969, p. 3; June 12, 1969,
p. 6 (Quote). Chicago Sun-Times, March 31, 1969, p. 3.
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then doing another or nothing . . . related to building sites,
construction plans, building completion dates, boundary changes,
new programs, integration and others."

Oliver felt the Board

should organize district councils of parents in which "The citizens will be heard and

f~lt.

If the school system doesn't listen,

the citizens will blow us right out of the water.
much time left. 112 3

There isn't

How to determine which voices were to be lis-

tened to was more clear to Oliver than to other Board members.
Oliver's attacks on fellow Board members resulted in prepared defenses of union affiliations being read into the Pro1

ceedings of the Board meetings and shouted responses during the
sessions.

At the last meeting Oliver was to attend, a concili-

atory farewell wish from Whiston evoked some poignant statements
regarding the decision-making structure of the Board.

Oliver

responded to the president's farewell by observing that "no two
of us ever seem to agree consistently."

In reflecting on this

statement Mrs. Malis agreed and stated, "we have all voted with
different people on different issues, depending on the issues .
I would like to state clearly that I know of no block voting on
this Board or lobbying done by members of this Board in order to
23 chicago Daily News, June 12, 1969, p. 6 (First quote).
Chicago Sun-Times, June 12, 1969, p. 10 (Second quote).
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get other members of this Board to vote with them."

Oliver had

already expressed his view that the Board President and Superintendent Redmond had repeatedly blocked efforts of individual Board
members to become involved in the Board's legislative and financial
programs. 24 Thus, certain decisions might have been left in the
hands of a few who were knowledgeable in that area, and, for lack
of information, other members would be hesitant to protest.
Mrs. W. Lydon Wild, the wife of an executive of the Great
Lakes Dredge and Dock Company, had been a Chicago school teacher.
She was active in numerous Catholic organizations and her child
(

had attended the parochial schools in the South Shore area.

A

personal friend of Mayor Daley, she had been active in his campaigns.

At the time of her appointment in 1963, she had stated

that she would be willing to scrap the Board's neighborhood policy
in order to achieve integration.

Regarding conununity participation

in the Board's decision process she conunented in

he~

usually lucid

style, "To have everybody putting their two cents into a system
is difficult.

All you might get is utter confusion.''

In response

to suggestions that the .Board be elected from various areas of
24Proceedings, June 25, 1969, pp. 3079-80; July 23, 1969
p. 11 (Quotes). Chicago Daily News, May 29, 1969, p. 3; June 12,
1969, pp. 6, 10.
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the city Mrs. Wild stated, "If we sat there as elected representatives, just think of what would happen if we all represented a
different area.

No decision would ever be reached."

In July,

1967, Mrs. Wild took over the chairmanship of the South Side
Boundary Committee from Murray.

This committee, by adjusting

school boundaries, can play a crucial role in desegregating
schools.

Mrs. Wild had already been accused of continually

opposing desegregation by City Alderman Leon Despres.

In August,

1967, she qualified her vote of approval of the Redmond Report by
stating "we must not mislead the people involved that by accepting
I

· this in principle that we insure its immediate implementation,
since we have

. no funds available."

In January, 1968,

Whiston chose Mrs. Wild to sit on the busing hearings committee
because, in his opinion, she was in the middle on the busing
proposal. 25
Cyrus Adams III was a descendant of a famous family and an
executive of a leading Chicago department store.

A graduate of

Princeton, his own children had attended the Chicago.Latin School.
25

chicago Daily News, December 27, 1963, p. l; December 31,
1963, Society Section, p. l; November 13, 1964, p. 5 (First wuote);
June 6, 1967, p. 3; March 16, 1968, p. 2. Chicago Sun-Times,
December 28, 1963, p. 3. Southeast Economist (Chicago), January
14, 1968, p. l; February 29, 1968, p. 7 (Second quote). Proceedings, July 12, 1967, p. 251; August 27, 1967, p. 534 (Third
quote).
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He believed desegregation could be achieved within the neighborhood school concept.

He supported the controversial Benjamin

Willis in 1963, asking the Board to.refuse his resignation.

Re-

garding desegregation he stated, "The board has said they are
against segregation; I would be too.

When you get into inte-

gration--the word means different things to different people. •.•26
It was this middle-of-the-road attitude which had led Alderman Leon Despres of the City Council to oppose the reappointment
of Adams.

The alderman claimed Adams was a member of a "swing

group which sides with the administration on crucial issues on the
(

Board and Daley is always in the background pulling strings."
few agreed with the alderman's appraisal.

But

The Chicago Daily News

applauded Adams as being "a conscientious contributor to the
board's discussions and decisions from a thoroughly developed
knowledge of the problems of Chicago's schools. 1127
Adams' middle position did not stop him from taking stands.
In 1966 he issued a statement in which he openly favored extra pay
for teachers working in inner-city situations.

He favored pub-

. lishing the achievement test results of Chicago students, but he
26

Chicago Daily News, December 28, 1963, C.ity Page (Quote);
December 23~ 1963, Society Section, pp. 1, 9.
27

chicago Daily News, May 11, 1966; p. 11 (First quote);
editorial, May 7, 1966 (Second quote).

39
wanted the results published by school dis'tricts rather than
individual schools in order to avoid any stigma on a particular
school.

He felt the cluster plan had mixed results and permissive

transfers "make people move out in some cases."

(The cluster

plan had been suggested in 1964 by the Hauser Report to expand
attendance areas so that students might choose between a few
"clustered" high schools.)

Adams favored the neighborhood school

plan for small children because of the hazards of traveling.

He

thought open enrollment for high schools would be desirable but
not during the current period of overcrowding. 28
Perhaps most typical of Adams' attitude was his comment on
community participation.

He stated it was "appropriate to a point.

You have to find a compromise between community participation
in
l
your affairs and the problem of too many cooks spoiling the broth."
When controversy arose over a motion to grant extra support to
integrated elementary schools, it was Adams who sponsored a compromise which led to its adoption.

He was to play this role again

in the final busing decision in 1968. 29
The relationship between the Board and its Superintendent of
28chicago Daily News, May 11, 1966, pp. 1, 15.
29fhicago Daily News, November 13, 1964, p. 5 (Quote).
froceedings, April 28, 1966, p. 3079; May 11, 1966, p. 3092.
Northwest Times (Chicago); March 7, 1968, p. 1.
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schools has played a dramatic role in Chicago Public School history.

The weakened position of the superintendent under corrupt

Boards was a major concern of the Commission for the Defense of
Democracy Through Education when it reported on the scandals which
culminated during World War II.
Chicago.

Herold Hunt began the reforms in

When he passed the reins to Benjamin C. Willis in 1953,

a very strong leader entered the Office of the Superintendent of
Schools.

Dr. Willis built not only new schools but a school

·system which was renowned for its emphasis on "quality education."
Dr. Bernard Friedman, often a critic of Dr. Willis, has summarized
one view of the controversial Superintendent when he stated,
Willis was here in an extremely difficult period. He was
excellent in the development of schools--design and selecting
locations was his forte. If only providing facilities,
teachers, funds and programs was all that was needed, then
there wouldn't have been nearly as many problems. But the
problem was inte3ration and desegregation. He just wasn't
flexible enough. 0
·
Dr. Willis obviously wished the Chicago Public School System
to operate autonomously of the other institutions of the city.

He

often withdrew cooperation from those agencies which he could not
control and set out to establish a strongly centralized
sional body in the superintendent's offices.

p~ofes-

This policy would

30James Kerr, "Ben,Willis After Chicago," Chicago Tribune,
Section IA, October 31, 1971,, p. 1. ·
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not only allow the Superintendent to purge corrupting influences
from his teaching staffs--it also reflected a personality which
would brook no challenges to authority.
By 1963 leaders of the developing civil rights movement were
questioning Chicago school policies.

Minority representatives

claimed Dr. Willis was committed to de facto segregation.

In

August, 1963, a legal action resulted in the appointment of a
committee chaired by Philip M. Hauser of the Sociology Department
at the University of Chicago.

The Hauser Panel was

to analyze and study the school system in particular regard to
schools attended entirely or p~edominantly by Negroes, define
any problems that result therefrom, and formulate the report
to this Board [of Chicago] . . . a plan by which any educational, psychological, and emotional problems or inequities
31
in the school system that prevail may best be eliminated . . .
Four months before the commissioning of the Hauser panel the
Board Survey Committee had contacted Professor Havighurst of t'.1e
Education Department at the University of Chicago to begin an
exhaustive study of the entire school system.

The Survey Committee

31
Advisory Panel on Integration of the Public Schools, Report
to the Board of Education, City of Chicago, March 31, 1964, Integration of the Public Schools--Chicagor Philip M. Hauser, Chairman
(Chicago, Chicago Board of Education, 1964), pp. vii, 2. Hereinafter referred to as Hauser Report. The report is examined in
greater detail in chapter iv of this study.
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had spent over eighteen months determining the scope of the report
and choosing the director.

Despite his prior approval of the

commissioning of a study, Dr. Willis strongly objected to the
Board's action, claiming he "had not been adequately consulted concerning the choice of a director and the design of the Survey. 11 32
Actually, the superintendent had been frank in his off-therecord opposition to the survey.

He was just as blunt in his

opposition to the choice of Dr. Havighurst, who advocated overlapping and expanded school districts.

At the May 22, 1963, Board

meeting Willis said:
(

I can only surmise that the [survey] committee of the Board
of Education, without asking for data from the administration,
or its analysis, and without deliberative action of the Board
of Education, has made a decision to change the direction of
the policy away from the neighborhood school.33
The Board was able to assuage the superintendent's misgivings
by establishing a committee of three to plan and direct the survey.
As Willis was to sit as one of the committee, both he and the Board
were able to save face.

But definite problems could be identified

3 2Robert J. Havighurst, The Public Schools of Chicago: A
§urvey for the Board of Education of the City of Chicago. (Chicago:
Chicago Board of Education, 1964), pp. 3-5 (Quote, p. 3). ·Hereinafter referred to as Havighurst Survey. The report is examined in
greater detail in chapter iv.
33Pois, Crisis, pp. 106-07.
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in the relationship of the Board with its superintendent.

The

growing pressures of the civil rights groups regarding de facto
segregation were likely to increase tensions and further test the
hazy border between the policy-making powers of the Board and the
administrative powers of the superintendent.

By giving in on

numerous issues the Board had failed to establish any clear cut
line as to when it would take a stand.

When it did move to reverse

the superintendent, the Board precipitated a crisis.34
When the school year began in September, 1963, two issues
confronted the Board.

As populations shifted in Chicago, school
(

enrollments rose or fell.

In order to meet the extra demands put

on school facilities mobile class units were brought to some
schools on a temporary basis.

Most of the 625 mobile units had

been placed on playgrounds of predominantly Negro schools.

Civil

rights groups argued this practice was meant to contain them and
demanded the units be placed on playgrounds of predominantly white
schools thus opening them to desegregation.

Demonstrations were

initiated demanding the resignation of Willis.
34

Predominantly

rbid., pp. 103-09. Pois cites a case where Dr. Willis
accepted and worked on a survey of the Massachusetts schools for
a large fee. This commitment, which would require the Superintendent to devote much time to another school system was finally
approved by the Board.
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white groups organized and responded with demands to keep the
5 uperintendent.35

The second and precipitating issue centered upon the opening
of schools to pupils who did not live in the district.

Under

pressure to initiate some plan of desegregation, the school staff
developed a selective permissive transfer plan in which students
of outstanding ability would be permitted to transfer out of
schools with limited numbers of such students into schools with a
greater number of such students.
four receiving high schools.

The initial plan listed twenty-

A month later Willis reduced this

number to nine and went to great lemgths pointing out that most
of the eligible students were not interested in leaving their home
schools as special programs had provided for their needs.

At the

next Board meeting, it was pointed out by Board members that n·presentatives of the connnunities of the Hyde Park and South Shore High
Schools had expressed a willingness to accept talented Negro students into their honors programs.

The Board overruled Willis by

authorizing the transfer of twenty-four students between these two
35Kerr, "Ben Willis After Chicago_," p. 1. This problem will
be developed further in chapters iii and iv of this study.

r
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high schools which had been removed from the initial list.36
At first Willis refused to implement the decision, and then
he resigned on October 4, 1963.
on both sides of the issue.

Forces had already been mobilized

Civil rights groups hailed his resig-

nation which they had helped to precipitate.

The parents of stu-

dents he had refused to transfe.r had immediately begun court
proceedings which had resulted in a legal order to implement the
transfers.

The South East Community Organization had sent a

letter to Board President Roddewig demanding the twenty-four
students be transferred from Hyde Park to South Shore High School.
When Willis resigned, in protest of what he considered a violation
of his professional integrity, all the major newspapers, except
the Chicago Tribune, ran editorials accepting his departure. 37
But Willis was not without friends.

Business leaders tele-

graphed thei·e support for the man who had modernized the massive
school system at a minimal cost.

Administrators within the

school system expressed their admiration for an effective and
36 Proceedings, June 26, 1963, p. 2371; August 14, 1963, pp.
274-76; September 11, 1963, pp. 378-79; September 25, 1963, pp.
445-46.
37chicago's American, October 8, 1963, pp. 4, 6. Chi·c~g~
Q.§.ily Defender, October 1, 1963, p. 3; October .10, 1963, p. 15;
editorial, October 12, 1963. Editorial, Chicago Sun-Times,
October 6, 1963. Chicago Daily News, October 8, 1963, p. 10;
October 9, 1963, pp. 1, 8~
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tough leader.

The chairman of the Illinois State Committee of the

North Central Association, referring to the days of political
domination, defended the powers of the superintendent.

Indeed,

the implication that Chicago schools might lose accreditation led
Bernard Friedman to comment, "From the timing of it, it looked
like a threat, a threat designed to influence the board when it
meets Monday [October 7].
appropriate. 11 3 8

It was premature and certainly not

And on the fringes there were those uncounted

numbers of citizens who supported Willis because his decision had,
in effect, helped to keep some schools segregated.
(

The response of the Board to the resignation was affected
by many factors.

Some members undoubtedly supported the superin-

tendent from the onset.

President Roddewig took the position

that the superintendent should run the schools.

Already a month

into the new year and with a deputy superintendent who was ill,
there seemed little chance of finding another person to run the
highly centralized structure Willis had been so influential in
creating.

At a special meeting on October 7, the Board refused

to accept the Willis resignation by a six to two vote; Friedman
and Bacon opposing the move.

At the regular meeting on October 9,

38chicago's American, October 8, 1963, p. 4 (Quote).
Crisis, pp. 110-14.

Pois,
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the Board reversed itself on the transfer decision and also cancelled hearings on public school issues.

Board President Roddewig

had conferred with Willis regarding the establishment of a set of
rules to determine the relationship of the Board to its Superintendent.

Willis promised to draw up a set of guidelines.

When

the superintendent reported to work on October 16, only Bacon,
newly appointed that May, refused to accept his return.39
The Board itself certainly had not been accepting the role
of leadership in the decision-making function.

It was usually

enmeshed in petty details which preempted more important decisions.
(

Board members had tended to avoid controversial issues and to be
thankful that the s:uperintendent would absorb the brunt of public
disdain.

It might have appeared that the lack of a clear cut

statement of the relationship between the Superintendent and the
Board was at the base of the difficulties between the two components of the school structure.

Thus Willis had promised to

present a set of guidelines to distinguish the functions of the

3 9Proceedings, October 7, 1963, pp. 447-49; October 9, 1963,
pp. 451-52; October 16, ·1963, p. 497. Chicago Daily News, October
9, 1963, pp. 1, 8. Chicago Sun-Times, October 10, 1963, pp. 5,
32. Mary J. Herrick, The Chicago Schools: A Social and Political
~istory (Benerly Hills, California:
Sage Publications, 1971),
pp. 316-17.
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Board and its Superintendent.40
It was not until April, 1964, that the "Statement of Prin.
ciples and Procedures for Effective Cooperation Between the Board
of Education and the General Superintendent of Schools" was considered by the Board.

The Board was recognized to have powers of

general supervision and management of the affairs of the schools.
While policy-making was recognized as the prerogative of the Board,
it was to exercise it on major issues, and access to informationgathering departments was controlled by the superintendent.
.~uperintendent

The

held the responsibil1.ty to present proposals and

recommendations on major school issues.

He was expected to support

and clarify his suggestions with information gathered by his staff
as well as to supply information to Board members upon their
request.41
The superintendent was expected to execute Board policy, and
departure from a program.was to be approved first by the Board.
In return the Board was expected to support administrative acts
performed in carrying out the decision.

While the Board was

40 Pois, Crisis, pp. 43-50, considers the numerous factors
Which led the Board to procrastinate in the dec~sion-making
process.
41Proceedings, April 23, 1964, pp. 2212-14
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recognized as the final authority on any issue, the guideline was
so worded that those issues were to "be resolved through the regularly constituted administrative channels" if at all possible.
Members were cautioned to support policies once the Board as a
whole had accepted them, and individual members were reminded that
their private intercessions had no binding power over the superintendent.

Members of the Board were to make contact with the staff

only through the superintendent.42
Ways and means of communicating with and serving the community were recognized as the function of the Board, but the General
(

· Superintendent was to supply advice and cooperate in all such
endeavors.

The superintendent was expected to keep the public

informed of what the schools were doing.

Appeals, complaints and

applications made to Board members regarding administration of the
schools were ·to be made known to the superintendent for investigation and report.

The right of the Board to sit in closed .

sessions·for purposes of informal discussion was upheld although
meetings were expected to be open to the public.43
That these guidelines would not clarify the hazy line which
~xists

between policy-making and administration is clear in a
42 Ibid.

431bid.
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perusal of the statement.

By keeping tight control over the in-

formation gathering machinery, the superintendent would effectively limit the abilities of the lay Board to prognosticate needs
or establish any policy in advance of a clamor from without or
the suggestions of the superintendent from within.

Thus Bacon

could observe, "One of the board's characteristics is its failure
to get pertinent information often needed to allow members to make
decisions independent of the superintendent instead of ratifying
action already decided by him.''

Furthermore, the superintendent

could also refuse to collect data on request by arguing that his
(

staff was overburdened with other duties.44
The guidelines reflected the opinion of most educational
administration texts which discouraged standing committees o'f the
lay Board.

But it can also be argued that the operation of these

committees would lead to independent sources of information and a
more detailed study by some Board members of special problems.

One

ex-Board member has pointed out that on those committees which did
exist, there may have been a tendency to appoint Board members to
chairmanships who were not as adamant in suggesting innovations.45
44Pois, Crisis, p. 121.
p. 12 (Quote).

Chicago_Tribune, June 25, 1964,

45witkowsky, "Education of a School Board Member," p. 91.
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Furthermore, the size and complexity of the large city system ·
placed immense demands upon the time of Board members who were not
paid for their efforts.

Board members often spent a good portion

of their working days meeting other demands in their lives.

The

fact that they devoted so much time to Board matters is indicative
of the dedication of most of the members, but that they would
often welcome the easing of their tasks by a strong superintendent
would be quite understandable.
The Board members are lay people in education.

That Willis

wished to limit their penetration into the operations of the school
(

system would be logical.

To be sure, such a position was always

in accordance with the superintendent's philosophy while in the
Chicago school system.

In 1954, a few months after he came to

head the city's schools, Willis wrote that professional educators
should be leaders, not errand boys.

He stated, "Much of what is

wrong with education today can be attributed to the fact that educators . . . have abdicated from positions of educational leadership, and have permitted themselves and their schools to be swayed
by the winds of uninformed public opinion. 11 46
4 6 Benjamin C. Willis, "The Need For Professionalism in
Education Today," Chicago Schools Journal, XXXV '(March, 1954),

273-80.
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Public opinion is an elusive specter; indeed, it is many
specters.

Undoubtedly, the crucial factor in most issues on the

division of power is that there is disagreement on what goals must
be achieved.

Sometimes the goal is elusive because the name

attached to it has different meanings for different publics.

Thus,

"quality education" meant one thing to Benjamin Willis, another to
Warren Bacon and yet another to an element of the population of
Chicago.
Willis described quality education in terms of neighborhood
schools with good facilities, competent faculties, small class
sizes, more programs, and the extension of programs the year round.
It was the task of the public school.system to offer children,
youth, and adults "the best of all educational opportunities. 1147
To Warren Bacon quality education was described in the 1954 Supreme
Court decision--there could be no quality.education without integration.

And for another nebulous but vocal group there could be

no quality education for their children if another racial group
was attending school in the same building.

Each of these opinions

was held by a public and each public had different demands to make
upon the Board.

The Board's problem was not a lack of goals but

47 Proceedings, February 13, 1964, pp. 1945-46.
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the lack of a goal.
The relationship between the Board and its Superintendent
continued to degenerate as the various publics brought pressure
to bear to achieve their often conflicting goals.

The return of

Willis brought renewed attacks by civil rights groups.

Edwin

Berry of the Urban League had stated that if Willis stayed on,
members of the corrnnunity "will take their battle into the courts
and into the streets."48 The Coordinating Council of Corrnnunity
Organizations (CCCO) organized a boycott of the schools in which
over one-half of the student body was absent.

Finally, Board Pres-

'
ident Roddewig met with the CCCO organizer,
Albert Raby, but com-·
plained that nothing was discussed.

Nevertheless, he decided a

statement of policy regarding integration
stem the boycott.

~:rould

be necessary to

The final statement read in part:

. . . this country would be healthier economically, educationally, and morally if Chicago, Illinois, and all sections of
the County, reflected the kind of racial and ethnic diversity
characteristic of the nation as a whole . . . . [Board members
have] already made clear our opposition to segregation or
discrimination in planning attendance areas and educational
programs. . . . However, we see no overall step or action by
which such diversity can be brought irrnnediately to all schools
by the Board of Education alone.49_
48chicago Daily News, October 9, 1963, pp. 1, 8.
49Proceedings, January 27, 1964, pp. 1856-57; February 13,
1964, pp. 1943-45 (Quote on p. 1945).
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Despite the relative ambiguity and apparent lack of new
direction in this Board statement, the superintendent could not
bring himself to openly endorse it.

Instead, he spoke of "quality

education" and pointed out that:
America has a unique history in the world: a history of
assimilation of peoples of diverse backgrounds; a history
of upward mobility. The public schools of America have made
the assimilation possible. It is education, that makes
mobility upward possible.so
In the fight for integration Negroes did not have to be reminded of the melting pot theory--what they desired was an implementation of the credo.

If the Board promised little in its
(

policy statement, the superintendent appeared even more intransigent.

It was evident that the Negro communities would continue

to protest as long as the uncompromising superintendent remained
in office.
A middle group was also slipping away from supporting Willis.
The Citizen Schools Committee had criticized the lack of cooper,

ation and information that its representatives, Board members, and
the Hauser- and Havighurst committees had received from the school
administration.
group.

Willis responded by severing relations with this

The business community, which had been favorably impressed
50

Ibid., pp. 1945-46 (Quote on p. 1946).
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with the superintendent's efficient and economical administration,
was also becoming more critical of his ability to deal with the
changing scene.

One businessman is quoted as saying,

11

I thought

him an extremely able fellow, but he stuck his foot in his mouth.
He was too arrogant."

Another estimated that by the time he left

the support of the business community had dropped from about 90
percent to only about half. 51

Havighurst and Hauser were reported

to have stated in a WIND radio interview that Willis had done
little to implement their reports and that he was hiding problems
and deficiencies in the school system. 52
(

Support for the superintendent on the Board also began to
dwindle.

In June, 1964, Cyrus Adams III, newly appointed that

January, commented, "When we need help I will put my money on our
own inside experts against hiring or inviting outside experts."
But a year later Adams joined Mrs. Malis and Mrs. Wild, also newly
appointed, in looking for a way to ease Willis out of the Superintendency. 53

Warren Bacon remained a most outspoken critic of the

51Herrick, The Chicago Schools:
History, pp. 319, 426-27.
52

A Social and Political

f~icago Daily Defender, January 25, 1965, p. 5.

53Proceedings, January 27, 1964, pp. 1823~24. Chicago SunTimes, June 23, 1964, pp. 3, 24 (Quote); May 14, 1965, pp. 1, 28.
Chicago Daily News, May 28, 1965, pp. 1, 4; May 29, 1965, pp. 1, 2.
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school administration, arguing "Education like war, is too important to leave to the professionals."

Bacon continued to hammer

away at administrative policies, questioning the effectiveness of
the student transfer plan, the lack of implementation of the Hauser
and Havigfwrst Reports, and the unwillingness to discuss any topics
but the ones the superintendent introduced. 54
Raymond Pasnick, about to resign in 196S, found Willis to be
insulting when he opposed the Board's demands that he offer the
names of more than one candidate for appointment to a staff position.

The superintendent argued that his responsibility required
(

him to have control over personnel matters, and he went on to state
that staff members feared a return to the days when appointments
were made on a political basis.SS
As the time for renewal of the contract of Willis approached,
the administrative staff did support the superintendent.

The head

of the Chicago Principals' Club wrote an open letter attacking the
Board for not supporting the principals.

The letter went on to

defend the position of a resigning associate superintendent who
54chicago Sun-Times, March 12, 1964, p. 3; June 4, 1964, p.
104; June 21, 196S, p. S2 {Quote). Chicago Daily News, January 20,
1964' p. 7.
55chicago Sun-Times, February 11, 1965, p. 3.
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criticized the Board for requiring the staff to prove everything.
conununity organizations distributed buttons, collected signatures
on petitions, and organized demonstrations at Board meetings in
support of the superintendent. 56
But Willis' position had deteriorated since his stand
against the encroachments of his powers by the Board in 1963.
On May 14, 1965, a compromise porposal to renew the superintendent's
contract, with the understanding that he would retire on his sixtyfifth birthday, was defeated by a seven to four vote.

Whiston,

who had made the proposal, was joined only by Murray, Scheffler,
(

and Mrs. Green.

Bacon, Clement, Friedman, and Pasnick were joined

by Mrs.Malis, Mrs. Wild and Adams in defeating the contract
agreement.57
Emotions ran high in the connnunities.
life was reported.

A threat on Bacon's

The Citizen Schools Committee entered the fray

by issuing a letter criticizing the support of the superintendent
from within the schools and asking Willis to issue a directive
pointing out that such a campaign was not "sound professional
56 ch.icago. Su~1-Times, January 14; 1965, pp. 1, 6; April 3,
1965, p. 8. Herrick, The Chicago Schools: A Social and Political
History, pp. 333-39.
57chicago Sun-Times, May 14, 1965, pp. 1, 28.

May 14, 1965, p. 2582.

Proceedings,
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practice."

While these divisions in the communities continued,

Board members Mrs. Wild, Mrs. Malis, and Adams agreed to switch
their votes.

They were reported as expressing their opposition

to the superintendent but felt that compromise was necessary.
Willis accepted the new contract but refused to commit himself to
the understanding that he would retire on his birthday in
December, 1966. 58
The decision was met with renewed protest in the Negro community.

The National Association for the Advancement of Colored

People threatened to organize a boycott of Loop stores and other
(

protests if Willis was not removed.

The organization had already

brought suit against the Board, challenging the mayor's method of
appointing members.

Continued pressure on City Hall led Mayor

Daley to suggest a meeting between civil rights leaders and the
Board. 5 9
Pasnick resigned from the Board in 1965 with an attack upon
Willis and the Board itself.

He expressed frustration at "the

chicago Tribune, May 17, 1965, p. 12. Chic~o Sun-Times,
May 21, 1965, p. 52; May 28, 1965, pp. _3, 72. Chicago Daily News,
May 28, 1965, pp. 1, 4. Proceedings, May 28, 1965, pp. 2592-600.
58

59chicago Daily News, May 29, 1965, p. 1. Chicago Sun-Times,
June 24, 1965, pp. 3, 26. Editorial, Chicago Tribune, April 23,
1964.

59
do-nothing attitude in this whole area of integration that has
existed too long in the City of Chicago," and at the
lack of action when we have opportunities to do something
concrete, our reluctance to take specific positive action
dealing with the questions so that we can make clear to the
public generally where we stand insofar as integrating our
schools and providing every child with an equal educational
opportunity. 11 60
'
Less than a year later Clement resigned in an open conflict
with Willis.

In a letter to Mayor Daley he listed factors of

"personality, character and basic attitudes [as] an issue here."
The superintendent was cited for his defensive and dictatorial
positions and his "contempt for the¥ judgment of any board member
who has the temerity to disagree with him."

Clement attacked the

administrator's "refusal to accept the official board policy
adopted over two years ago to continue to seek and promptly take
any practicable steps [to increase] racial and ethnic diversity
in the schools," and his lack of respect for parent organizations,
neighborhood groups, employee organizations, and other citizens
who are interested in the schools.6 1
Even if one questioned the possibility of identifying a
60

61

.
Proceedings, August 11, 1965, p. 232.

.
Chicago Daily News, March 2, 1966, pp. 1, 5; March 3,
1966, p. 8.
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common factor in all these organizations on which to obtain a
consensus to act, it was clear that too many elements had been
alienated or embarrassed by the continuing controversy which had
come to center on the superintendent.

Mrs. Malis, addressing an

educational seminar, could complain of "a perpetual tug-of-war in
which all decision-making is hampered" that had grown during her
tenure.

She saw a somewhat new role for the Board in which the

public expected it to be more responsive to needs and to assert
itself as a body.

"As a result," she stated, "boards are no longer

willing to sit back and let the superintendent wave the baton a.nd
(

the orchestra will play. 11 62

In May, 1966, the leader announced he

would leave his office in August in order to allow a new superintendent to take over at the beginning of the academic year.
It is indicative of the breakdown of the relationship
between Willis and his Board that the search for a new superintendent was begun almost immediately after his contract was renewed.
President Whiston appointed Board members, Scheffler, Bacon,
Friedman, Mrs. Malis, and Mrs. Wild to a special corrunittee to seek
a successor.

Whiston stated, "In

sele~ting

the committee, I tried

.to prove the committee is not stacked for or against the
62

chicago Sun-Times, February 4, 1966, p. 18.
an address at Northwestern University.
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superintendent."

Whiston appointed himself as an "ex-officio

member" without a vote, but it became apparent that he would have
a dominant voice in the selection of a new administrator. 6 3
An early attempt to recruit leaders from the local universities to aid in the search failed when dissension occurred among
the Board members and some university presidents protested that
they had not consented to serve before the offer was made public.
Business leaders supporting the Urban League issued a letter
listing what they felt to be essential qualifications among which
was "equal access to our public schools by all races, with a pos.1

· itive policy and program to eliminate segregation."

Cyrus Adams

commented that "equal access" was not realistic and said, "Segregation will be eliminated when segregation is eliminated in
The whole thing is utopian. 1164

housing.

By March, 1966, the search for a new superintendent was
still continuing, and Whiston was reported as leading the committee.
Indeed, the illness and eventual death of his son was offered as a
reason for the lack of progress.

63

When the search eventually

.

Chicago Daily News, June 2, 1965, p. 65.

64

chicago Sun-Times, June 18, 1965, pp. 1, 4.
!!._aily News, July 13, 1965, p. 5 (Quotes).
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boiled down to two men, it was Whiston who made the final choice.
The fact that this choice was accepted by a vote of ten to one,
only Mrs. Green dissenting, indicates the general willingness to
accept the new administrator on the basis of his qualifications.65
James F. Redmond, fifty years old in 1966, had an almost
ideal background to bring to his new challenge.

He came to Chicago

in 1948 with his master's degree and doctorate in education from
Columbia University.

He had served under Harold Hunt as Assistant

Sµperintendent and then Director of Purchasing, leaving the system
in 1953 when Dr. Hunt left.

He served as Superintendent of Schools
(

in New Orleans from 1953 until 1961.

There he made the acquaint-

ance of Bishop Cody, who later came to Chicago as archbishop of
the Catholic diocese.

Both had been in key positions when the

Federal Court ordered the desegregation of New Orleans.

Redmond

had at least some familiarity with the current Chicago School
System as he had served as a consultant with Boaz, Allen and
Hamilton, a management firm-which had studied Chicago schools.

At

the time he was considered for the Chicago Superintendency, he was
65 chicago. Daily News, January 5, ·1966, p. 19; March 22, 1966,
p. 5. Chicago Sun-Times, May 11, 1966, pp. 3, 26; May 26, 1966,
pp. 3, 38.
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chief administrator of the Syosset, New York schools. 66
The position which Redmond was to fill was wrought with
pitfalls.

He no longer needed to fear the obvious corruption of

past Boards, but the mayor's influence was still real, if more
benign.

Indeed, in its final composition the Board may be said

to have reflected the wishes of the mayor--and the mayor obviously
did not actively favor integration.
The city already divided over the issues of segregation, and
organizations had formed ready to take action at the signs of any
issue.

The superintendent's position would depend upon his abilty
I

· to balance the various publics.

He could never allow one group

to become so alienated that its protests would seriously disturb
the equilibrium upon which the city's political structure and
his effectiveness depended.
The composition of the Board abstractly represented factions
within the city.

It is natural for any political body to hesitate

to make controversial decisions.

During Willis' tenure the Board

had never taken a clear stand, other than verbal, on integration.
The guidelines for Board and Superintendent recognized that the
W~Y$.

and. means of communicating with and serving the public were

66 Chicago Daily News, May 10, 1966, pp. l; May 12, 1966,
p. 3. Chicago Sun-Times, _May 11, 1966, pp. 1, 3, 26.
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the functions of the Board, but the superintendent was responsible
for information gathering.

While it would be the function of the

Board to set policy, if Redmond did not defend the functions of
of his staff, he would leave the way open for the destruction of
the mechanism built up by the prior two superintendents.

Redmond

was well aware that much would depend upon his personality and
temperament in advising the Board.

As he stated at the first

Board of Education meeting he attended, "Please don't forget that
you have a superintendent and staff who are your advisers. 1167

I

67 chicago Daily News, May 11, 1966, pp. 1, 10, 13.
Sun-Times, October 14, 1966, p. 21 (Quote).

Chicago

CHAPTER III
INTELLIGENCE AND RECOMMENDATION FUNCTIONS:
THE CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION:
PRESSURES AND RESPONSES
The famous Brown v Board of Education decision of the United
States Supreme Court in 1954 had established the principle that
segregated schools were "inherently unequal," but by the early
'
1960's the ramifications of this decision were still not clear.
While de jure segregation was undoubtedly unconstitutional, there
were many questions regarding the

~xtent

of responsibility of

school boards to correct de facto segregation in the schools.
Obviously, all children were entitled to "quality education."

It

was not, however, clear to what extent desegregation would im1.)rove
learning experiences or promote racial harmony and empathy.

if

some children were not achieving levels of performance as expected
by academic norms, what guidelines could be established to help
compensate for these deficiencies? 1
Early critics of Chicago Board of Education policies tended
1John E. Coons, "Chicago," Civil Rights U.S.A.: Public
Schools Cities in the North and West, 1962, A Report to the United
States Commission on Civil Rights (Washington, D.C.: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 189.
65

66

to concentrate on physical characteristics of the school system.
They argued that the Board and its Superintendent had fostered
segregation in decisions regarding school district boundaries,
construction sites and the use of mobiles to relieve overcrowding."
They criticized the aspect of the neighborhood school policy which
forbade students to transfer to schools beyond their neighborhood
school boundaries when their own schools were overcrowded.

They

questioned the policy which allowed teachers in these overcrowded
schools to transfer with the result that large numbers of inexperienced teachers were to be found in inner-city schools.

They

(

pointed to inequities in per-pupil expenditures between segregated
white and Negro schools.

When, in their opinion, suggestions for

change went unheeded, they resorted to forms of picketing and
boycotting and also sought remedy in the courts.2
In defense against these charges it was argued that many of
these policies were

inh~rited

from past practice, and that the

school Board had little power to alter factors in the community
which fostered segregation and tended to concentrate large numbers
of Negro children into confined areas ..

Furthermore, Illinois law

was interpreted to forbid the taking of

ra~ial

2Ibid.

counts on which
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decisions could be made regarding desegregation.

Inherent in the

Board's policy, although often unspoken, was the fear that an
active desegregation policy would drive white pupils from the
schools and white residents from the city. 3
Groups demanding changes regarding the Board's policies on
desegregation did not become adamant until the 1960's.

While

Edwin C. Berry of the Chicago Urban League was active in criticizing Chicago as the most segregated large city in the United
States during the 19SO's, emphasis in his organization had been
upon open housing and better job opportunities. 4

In reports to

(

the United States Commission on Civil Rights in 1962 vigorous
protests against de facto segregation in the North were based on
a New York Federal district court decision of January, 1961.

In

this case the Board of Education of New Rochelle was found to have
denied Negroes equal protection under the .law as granted under the
Fourteenth Amendment by maintaining policies which ih effect
3 Ibid.

4

Chicago Daily Defender, September 10, 1957, p. 11. Arvarh
E. Strickland, History of the Chicago Urban League (Urbana,
Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1966), pp. 216-18, 232.
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created and maintained racial segregation in one of its schools.5
In September, 196i, Negro parents in Chicago filed suit
against the Board of Education seeking injunctions under the
Fourteenth Amendment to prevent the school system from compelling
their children to attend segregated schools.

The complaint

charged that the Chicago Board deliberately fostered segregation
by use·of the neighborhood school policy, gerrymandering attendance
districts, selecting school sites, and refusing to utilize empty
space in white schools.

The plaintiffs alleged that their children

were enrolled in overcrowded and inferior schools as a result of
(

these Board policies.6
Litigation regarding these charges dragged on into 1963 when
the Board agreed t:) an out-of-court settlement which initiated a
panel to analyze and study the school system in particular
regard to schools attended entirEly or predominantly by Negroes,
define any problems that result therefrom, and formulate and
report to this Board as soon as may be conveniently possible
a plan by which any educational, psychological, and emotional
5united States Commission on Civil Rights, Staff Reports of
Commission, Civil Rights U.S.A.: Public Schools Cities in the
North and West, 1962 (Washington D.C.: Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Governme11t Printing Office, 1962), p. 1. Citing Taylor v
Board of Education of New Rochelle, 191F Supp. 181 (S.D.N.~. 1961),
6 Race Rel. L. Rep 90 (1961).
6webb v Board of Education of the City of Chicago, Civ. No.
61Cl569 D.C., N.D. Ill. (1961).
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problems or inequities in the school system that prevail may
best be eliminated.7
This panel, headed by University of Chicago sociologist Philip
Hauser, would receive a lukewarm reception to its report in March,
1964, as will be discerned later in this chapter.
Protests in Chicago during 1961 tended to concentrate on
empty classrooms which were found in predominantly white schools.
The growing Negro population of Chicago, contained within two
corridors in the south and west sides of the city, placed a great
strain on school facilities in black neighborhoods.
this problem a great deal of the

ne~

To alleviate

school construction in the

city was located in Negro neighborhoods.

Despite this building

program, Negro schools averaged about forty pupils per class, and
almost all the schools in black neighborhoods were on split stifts.8
Critics of Board policy argued that new construction was concentrated in Negro areas in order to contain black students within
a ghetto.

Advocates of integration pointed out that it also would

7Advisory Panel on Integration of the Public Schools, Report
to the Board of Education, City of Chicago, March 31, 1964, Inte.B_!:'ation of the Public Schools--Chicagoy Philip M. Hauser, chairman
(Chicago: Board of Education, 1964), pp. v, vii (Quote), 2, 7-9.
Hereinafter referred to as Hauser Report.
8coons, "Chicago," pp. 189-90, 223, 230, 235-36.
!eport, pp. 6, 15.
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less expensive to allow Negro parents to enroll their children
segregated white schools with empty seats.

A major obstacle to

utilizing empty seats lay in the fact that the school administration
no longer reported empty classrooms.
ordered a study on vacant classrooms.

In September, 1961, the Board
A series of reports given

by Dr. Willis in October avoided any listings of vacant classrooms.
A November report was confused by the introduction of plans to
utilize elementary school classrooms for high school branches and
a recommendation to redistrict eighty elementary attendance a.re.as
to balance class loads.9
(

In December the Chicago Urban League challenged the classroom
figures reported and claimed that Dr. Willis had not counted 382
empty rooms.

The existence of empty classrooms and the refusal

of the school system to allow Negro students in overcrowded schools
to utilize empty seats, if they existed, could be taken as evidence
that Board policy did operate to segregate Negroes from whites.
Proof of the existence of the empty classrooms became muddled in
an array of statistics and new programs.

High school branches

9 Board of Education, City of Chicago, Proceedings, Board of
Education, City of Chicago, (Chicago: Board of Education, September
13, 1961), pp. 403-04; (October 11, 1961), pp. 551-58; (October 24,
1961), pp. 602-05; (November 8, 1961), pp. 690-99. Hereinafter
referred to as Proceedings, date of meeting, page number.

71
were established in numerous elementary schools.
about 2000 desks which might have remained empty.

This utilized
The superinten-

dent announced plans to end double shifts and relieve overcrowding
by continuing new construction and utilizing mobile classrooms at

schools which lacked facilities for reducing classroom sizes
without double shifts.lo
The introduction of these plans was met with rising resistance from the Negro community.

The Chicago Urban League, the

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the
Congress of Racial Equality joined to call for a halt to any con-

'

'struction until facilities already existi1;1g were "accounted for
and properly utilized. 1111

The Board's building program was chal-

lenged by litigation in January, 1962, with the initiation of
Burroughs v Board of Education.

In September, 1961, the McDade

School had been opened to relieve overcrowding at the Burnside
School, which was located in the South Side of the city.

An

addition ·to the nearby Gillespie School was also completed later
that fall.

Students from areas of the Burnside School district

were transferred to the other two schools, but all three schools
10 Proceedings, November 22, 1961, pp. 779-94, passim; December 23, 1961, pp. 886-87.
11Chicago's American, December 20, 1961, p. 3.
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remained overcrowded.

Negro parents of children at the Burnside

School demonstrated within the building against the boundary
decision and sought an injunction against maintaining the nearby
perry School as an almost all-white facility.

The Burrough suit

charged that deliberate segregation was evident in the Board
decision to assign Negro students to overcrowded schools while it
maintained special classes for the handicapped to fill rooms in
the Perry School.

It is to be noted that the suit also charged

that the Board discriminated against Negro children by forcing
them to travel a greater distance than would be necessary.
I

The

suit further questioned the adequacy of lunchroom facilities. 12
In 1963 the Illinois legislature passed the Armstrong Amendment which stated, "In erecting, purchasing or otherwise acquiring
buildings for school purposes, the board shall not do so in such
a manner as to promote segregation and separation of children in
public schools because of color, race or nationality. 13

In 1965

the Coordinating Council of Community Organizations (CCCO)', an

integrated civil rights group on Chicago's South Side, complained
12

Burroughs v Board of Education of the City of Chicago, Civ.
No. 62C206, D.C.N.D. Ill. (1962). Coons, "Chicago," pp. 212-15.
1

~Illinois,

The School Code of Illinois (1965), sec. 34-22.
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to the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare

that the Chicago Board had actively lobbied against legislation
which would require school boards to redistrict periodically to
.
14
reduce segregation.
Members of the civil rights groups were not the only critics
of Board policy who observed that its decisions may have been
deliberately segregative.

The Hauser Report, published in 1964,

observed that of the seventy schools built since 1955 only six were
desegregated in 1963.15

The 196 7 Civil Rights Report observed that

the Board apparently did not heed the mandate of the Armstrong Act.
(

It cited the opening of the Paderewski School on the West Side of
Chicago as an example of gerrymandering of school attendance areas.
When the Paderewski School was opened, the nearby Burns School
sent almost all of its Negro students to the new school.

The

result was that the Burns School, which was about 60 percent Negro
in 1963 was 98 percent white in 1964.

The Paderewski School

opened with a 98 percent black student body.

Furthermore, while

1411 The Chicago Title VI Complaint to H.E.W.: The July 27,
1965, Document," in Integrated Education: A Reader, ed. by Meyer
Weinberg (Beverly Hills, California: The Glencoe Press, 1968),
p. 103. Hereinafter referred to as July 27, 1965 HEW Complaint.
R.!"oceedings, March 25, 1959, p. 1646.

15Hauser Report, p. 62.
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the class sizes in both schools increased, the average size at the

paderewski was 3.6 students greater than at the Burns.16
The Hauser Report had cited a common practice which led to
segregation in some schools when it noted:
The principal reason why segregated residential areas are
usually served by segregated schools is that major natural
boundaries, such as main streets or elevated railroads, become
school attendance boundaries for reasons of safety, as well
as-being likely residential racial barriers.17
However, the Civil Rights Commission Report noted that:
The railroad tracks, which are the common boundary between
Burns and Paderewski, are not impassable to elementary
children. Children crossed these track before 1964 to attend
Burns and crossed them in 1965-66 in other attendance areas
on the West Side. There are numerous underpasses in the area.18
Community pressures and the Board's desire to stabilize
neighborhoods by offering concessions to white residents played
an overt role in Board decisions.

While the Board may have found

it convenient to concede to pressures to utilize building programs
to separate the races in the 19SO's, this was certainly not the
case during the 1960's.

The CCCO complaint in 1965 listed over

16 u.s. Commission on Civil Rights, Racial Isolation in the
!_ublic Schooh:, Vol I (Washington, D.C.: Superintendent of Public
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 47.:.49_
Hereinafter referred to as Civil Rights Report, 1967.
17 Hauser Report., p. 63.
l8civil Rights Report, 1967, p. 48.
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twenty cases in which, it was argued, Board decisions or lack of
decisions had led to unnecessary segregation. 1 9
This growing demand of the Negro community to participate in
decisions regarding school construct.ion often resulted in long
delays in building.

One pf these delays has been seen to have had

a direct effect on the busing plan of 1968.

As Negroes moved into

the Austin community, the administration planned to build a new
facility for 1500 children in grades six through eight to relieve
overcrowding in the May, Spencer, and Emmet Schools.

In reflecting

on the difficulty of achieving community consensus regarding
(

location, one administrator stated:
Had we had that building ready at the time when the adjustment
and change were very clearly discerned . . . we would not have
had to go to this kind of means [busing] . . . . we could not
get the ~ommunity to agree, first of all, on where the new
school should be placed, and secondly, on the type of school
that should be placed there. Five years we belabored that
[1966-1971], five years, meeting after meeting after meeting,
rehashing the same things. Nobody breaking down until finally,
one day at a meeting down here at the Board Room, the Negro
element in this community said they were sick and tired of
fighting with the whites over where this school should be.
Whites insisting it should be south of Lake Street [Negro
community]. The blacks insisting it should be north of Lake
Street . . . . This is the thing; we have to work with people.
They all have feelings--pronounced feelings. There were very
few people who were in between on this thing. They're either
out there in left field or right out there along the right
19July 4, 1965 HEW Complaint, pp. 88-103.
cases involved new building.

Not all the
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field foul line . . . and to get them to come together and
reach down the middle was an enormous task . . . but it's at
least five years too late.20
It is difficult to speculate on what effect the new school
would have had if it had been built in 1967.

Often, these facil- ·

ities were overcrowded on the first day they were opened.

Fur-

thermore, building plans originally designed under Superintendent
Willis were under attack in 1967 as "needing to reflect the Board
of Education philosophy rather than that of a few Redmond assistants."

The biracial Citizens School Committee complained that

building plans would result in segregation that could be avoided. 21
(

Pressures for action which would reflect new integration policies
under Dr. Redmond were evident, and a continuation of the old
building program was certain to have met with much resistance.
The use of mobile classrooms was a less expensive approach
to relieving temporary overcrowding.

In March, 1962, twenty-six

of these air conditioned, thirty seat mobiles were introduced into
overcrowded Negro districts.
almost immediately.

A boycott against them was begun

Complaints were directed at their location

2 °Francis McKeag, Assistant Superintendent, Chicago Public
Schools, private taped interview held in his office, Chicago,
Illinois, August 30, 1971. Proceedings, June 28, 1967, p. 3339.
21chicago Daily News, April 17, 1967, p. 9.
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on a busy street, lack of playground facilities, the inadequate
notice given parents, and the fact that children had to walk past
a new school on the way to the mobiles.

The Woodlawn Organization,

a militant Saul Alinsky confederation of South Side residents, led
the protests against the "Willis Wagons. 11 22
Underlying the objections was the conviction expressed in a
National Association of Colored People complaint that the mobiles
were being used to avoid sending blacks into underutilized white
schools.

Prior to the installation of the units the Chicago Urban

League had requested the Board not to use the trailers until empty
I

classrooms were filled.

Board member Raymand Pasnick stated that

the use of mobiles was a segregationist policy.

The Negro commu-

nity organized "truch squads" to enter schools and photograph
empty classrooms.

Sit-in and walk-in demonstrations resulted in

arrests which served to strengthen Negro militancy.23
2 2cpons, "Chicago," pp. 196-97.
Chicago Urban League, pp. 239-40.
23

Strickland, History of

coons, "Chicago," p. 197. Strickland, History of Chicago
Urban League, p. 240. These objections to these mobiles was not
directed toward their interior facilities which were often, superior to those in the main school building. Some complaints were
directed at the lack of security for staff members who were more
subject to attack from intruders off the street, but in many
neighborhoods the structures were not found to be objectionable.
In a modified form they were still in use in the early 1970's.
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Board policy regarding the empty classrooms and mobiles did
not change in the following years.

In late 1964 eighty-five

mobiles were ordered purchased at a cost of $806,990.

Board member

warren Bacon voted against the purchase complaining that the administration should investigate the use of empty classrooms which were
estimated to number over 700 in the system.

Board member Cyrus

Adams III argued that over a period of years the mobiles would
cost less than transporting pupils from crowded schools to the
vacant rooms.

He pointed out that mobiles would be used to

stabilize desegregating neighborhoods. 24
(

In 1966 the Board purchased 463 mobiles at a cost of
$4,630,000 while the Chicago Daily Defender claimed there were
453 vacant classrooms.

Superintendent Willis rejected busing

pupils to underutilized schools as simply a means of moving students just for the sake of moving people. 2 5
imbroglio was never resolved under Willis.

The empty classroom
When he left, it

remained one of the major problems facing James Redmond.

The use

of mobiles to stabilize desegregating neighborhoods was not generally successful.

Mrs. Wild would later reminisce that the Board

24chicago Daily News, November 19, 1964.
November 20, 1964.

Chicago Sun-Times,

25 Chicago Daily Defender, March _16, 1966, p. 3.
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had provided mobile classrooms and other demands to white parents
who were threatening to leave the area around O'Keeffe School in
south Shore.

She observed that the parents moved anyway and

o 'Keeffe became a black segregated school. 26
The establishing of boundary lines between schools in
racially changing areas came under attack by civil rights groups
in the early 1960's.

Until 1948 evidence indicated that "neutral

zones" had been used to allow white students to choose between
attending an integrated school in their own area or transferring
to a neighboring all white school.

In 1948 Superintendent Hunt
(

ended this practice in all but eighteen areas.
ended the practice almost entirely.

In 1962 the Board

However, complaints still

remained that the administration was not redrafting attendance
districts in fringe areas in order to create desegregated schools
and relieve. overcrowding. 27
In the spring of 1964 Willis suggested a boundary change
between Marshall and Austin High Schools in order to alleviate
overcrowding in the predominantly Negro Marshall High School.
Within a year disturbances with racial overtones were reported
26chicago Sun-Times, July 14, 1968, p. 11.
27strickland, History of Chicago Urban League, P. 236.
"Chicago," pp. 194-196, 231.

Coons,

r
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at Austin High School.

Some groups contended that the boundary

decision would lead to an exodus of white pupils in the Austin
area.

Willis felt that the problem had changed from a school to

a community problem.

Civil rights leader, Al Raby, argued that

the flight of whites was caused by gerrymandering of school boundaries and not by the presence of Negro students.

He contended that

Austin-High School was being held to a 14 percent Negro quota by
28
.
Boar d gerryman d ering.
In a complaint to federal authorities Raby's civil rights
group listed numerous cases of gerrymandering in an attack upon
I'

·the Board's neighborhood school policy.

One example dealt with

the Altgeld Gardens, an all-Negro public housing project built
during World War II.

New schools were built to serve the project

children, and the nearby all-white Riverdale School district was
gerrymandered.to exclude black students while Riverdale graduates
were allowed to choose to attend the all-white Fenger High School.
A plan to· end the gerrymander was suggested in July, 1964, but was
deferred, and a new proposal was adopted in October, 1964, which
allowed Riverdale graduates to continue attending Fenger.29
chicago Daily News, May 26, 1964, p. 3. Chicago Sun-Ti~es,
December 8, 1965, pp. 1, 48 (Quotes); December 9, 1965, pp. 1, ~-8.
28

29 July 27, 1965 HEW Complaint, pp. 93-103, esp. pp. 93-96.
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Thus, white students were traveling about three miles to an
all-white high school while living about five blocks from a predominantly black high school.

Class sizes in the Riverdale School

were considerably smaller, 16.8 students per room as compared to
over 32 per room, than in neighboring schools serving black children.
But very few observers would have contended that boundary adjustments could be used to integrate'many of Chicago's public schools.
T.he Hauser Report observed that because of the highly defined

boundaries in the housing patterns of the city, even extreme
manipulations of school district boundaries could not achieve
integration of the city schools. 30

I

Any plan for total integration

would require the movement of large numbers of students over
considerable distances.
Late in 1961, apparently in response to complaints about
empty classrooms in white schools, Willis introduced a plan to
create high school branches in various elementary schools to accept
about 2000 students.

The Chicago Urban League protested that these

branches were being established to insure that schools would remain
segregated.

John E. Coons, professor of law at Northwestern

University, in a report to the United States Commission on Civil
30
rbid., citing Proceedings, October 27, 1964.
- p. 62. - -

Hauser Report,
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Rights in 1962, concluded that the Willis plans, "suggested uses
which either would fill up space primarily with white students or
leave the space unused. 11 3 1
There appears to be some room to suspect the purpose of the
plan.

Two branches were created for Schurz High School on the

northwest side.

At the time, the administration of the school had

not found it necessary to go into an extended day to relieve overcrowding in the main building.

The two branches, Beaubien and

Irving Park Schools, were within two blocks of the Northwest
(Kennedy) Expressway.

Four branches were created for the Steinmetz
(

High School which then went on a nine period day program while most
high schools were functioning on schedules of ten periods or more. 32
If students

~ere

to be transferred from overcrowded schools

into empty classrooms the branches would have to be closed.
not until Willis retired that this action was taken.

It was

In the fall

31Proceedings, November 8, 1961, pp. 690-91. Coons,
"Chicago," pp. 199-200 (Quote). Strickland, History of Chicago
Urban League, p. 235.
32 schurz and Steinmetz High Schools, Chicago, Illinois, private interviews with selected teachers and assistant principals,
May, 1973. Havighurst pointed out that a ten period day was so
common in Chicago High Schools that it was considered normal.
Schedules ran as high as fourteen periods. Robert J. Havighurst,
The Public Schools of Chicago: A Survey for the Board of Education
S!._f the City of Chicago. (Chicago: Board of Education,- 1964), pp.
237-38. Hereinafter referred to as Havighurst Survey.
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of 1966, Adams, one of the swing voters on the Board suggested
that high school branches in elementary buildings should be abandoned.

Complaints had been raised qgainst the high school permis-

sive transfer program on the grounds that high schools with branches
should not be receiving

~chools.

In the spring of 1967, Redmond,

in office only one-half a year, first suggested the closing of six
branches, only one of which would later become a receiving school
, in the busing program.

By the end of April the Board had approved

the closing of all the branches of Steinmetz High School for the
following September.

33

While the busing plan was not yet developed,
I

classrooms were being made available for a future transfer of
students in a plan for the northwest community.
ln the South Shore area the situation was more complex.

The

community was integrating, and the Board was enmeshed in plans to
stabilize the schools.

The South East Community Organization was

requesting that branches of South Shore High School be created at
O'Keeffe, Bryn Mawr and Bradwell Elementary Schools.

The high

school had a Negro enrollment over forty percent, and it was projected that the ratio of white and black students in the main
33 Chicago Daily News, October 18, 1966, pp. 1, 7, 37; October
20, 1966, p. 25. Proceedings, March 22, 1967, p. 2673; April 12,
1967, p. 2737, 2744-45; April 26, 1967, p. 2838-40.
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building would be approximately maintained in 1967 by establishing
the branches to serve the ninth grade.

As the report read, "The

maintaining of the 10, 11 and 12 grade students only in the main
building will improve the educational climate."

When South Shore

High School opened in September, 1967, it was served by the Black,
Bradwell, and O'Keeffe branches, but the Negro enrollment in the
main building was over fifty percent.

In September, 1968, when

· all the branches were closed, almost three-fourths of the students
were Negroes. 34

Stabilization in Southeast Chicago appeared to be

an insurmountable problem.

In face of the proximity of the Negro
(

belt, white people had apparently chosen to run.
In March, 1964, the Panel on Integration of the Public
Schools submitted its report to the Board.

The premises of the

study may serve as a reminder of the philosophy which demanded integration as a part of quality education.
1.
2.

The report stated:

Racially segregated education, regardless of its causes,
is incompatible with the ideals of a free society and its
commitment to equal educational opportunity for all.
The quality of education for any child in a racially pluralistic community is improved when teaching and learning

34 Proceedings, June 28, 1967, p. 3338 (Quote). Chicago Public
Schools, Teacher Observation Headcount, (hand tabulated Xeroxed
copies, Chicago, 1966, 1967, 1968, District Twenty-two). Hereinafter referred to as Headcounts. The Black branch had formerly
been an annex of the Bryn_Mawr School.
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3.
4.

are conducted in racially integrated schools.
There is no necessary conflict between the improvement of
teaching and learning and racial integration in schools.
Neither potential administrative difficulties nor limitations
of existing educational policy is a morally, socially or
professionally defensible reason for failure to pursue the
aims of quality education and racial integration simultaneously and with vigor, using all resources and methods
presently available or which reasonably can be devised
for their attainment.35
In a demographic study the Hauser Report noted the historical

segregation of Negroes in Chicago, the impetus in black immigration,
and the exodus of the white middle class from the city.

Drawing

parallels between white ethnic enclaves of immigrants and the prejudice against newly arrived

groups~

the study observed that the

Negro had been unable to assimilate due in particular to his visibility.

The schools alone could not overcome the forces of segre-

gation.

It would "require the active participation of religious

institutions, business and labor organizations, civic and community
groups, and social and fraternal societies as well as of all agencies of governme.nt."

Finally, its readers were warned that,

"unless the exodus of white population from the public schools and
from the city is brought to a halt or reversed, the question of
school integration may become simply a theoretical matter. 11 36
The Hauser Report found few differences .in the costs per
35Hauser Report, p-. 2 7.

36rbid., pp. 4-7, 12 (Quotes).
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pupil for supplies and facilities offered students in white, integrated, or Negro schools.

The major discrepancies between white

and nonwhite schools were found to be in the overcrowded schools
with less experienced teachers which Negroes attended.37

The iden-

tification of quality education with expenditures per pupil,
library resources, textbooks, and supplies was the result of a
Chicago Urban League study presented to the Board in December, 1961,
which had concluded that discrimination against Negroes existed not
only in lower salaries reflecting less experienced teachers in
Negro schools but also in lower costs for other operating expendI

itures.

However, the lower operating costs per pupil in crowded

Negro schools was apparently a reflection of the spreading of
fixed operating costs over a larger number of students.38
To reduce overcrowding the Hauser Report suggested that mobile
classrooms be continued, but not "as a means for effecting or
perpetuating segregation."

A plan was suggested which would permit

"any child to transfer to an underutilized school of his choice,
provided that each transferee assume the cost of his own transportat ion."

A crucial recommendation sugg-es ted that "free transpor-

tation should be provided to convey students from overcrowded to
3 7Ibid., pp. 69-78.

38

Coons, "Chicago," pp. 216-17, 224-25.
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under-utilized schools when the distances are in excess of one

mi·te · 1139
The Report located areas on a map indicating vacant seats and
excess pupils.

The coincidence of crowded schools with segregated

Negro schools was manifest.

The map also clearly indicated the

proximity of areas with an excess of students to areas with an
39ttauser Report, p. 30. All of the thirteen recommendations
made in the Report are not pertinent to this study. For the
. reader's convenience they are summarized here. Hauser Report,
pp. 27-38.
1. Create open enrollment patterns in which two or more schools
are clustered to accept students from larger attendance
areas.
/
2. Use of transfer plans, free transportation and mobiles to
relieve overcrowding.
3. Location of schools and school boundaries to foster
integration.
4. Integrate faculties.
5. Assign teachers to create a fair distribution of experience
and credentials.
6. Encourage teacher schools to develop more effective
programs for teaching in schools with problems.
7. Create an in-service program emphasizing minority histories,
teaching children of different cultural heritages, and
emphasizing human relations practices.
8. Allocate greater learning resources to schools with special
problems.
9. Intensify educational programs in basic skills in schools
with a high student turnover.
10. Increase guidance and counseling services.
11. Develop pilot programs of educational saturation in one or
more districts serving children with educational problems.
12. Seek additional revenues from city, state, and federal
governments.
13. Develop effective school-community relationships.
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excess of seats.

An illustrative case was cited in which two

schools were found, "only two miles apart, one of which was

L~7

percent over capacity, while the other was 40 percent vacant."
While it was recommended that boundary lines be redrawn, it was
concluded that even "if the most extreme procedures of redistricting school attendance areas to increase integration were to
be used, there would still be all-Negro and all-white schools in
the city. 1140
The analysis noted that, under the neighborhood school policy,
integrated schools were found only in integrated or racially
I.

changing neighborhoods.

Where rigid boundaries divided areas of

Negro and white residences, the schools serving these students Nere
usually segregated.

Hauser suggested that the basic values of the

traditional neighborhood school policy could be retained by modifying the enrollment boundaries of clusters of schools.

It wa.s

proposed that the attendance areas of two or more elementary and
three or more high schools serving contiguous areas be combined
to allow pupils within the greater district to attend a. school of
their choice.

Integration, education.al-advantage to the child, and

proximity of residence were to be the criteria for admission to an
40

Hauser Report, pp. 30, 56-60, 62-63.
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over-enrolled school.

Vocational and special high schools were to

be opened to city-wide enrollment.41
The Report emphasized the necessity for preparing a neighborhood for integration.

Top leadership in Chicago was advised to

"actively exert its influence and authority to elicit the co-operation of local community groups."

It was cautioned that inte-

gration "cannot be achieved solely through pressu!."e tactics or
through brute force and compulsion."

Leaders of both the civil

rights movement and white citizens groups were chided for tq.king
extreme positions which abetted confusion and suspicion.

The Board

(

'was warned that the "extremists on either side of the desegregation
issue must not be permitted to determine policy."

On the other

hand it was morally and legally imperative that the Board make a
firm commitment to the policy of integration. 42
A lack of communication within the school system and with
the community was seen as one cause for difficulties in school
integration.

It was suggested that school officials adopt an open

door policy with the public.

The Board was advised to regularly

publish statistical data regarding pupil achievement and enrollment,
4libid., pp. 27-30, 62.
. . - 43 .

42Ibid., pp. 40 (First quote), 41, 42, (Second, third quote),
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faculty distribution, use of facilities, and action taken or contemplated by the Board regarding the Report recommendations.

The

absence of any single administrator within the system was noted
whose function was to coordinate and communicate policy with
respect to integration.

The resolution of this problem was left

to the Board, but two committees were suggested.43
A biracial "Friends of the Chicago Schools" committee consisting of community leaders was recommended to work with the Board
and Superintendent on integration problems.

This committee would

also serve to gain public support for integration programs and, in
(

particular, work with religious leaders to help pave the way for
school integration.

A Schools Committee on Integration was sug-

gested to be comprised of representatives from all staff levels.
The purpose of this committee would have been to develop programs
to implement the Report recommendations.44
The necessity of federal and state financial aid to implement
programs -of quality education was noted.

The Report recommended

a pilot educational saturation program in one or more administrative
districts where high student turnover and low achievement were rife.
Pre-school programs, extended days, enriched learning resources,
43rbid., PP· 36-38.

44 Ibid., p. 38.
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school aides, expanded counseling services, and varied instructional techniques were some of the recommended innovations.

The

high cost of this program was recognized, but it was stated that
the cost of unemployment, welfare, crime, and high morbidity
would undoubtedly "far exceed the required expenditures for the
program recommended by the Panel. 11 45
In initiating the Hauser Report to effect an out-of-court
settlement in the Webb Case, the Board had promised on receipt of
the Panel's study to "promptly take such action as it may determine
is appropriate or required to work toward a resolution of any
I

problems involved and any inequities found to exist."

The reaction

of Board members after the presentation of the Report was as ambiguous as their promise.
funds were lacking.

Adams observed that while goals were stated,

Murray asserted that the Panel "didn't

entirely abandon the neighborhood school policy.
up a little but it's still there."

They chopped it

Scheffler declared, "You can't

have integration without white students."

Mrs. Green considered

the Report "one of the great documents of our time," while Bacon
noted that the recommendations were not particularly new but were
45rbid., pp. 33-35, 36 (Quote), 41.

92
''pulled together and given a sense of urgency. u46
Reactions in the communities were much more pronounced.
president of the Wrightwood

Improve~ent

The

Association, on Chicago's

southwest side promised to fight any breaches in the neighborhood
school policy and

threat~ned

to bring court action against any

Board programs which deviated from the policy.

Al Raby of the

Co-ordinating Council of Community Organizations led a demonstration
at an elementary school to force implementation of the Hauser
Report.

Mail for and against the Report poured into the Board.

During the summer of 1964 an advertisement appeared in the four
(

leading Chicago papers in which 140 business, church, and civic
leaders urged the Board to begin implementing the recommendations.
A few weeks later a Chicago Daily News editorial, discussing a
disorder at Bogan High School on the city's southwest side when
Hauser appeared to explain the Report, concluded, "if leaders were
to wait for complete community acceptance before acting, nothing
would ever get done except by violence. 11 47
46

rbid., p. 2 (Quote). Proceedings, March 31, 1964, pp.
2119; April 23, 1964, p. 2215; June 10, 1964, pp. 2449-55. Chicago
Sun-Times, April 1, 1964, p. 28 (Second through fifth quotes).
47chicago Sun-Times, April 1, 1964, p. 22; April 4, 1964,
pp. 2, 30; August 12, 1964, pp. 1, 30. Editorial, Chicago Daily
~'August 28, 1964 (Quote).
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Board action seemed limited to commissioning further studies.
A part of the thirteenth recommendation, calling for the establishment of the Friends of the Chicago Schools Committee_, was the
only suggestion immediately implemented.

The first three recom-

mendations, dealing with methods of student integration, were
assigned to a Board committee.

Recommendations four through eleven,

dealing with teacher integration and teaching programs and services,
were assigned to the superintendent and his staff for response.
The staff report, made in July, 1964, was largely a defense of
previous school policies and a listing of various programs which
(

had already been initiated.

It cited an Illinois law which forbade

requiring information regarding color,

rac~

nationality, and

religious affiliation or assigning anyone on such a basis as an
obstacle to integrating faculties.

While it noted the use of

state and federal financial assistance in developing programs, the
response generally decried the lack of funds to implement
projects.48
48 Proceedings, April 8, 1964, pp. 2152-57. Response to
Recommendations 4 through 10 of the Report to the Board of Edu£ation, City of Chicago, by the Advisory Panel on Integration of
~Public Schools, A report prepared under the direction of
Benjamin C. Willis, General Superintendent of Schools (Chicago:
Board of Education, July 8, 1964). Above, chapter iii, footnote
39 for the general topics discussed by the Response.
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A year after the Hauser Report was accepted a Chicago Urban
League report observed that segregation in the schools was actually
increasing.

Al Raby, in a complaint to the Department of Health,

Education and Welfare, noted that the Friends of the Chicago Schools
committee was the only Hauser Report recommendation implemented
and four members of this connnittee had resigned in protest against
the misleading role of the group.

During the controversy regarding

the rehiring of Willis, Hauser had declared that his Report would
not be implemented during the superintendent's tenure but the
Board rehired Willis.49
I

Early in 1966 Board member Clement introduced a resolution
concerning the urgent necessity to give support to integrated
elementary schools.

He cited the Hauser Report, the Armstrong

Law, and the policy of stabilization in support of a compensatory
education policy.

His detailed plan was aimed at upgrading

physical facilities, teaching resources and programs while increasing the types and numbers of personnel administrators, and
community programs in integrated schools.

The resolution was

deferred three times in ·two months with no public discussion.

It

49 chicago Urban League, Research Report of the League, May
12, 1965, Public School Segregation: City of Chicago 1963-196L~ and
1964-1965 (Chicago: Urban League, 1965), p. 3. July 4, 1965
!!_.E.W. Complaint, p. 87.
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was finally voted down late in April.

Scheffler expressed the

opinion that the resolution was illegal as it would be "placing
integration before education."

Mrs. Wild considered it a "paper

plan [which] would get everyone stirred up when we know we don't
have enough money to

carr~

through."

In supporting the plan Mrs.

Malis noted "I don't know how anyone can vote against this motion
in good conscience.

Even those against integration would probably

welcome such an effort to help stabilize neighborhoods."

Bacon

conjectured, "I don't think this Board has yet demonstrated that
it wants to do what is stated in this motion.

You can find all

(

the spurious reasonable-sounding objections you want."so
A more comprehensive survey of the Chicago School System,
under the direction of Dr. Robert J. Havighurst, was presented in
November, 1964.

A study by an outside agency had been requested

in the spring of 1961 by the Chicago Parent-Teacher Association.
The Association had conducted its own survey seven years before
but complained that none of the problems it identified had been
corrected.

After the Citizen Schools Committee endorsed the

request, the Board authorized the study in November, 1961.

A

Board committee was appointed, but no action was taken during 1962.
50Proceedings, February 23, 1966, pp. 2777-79; March 23,
1966, p. 2793; April 13, 1966, p. 2915; April 28, 1966, p. 3004.
Chicago Sun-Times, April 29, 1966, pp. 3, 10 (Quotes).
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In 1963, Willis named Eldridge T. Mcswain, a dean of Northwestern
University, to direct a curriculum study which was an apparent
substitute for the comprehensive study.

Mcswain stated he saw no

need to appraise all aspects of the Chicago System.

Soon after,

Willis accepted a contract to conduct a survey of the Massachusett's
schools, and the Board faced renewed pressure from dozens of civic
organizations that a comprehensive study be made of the Chicago
School System. 51
In April, 1963, the Board Committee named Havighurst to
direct the Survey.

Willis threatened to resign, claiming he had
(

'not been adequately consulted concerning the choice of a director
or design of the study.

As a compromise, Willis was appointed to

the study team and a third member, Dr. Alonzo Grace, Dean of the
School of Education at the University of Illinois, was chosen by
Havighurst and Willis.
did little to aid in the

During the course of the survey, Willis
research~

The final report observes that,

while the original design was to use outside consultants and selfstudies by school staff groups, the actual procedure soon developed
51Havighurs t Survey, pp. 1-13. Proceedings, Novembe'r 22,
1961, p. 779. Chicago Daily News, June 28, 1961, p. 24; November
12, 1964, p. 9.
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into a survey independent of school staff studies. 52
The Survey characterized the Chicago Public School System
under Willis as adhering to a "four walls" philosophy of education.
In this school of thought educators were considered as

profes~

sionals committed to doing the best possible job of educating each
child.

In order to accomplish their complex task educators were

to make it clear that they were running the schools.

Schools were

to be kept out of local politics, and cooperation between schools
and other institutions was to be kept at a minimum.

The outside

connnunity was seen as a source of tension which could interfere
(

with the efficient operation of the school system.

While outside

agencies were to be utilized, the relationship between them and
the school was not to be allowed to overlap so that the educator's
authority and expertise would be compromised.

This philosqphy was

reported to be efficient and economical. 5 3
In contrast to the four walls philosophy a concept of an
"urban community" school was advocated by Havighurst.

In this

point of view the anxiety of urban parents was seen to be increased
by the rigid rules and aloof attitudes of school administrators.
52Havighurst Survey, pp. 3-8. Chicago Daily News, November
11, 1964, p. 4. Proceedings, June 12, 1963, p. 2299.
53Havighurst Survey, pp. 28-29.
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This difficulty would be alleviated only when educators became
involved in the affairs of the community and in a quest for
solutions to local problems.

The active participation of educators

in the social and urban renewal of the city was seen as a vital
role for the school system.

It was pointed out that school commu-

nities in Chicago could be kept integrated only if the Board of
Education developed policies suited to the particular needs of an
area rather than applying rules blindly to all situations.

The

schools were to be considered as a vital factor in the stabilization of a community. 54
(.

The Havighurst Survey emphasized the role of the school as
an agent of social change.

It surmised that ''if Negroes were not

present as a large minority there would still be an urgent need
for social urban renewal."

The major problem facing the nations

was seen as the necessity for "developing a pattern of social
relations and of cultural life which makes the city attractive"
and "a desirable place for all kinds of people, rich and poor,
white and Negro, to live a.nd raise their children."
process was not simply a physical

reha.~ilitation

This renewal

plan but depended

heavily upon the development of a sense of community among the
54Ibid., pp. 29-30, 370, 374.
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people of an area.

It required the cooperation of developers of

commercial centers, churches, schools, parks, and housing to help
people feel at home in a new environment. 55
The role of the schools in this process was to provide
quality programs at all levels in order to help stabilize neighborhoods in "retaining white fami_lies, or in retaining middle
class families."

The report noted that problems of pupil behavior

and low motivation were major causes for poor academic performance
in low-income areas.

It discovered "no deliberate attempt to give

pupils in low-income areas an inferior education.''

Indeed, it

(

found staffs in these areas often.worked hard at developing effective methods of teaching.

While ·the Survey called for continued

efforts to develop effective methods, it concluded that "Negro
children who go to de facto segregated schools are getting an
inferior education because of the fact of segregation. 56
These objectives left the school administration with its
continuing dilemma--how does the system bring about integration
and retain white families?

The Havighurst Survey stated, "Resi-

dential segregation is the basic problem. 1157

That this problem is

beyond the scope of the educational institutions was a position

55 rbid., p. 373.

56Ibid., p. 373-74.

57 Ibid., p. 374.
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which must have appealed to many school administrators.

But during

the early 1960's pressures existed at many levels which would not
brook such contentions, and the Chicago Board had already adopted
a resolution embracing the principles of integration.
The Havighurst Survey considered the limited success of open
attendance and permissive transfer plans in achieving desegregation.
While_Chicago policies regarding transfers had been severely
limited at the time of the study, it was observed that open attend_ance policies had not resulted in much integration in.cities which
had encouraged use of the method.

The long distances usually

required to travel from overcrowded to underutilized schools was
identified as one factor which limited the numbers of volunteers
for permissive transfer plans.

Furthermore, it was observed that

"the great majority of parents will send their children to the
nearest school, no matter how good or bad it is."

It was concluded

that everyday living pressures and the uncertainties concomitant
with sending their children to a distant school would keep most
parents from utilizing a transfer program.

These factors worked

especially to limit the transfer of children of the lowest
socioeconomic status, while children with ambitious parents were
seen as more likely to utilize transfer plans.SS
58rbid., pp. 374-76, 377(Quote).
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Thus it was argued that permissive transfer programs could
help avoid conflicts at a receiving school between children of
greatly varying socioeconomic levels, that might occur in a mandatory transfer program.

But, because of the lack of voluntary

transfers, it was pointed out that permissive transfer programs
based in a concept of relieving overcrowded schools would neither
achieve desegregation nor a balancing of class sizes.

Indeed, the

open attendance feature of the transfer program would permit white
children to leave a largely Negro school.

While the Havighurst

Survey saw this as a positive value in keeping white families in
.a changing neighborhood, the result in some schools would be a
resegregation of the student body. 59
The Havighurst Survey identified five necessary conditions
for successful integration.

First, compensatory education programs

requiring added expenditures in all
advocated.
the

comp~ex

~ower

socioeconomic areas were

Second, any plan for integration would have to respect
and diverse ethnic group feelings in the city.

A

pragmatic policy of integration was suggested in which the degree
of opposition to desegregation would be taken into consideration.

The Survey proposed that school desegregation policies would work
best in those areas where community organizations already existed

59rbid., pp. 377-78~
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to promote integration and stabilization.

Other areas were to be

chosen on the basis of the possibility of developing rational
discussion of the problems involved in stabilizing a community.
Some sections of the city would have to be written off for anything
except long range integration plans. 60
Third, Havighurst agreed with Hauser that the neighborhood
school policy be retained in principle but modified by the clustering of groups of schools into one attendance district.

Fourth,

it was suggested that the city could be broken into "local community areas" of about 250,000 residents which would contain segregated white and black areas within the larger integrated area.

It

was hoped that these large areas would develop "home rule 11
which would allow them to adopt long range plans and work for
their realization.

These home rule areas would thus be abie to

develop policies for their own unique problems without being seen
as a threat by other corrn:nunities within the city.

In order to

accomplish this task the Board of Education would have to set up
districts contiguous with the defined areas.

Strong connnunity

councils with power to call for local bond issues and special educational plans would be necessary.
60ibid., pp. 379-80.

The Board would be expected to
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cooperate not only with the community.councils but with other city
agencies to promote integration and urban development.

Fifth, the

Board would be obliged to consult with local community leadership
in choosing sites for new buildings and additions to existing
schools in order to alleviate crowded conditions which threatened
,
61
the success of school programs.·
Havighurst warned that school integration could take place
only as a part of an overall city plan.

The Board was to offer

a program which would guarantee that schools being desegregated be
kept 60 percent white.

Pupils being allowed to transfer into such

schools were not to be more than one year behind their age level
in reading.

Students were to retain their right to attend the

school in their home district.

The Board was to cooperate with

local community organizations in choosing the location of desegregated schools~ 2

A crux of the entire Havighurst scheme for

successful desegregation rested on the assumption that the intellectual community within an area would be able to exert a sufficient persuasive force to overcome the fears of the community at
large and that desegregation would be most successful when the
community participated.

61 Ibid., pp. 380-82.

6 2rbid., PP· 382-83.
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In order to implement integration policies the Havighurst
survey called for the creation of an assistant superintendent's
position directly responsible to the General Superintendent.

This

new administrator would have subordinates in each school district
and be a specialist in school-community relations.

It was further

suggested that the citizens committee created under the Hauser
Report expand its duties to include public hearings, define central
issues and make recommendations to the Board and the public. 6 3
The Havighurst Survey identified three areas "where conditions
appear to be ready for an active program of integrated education
as part of a plan for community redevelopment and social urban
renewal."

The Austin community was not experiencing any consid-

erable integration at the time of the survey and thus was not
studied.

The South Shore area, however, was designated as part

of a southeast Chicago area "nationally famous for its demonstration
of a stabilized integrated residential area in the Hyde-Park-Kenwood
community [near the University of Chicago]."

Numerous community

organizations were cited as examples of responsible grassroots
associations which could foster stabilization.

It was recommended

that Bowen, South Shore, and Hirsh High Schools be clustered in
63 Ibid., p. 384.

105
an open attendance area.

The Board.was asked to

guarante~

that

south Shore and Bowen High Schools not be allowed to become less
than 60 percent white.64
When the Havighurst Survey was considered by the Board
members in November, 1964, it met with a variety of evaluations.
Mrs. Malis saw "nothing new" in the Survey.

Bernard Friedman

considered it "a logical approach to touchy issues" which the Board
should begin implementing by early spring.

Mrs. Wild had "no

argument with any of it," but Edward Scheffler complained,

"He's

trying to do a lot of things in there that are impractical . . . .
The difficulty is his trying to take care of school matters from
a sociological point of view instead of a practical point of view."
·Warren Bacon questioned the thesis that only areas which were
receptive to integration should be considered for desegregation
moves.

He stated, "I believe that in those areas where there is

allegedly some hostility, there are many many people.who are not
as hostile as it appears."

But Bacon was pessimistic about the

probability of implementing the Survey suggestions when he commented, "Just as in the Hauser Report, it raises the question of
64rbid., pp. 385 (First quote), 386-87, 388 (Second quote),
388-90. Board action on these recommendations is considered in
chapter iv.
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whether the Board wi 11 fol low through .." 6 5
The cluster plan suggested by both the Hauser and Ha.vighurst
reports brought up the busing issue in 1964.

Cyrus Adams spoke

for many Board members when he stated his position regarding
integration.

He pointed out that white children would not be

forced to attend schools in areas far from their homes, nor would
Negro children be sent around to "overwhelm white schools."
Children attending neighborhood schools would not be forced out
to make room for transfer students from more distant schools.
Children who were educational or disciplinary problems would not
be allowed to utilize the transfer program, nor would the quality
of teaching and the educational environment in any school be
lowered by reasons of transfers into it.

Finally, no money would

be spent for transporting children for the sole purpose of desegregation, and under no circumstances would a great deal of money
be spent to bus children all over the city.66
Statements such as those by Adams were obviously designed
to alleviate the fears of those parents who were not in sympathy
with the objectives of the Hauser and Havighurst reports.

Within

65 ch·
icago Dai·1· y News, Novemb er 13 , 1964 , p. 5 .
66 Chicago Daily News, November 19, 1964, pp. 1, 18 (Quotes).
Editorial, Chica.go Sun-Times, November 23, 1964.
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a week Dr. Willis offered a plan which was seen as an alternative
to the Havighurst Survey.

At an estimated cost of one billion

dollars Willis proposed to increase educational services and
decrease class sizes throughout the system with emphasis on
remedial programs in schools requiring these services.

The plan

was rebuffed by Bacon who stated it
sounds very much like someone saying I can do this better than
you can. We've just had the Havighurst study. It would have
been better if Willis had incorporated his views in that study,
since he was a member of the survey comraittee. Such figures as
[one billion dollari) only serve to unnerve the citizenr6-people will be scared to death their taxes are going up. 7
In January, 1965, Willis again bore the brunt of the blame
for the inaction of the school system regarding integration.

In

a radio interview Havighurst and Hauser stated they felt Willis
had done little to implement their reports and that he was hiding
problems and deficiencies in the school system.68

Community and

federal pressures were increasing the tensions between the Superintendent and the Board, but the Superintendent's strong personality
tended to make him the focal point for criticisms of the school
system's lack of action on matters of integration.
67
68

chicago Sun-Times, November 26, 1964, pp. 3, 32.

chicago Daily Defender, January 25, 1965, p. 5. The newspaper was reporting a WIND radio interview between Havighurst,
Hauser and two of the periodical's reporters.
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Willis' contract was being considered for renewal during the
summer of 1965 amid much turmoil as some factions within the city
called for his continuance in office and others demanded his
removal.

At its first night meeting in eighteen years, called at

the request of the mayor, the Board promised to expand its search
-for a successor to Willis and require a commitment to integration
from the new superintendent.

It denied the need to create a

special staff to implement the Havighurst Survey but did concede
that a position of assistant superintendent for integration should
be created in accordance with the Survey recommendation.69
In August, 1965, Virginia Lewis was appointed to the newly
created post of Assistant Superintendent for Integration.

The

superintendent took the occasion to reiterate his philosophy of
quality education.

He stated:

I wish to say again that we all recognize that it is desirable
for children of different races to associate with, and to come
to know and to understand each other. The achievement of
integration, however, should and does involve every member of
the professional and non-professional staff in the schools.
. . . These all must be part of the continuing effort to have
quality education for each child according to his needs.70
6 9Chicago Sun-Times, June 30, 1965, p. 3; July 8, 1965,
pp. 1, 4.
70Proceedings, August 11, 1965, pp. 228-29.
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Raymond Pasnick, who was resigning from the Board in protest
of Willis' leadership, complained that the Superintendent,
has consistently objected to the creation of such a position
arguing that a responsibility of this kind should be shared
by the entire school system which in effect means we cannot
pinpoint responsibility with respect to an important question
of integration in our schools. . . . The Superintendent has
even objected to the Board interviewing this candidate to
ascertain her attitudes and her qualifications.71
Pressure continued to build for more positive actions from
the Board regarding integration.

By October, 1965, in response to

testimony of Chicago civil rights leaders at Washington, D.C.,
Office of Education Commissioner Keppel delayed federal funds
earmarked for Chicago.

The decision drew protests from Roman

Pucinski, a United States Representative from a northwest district
in Chicago and chairman of the House Subcommittee on Education.
Warren Bacon felt the "government is perfectly right if they h:..ve
the evidence," although Mrs. Wild denied that the public school.s
were deliberately segregated.72
The funds were restored amid rumors that Mayor Daley had
intervened, and the Board promised to take action regarding charges
of segregation including the establishment of a committee for the
7 1 rbid., PP· 232-33.
72

chicago Sun-Times, October 22, 1965, p. 3; October 27, 1965,
p. 1. Chicago Daily News, October 12, 1965, pp. 1, 3 (Quote);
October 26, 1965, p~ 1, 3.-
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purpose of reviewing attendance boundaries, branch arrangements,
high school feeder patterns and related policies.
threat of further federal intervention remained.

However, the
In December,

Health, Education and Welfare Secretary Gardner ordered that a
team be sent to Chicago to investigate segregation in the city
schools on reports that the Board committee headed by Cyrus Adams
was stalling.73
The plan for clustering schools rested at the heart of the
Hauser and Havighurst suggestions for desegregating schools while
retaining the neighborhood school pattern.

Willis apparently

ignored the Hauser recommendations for clustering when he submitted
a voluntary transfer plan in May, 1964.

Bacon accused Willis of

making derogatory remarks about the Hauser Report and decried the
emphasis the Board placed on overcrowded schools rather than
integration.

Under pressure from Bacon, Adams asked Hauser to

meet with the Board committee to reconsider the cluster plan
concept.74
In August the Board suggested that Willis develop several
73chicago Sun-Time-s, December 15, 1965, pp. 1, 42; January 4,
1966, p. 1. Chicago Daily News, December 30, 1965, pp. 1, 4.
74Proceedings, May 27, 1964, p. 2157; June 24, 1964, p. 2215.
Chicago Sun-Times, June 18, 1964, p. 4; June 25, 1964, p. 44.
Editorial, Chicago Daily News, June 19, 1964.
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school clusters.

Only Murray objected on the grounds that "the

great majority of the people of Chicago are opposed."

The Board

specifically ordered the Superintendent to submit a plan detailing
how Hyde Park, South Shore, Hirsch, and Bowen High Schools could
be clustered.

A plan was adopted involving Hirsh, South Shore and

Bowen High Schools, but by the spring of 1965 the administration
was accused of not informing eighth grade graduates of their
right to choose between attending any one of the three schools.75
Requests for cluster plans were

~eceived

from school and

community groups which hoped to stabilize already integrated
schools by linking them with nearby all-white schools.

The only

plan adopted was the Hirsh, Bowen, South Shore cluster, but the
result was an ironical twisting of the Hauser objective of integration.

White students used the plan to transfer from predom-

inantly Negro Hirsh High School into the other predominantly white
schools.

By the spring of 1967 Superintendent Redmond observed

that the flow of students was only in one direction out of Hirsch.
South Shore High School had already been dropped from the plan and
75 Chicago Sun-Times, August 12, 1964, pp. 1, 30; August 26,
1964, p. 20; August 27, 1964, pp. 3, 90 (Quote); December 10, 1964,
p; 32; January 14, 1965, pp. 1, 6; March 18, 1965, pp. 3, 22.
Chicago Daily News, August 12, 1964, pp. 1, 12;.editorial, August
28, 1964.
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the superintendent recommended its total termination as Hirsch
High School was at 157 percent of capacity while Bowen had reached
-over 210 percent of its capacity. 76
Another program which met with only limited success for
,purposes of integration was the permissive transfer policy.

Indeed,

,

,the plans were designed to ·relieve overcrowding and not to implement integration.

In December, 1961, when Willis first intro-

duced a scheme he suggested that students from schools with classroom sizes of forty or more might transfer to those schools with
classroom sizes of less t;han thirty.

As the transfers would be

voluntary and no transportation costs would be paid, there was
little doubt in many minds that few students would utilize the
plan.

The 1962 civil rights report observed that as most over-

crowded classrooms were in Negro schools, the ratio set by the
policy in effect insured that a student class size of forty
would be established in black schools and a limit of thirty
students per class would. be common in white schools.77
A new elementary permissive transfer program suggested late
76 chicago Sun-Times, August 8, 1964, p. 3; August 26, 1964,
p. 20; May 20, 1965, p. 43. Proceedings, April 12, 1967, p. 2741.
77 Coons, "Chicago," p. 191. Proceedings, December 2 7, 1961,
pp. 924-25; August 14, 1963, pp. 274-76.
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in 1963 dropped the minimum class size for a sending school to
thirty-five students.
destined to failure.

Warren Bacon attacked the plan as being
He pointed out that only twenty-eight students

had used a similar plan in 1962.

He complained that the plan was .

announced in the middle of the year thereby insuring that a transfer
would cause a maximum disruption to the individual's education.
He chided the administration for making little or no effort to
prepare the community and the school for the reception of transfer
students.

He blamed this lack of preparation and the lack of

expansion of the human relations staff for trouble which occurred
in some areas.

He pointed out that a list, exempting those schools,

which had high school branches, special education classes, temporary structures, no lunchrooms or needing boundary adjustments,
would allow neighborhood pressures to stop the acceptance of
transfers into local schools.

78

As a method of desegregating the Chicago schools, the permissive transfer program was accused of having serious defects.
The plan put its emphasis in the wrong place by permitting desegregation only on the basis of under-utilized or overcrowded classrooms.

Its noncompulsory provision put the whole burden of the

78 Proceedings, August 14, 1963, p. 274; October 30, 1963,
pp. 608-13; November 13, ~963, pp. 620-22.
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decision to integrate on the parent.

The lack of transportation

provisions insured that few young children, certainly the most
impressionable, would be involved.

The Havighurst Survey had

warned against these pitfalls while pointing out that the permissive transfer plan had not worked in other cities.79
In July, 1964, a Board committee recommended that transportation costs be paid for any child wishing to use a transfer plan.
A deluge of mail descended on the Board which was estimated to be
about nine to one against this policy.

Thomas Murray opposed any

form of paid transportation on the grounds that costs would snowball.

Cyrus Adams suggested that private donations be sought to

pay bus fares, but opposed the use of school funds.

Warren Bacon

estimated that it would cost twenty-six million dollars to provide
facilities in overcrowded schools.

He pointed out that the

interest on ·this sum would provide the money necessary to pay
transportation to underutilized schools. 80
The debate continued but the Board took no actions to provide
transportation costs.

Adams summarized the Board's position when

79chicago Sun-Times, June 18, 1964, p. 4.
pp. 274-78.
80

30.

Havighurst Survey,

.
..
Chicago Sun-Times, July 10, 1964, p. 26; July 12, 1964, p.
Chicago Tribune, June 23, 1964, Section 1, p. 12.
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he flatly stated, "No money is going to be spent for transporting
children for the sole purpose of integration."

Without an organ-

ized busing program providing free transportation there was little
chance that children in the early elementary grades would utilize
the program.

Indeed, when it was suggested that pupils from

kindergarten through fourth grade be permitted to participate in
a city-wide transfer plan, Willis opposed the idea on the grounds
that it would create health and safety problems.Bl
Fifteen hundred students used the permissive transfer program
in 1966, but almost all transfers were at the high school level.
No studies had been made on the effects of the plan when Mrs. Malis
asked what results the program had on overcrowding, integration,
academic and social problems.

Undoubtedly, some high schools had

been integrated as Negroes utilized the plan.

But white students

also were using the program to transfer out of integrating schools
into those schools with almost all-white student bodies.

Adams

felt that Illinois law allowed white students as well as Negroes
to take advantage of permissive transfers.

He pointed out that

there would be no way to keep whites from leaving the city if
81

_C~h_i_c_a_g_o....,...,.D_a_i_l~y~N_e_w_s, November 19, 1964, pp. 1, 18 (Quote);

November 20, 1964, p. 8.
24.

Chicago Sun-Times, June 23, 1964, pp. 3,

r
~
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'

attempts were made to force them into integrated schools.82
By the close of 1966 none of the various proposed methods
of fostering integration had been successfully implemented in
Chicago.

The 1967 Civil Rights Report found 89 percent of Chicagq's

Negro students in elementary schools which had less than 10 percent
white students, and 97 percent of the system's Negro pupils were
in elementary schools with a Negro majority.

Thus, if a 10 percent

guideline was to be used to consider schools to be desegregated,
only a relatively few black students attended these schools.
The Board had no active policy which was designed to bring
about desegregation.

Its stabilization policy was, at best, an

attempt to slow down the white exodus from a changing neighborhood
by controlling the number of black students allowed in previ.ously
all-white schools.

Attempts to achieve desegregation by adju&ting

contiguous school boundaries probably did hasten the withdrawal
of white students.
The permissive transfer program offered students, seeking
what they hoped to be a better quality education, a chance to
controi some aspects of their learning by choosing to attend one
of the less crowded schools.

While this policy provided for the

82 chicago Daily News, April 27, 1966, pp. 38, 39; editorial,
May 19, 1966. Proceedings, June 28, 1967, pp. 3304-05.
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desegregation of some previously all white schools, it also allowed
whites to escape from schools which were desegregating and then
resegregating with all-black student bodies.

Also, the relatively

long distances which a transferring student was required to travel
had limited the use of the permissive transfer policy to high
school students.
paid

p~ogram

Without an officially sponsored and publicly

of transportation, there was little chance of

utilizing a transfer program for elementary school students.
While the discussions about methods of desegregation had
little effect on the actual integration of the Chicago system,
.they had a pronounced effect on attitudes of residents in the city.
As Adams observed, "Whenever we propose a transfer plan, the
'redneck' areas of the city start rumors that their [black]
children are going to overwhelm their [white] schools.
statements are either malicious lies or nonsense. 118 3
to be little chance that any

prog~am

Such
There seemed

of rational discussion with

community groups would lead to the curtailment of opposition to
desegregation by a growing vocal element.

83chicago Sun-Times, June 19, 1966, p. 19 (Quote).
!._ights Report, 1967, p. 7.
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CHAPTER IV
INTELLIGENCE AND RECOMMENDATION FUNCTIONS:
THE COMMUNITIES AND THE SCHOOLS
Mayor Daley once said at a convention, "Some have criticized
us because we reach out into nationality, religious, and racial
groups.

It's the greatest thing we have ever done.

strength of our party from the beginning.' 1 1

It's been the

The mayor was talking

about the Chicago Democratic Party's power base created by establishing an arbitrary balance of positions between various ethnic
groups in the city.

This base was created in the late 1920's by

Mayor Anton Cermak.

A decade later University of Chicago Professor

Louis Wirth was identifying seventy-five distinct community areas
in the city.

These communities were differentiated from one

another on the basis of their historical settlement and growth,
the identification of local inhabitants with the area, centers of
trade local to the community, and the existence of natural and
artificial barriers such as rivers, railroads, and local
1Chicago Tribun'e, April 23, 1964, p. 16.
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.
transportation
systems. 2

These communities were also classified

by ethnic groups which tended to be predominant within the area.

Through various organizations these communities were able to exert
some influence on the decision-making process of the Democratic
party which has controlled the city since the 1930's.
For purposes of statistical comparison demographers have
retained the boundaries of the seventy-five communities just. as
the Democratic Party has retained its ethnic orientation to continue winning elections.

Not all groups had been equally repre-

sented in the party, just as the various ethnic groups were not
equally represented in all of the communities.

The maps on the

following page indicate the geographical distribution of some
ethnic groups throughout Chicago.

While definite concentrations

of population can be seen for people of all origins, it is easily
detected that individuals of European background were able to move
throughout the city.

Groups arriving more recently in Chicago,

such as the Puerto Rican and Mexican, were still concentrated
closer to the center of the city, and dispersal was minimal.
The Negro,

howeve~,

represented the most obvious exception

2Evelyn Kitagawa and Karl Taeuber, ed., Local Community Fact
.!!_ook: Chicago Metropolitan Area, 1960 (Chicago: Chicago. ~ommunity
Inventory, 1963), p. xiii. Hereinafter referred to as Factbook.

MAP 1
MAPS SHOWING THE DISTRIBUTION OF VARIOUS ETHNIC GROUPS
THROUGHOUT THE CITY OF CHICAGO IN 1960
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to the dispersal of an ethnic group over a period of years.

In

1920 about four percent of the city's population was Negro.

In

1923 and 1928 national quota laws sterrnned the immigration of white
ethnic groups into this country.

Thus, Negro migration into the

city began to exceed the white irrnnigration.

The use of restrictive

covenants to exclude Negroes from neighborhoods had become corrnnon
during World War I in reaction to the growing movement of Negroes
from the Southern United States.

By 1930 the Negro population of

.the city, which had doubled and represented seven percent of the
total number of inhabitants, was restricted to a few areas, mainly
. on the south side of Chicago (see map on preceding page).

By 1950

the Negro population represented over thirteen percent of the
city's population and the proportion leaped to twenty-three percent
in 1960 and twenty-eight percent in 1966, as the nonwhite population of Chicago increased from about one-half million to around
one million persons during this period.3
Despite this expansion of population, the Negro had not
scattered throughout the city.

He was held in a "black belt" area

resembling an inverted "L" radiating south and west from the center
o.f t.he city.

This pattern of residential segregation became an

3Harold Baron, "History of Chicago School Segregation to
1953," Integrated Education, I (January, 1963), 17-19, 30.
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established practice by 1920, and concentration within all-Negro
areas had steadily increased over the decades.

As the number of

Negroes expanded, it was obvious that the area of the city they
would occupy would have to expand.

However, this expansion

was consistently limited to areas contiguous to or closeby the
exclusively Negro section.4
Factors which tended to affect Negro migration into an area
are somewhat nebulous, but some tendencies have been noted.
Neighborhoods which drew strongly from one ethnic group had shown
greater resistance to invasion.

This was particularly true of

people of a southern or eastern European background.

Neighborhoods

made up of owner-occupied housing tended to change over more gradually than in those areas where there were a large number of
renters.

Parks, railroad tracks, industrial districts, and major

commercial streets often became barriers between the races. 5
Sociologists have described the process in which an area
4otis D. Duncan and Beverly Duncan, The Negro Population of
Chicago: A Study of Residential Succession (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 87-107, passim.
SReal Estate Research Corporation, Report prepared f.or ..tJ:ie
Board of Education, City of Chicago, December, 1967, Preliminary
findings and Projections of Population and School Enrollments for
£hicago, Illinois: 1970-1980 (Chicago: Board of Education, 1967),
p. 67. Hereinafter referred to as RERC, Preliminary.
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changes over from white to non-white.

This process of residential

succession has been practiced by most ethnic groups throughout the
history of the city as some group, achieving a higher socioeconomic status, moved into outlying areas and was replaced by a
newer group of

~ower

socioceonomic status.

Duncan and Duncan have

described four stages in the process.
During the first stage called "initial entry" or "penetration" a Negro family bought a home in an area occupied totally by
whites.

Once entry occurred in an area contiguous to the Negro

community, it was very uncommon that a new white family would move
into the neighborhood.

Thus, as members of the white group moved

out, they were replaced by Negro families.

The second stage

referred to as "invasion" occurred when a substantial number of
Negroes moved into the area. 6
Two factors are worth noting at this point.

First, as the

black belt was generally contiguous to older and less desirable
areas of residency, most of the Negro expansion had occurred into
these poorer areas.

However, Negro expansion tended to move along

the paths of least resistance.

It had been observed that in a

.contiguous area where the white residents were more affluent,
6Duncan and Duncan, The Negro Population of Chicago, pp. 98115, passlm.
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they were more likely to move than less prosperous residents and
more expansion occurred in these areas.

Second, during this

period of invasion, and during the next stage, integration was
occurring.

However, this integration had been only a temporary

situation which existed until most whites were replaced by nonwhites. 7
During the third stage called "consolidation" an increasing
number and proportion of the area population became Negro.

The

fourth stage was characterized by a "piling up" of people as the
population density continued to grow.

Pierre deVise, a Chicago

·sociologist, pointed out that Negro population density in what also
were Chicago's ten poorest communities was over forty percent
higher than the average population per square mile figure for the
entire city.

If the four communities in which industrial and com-

mercial prope·rties occupy much land were excluded from the list of
the ten poorest communities, then the Negro population density in
the remaining six communities was actually double the city average. 8
This increase in population, which put a strain on all the
7Pierre deVise, Chicago Widening Color Gap, Report Number 2
of the Interuniversity Social Research Committee, December, 1967
(Chicago: Community and Family Study Center, 1967), pp. 63-73.
115.

8nuncan and Duncan, The Negro Population of Chicago, pp. 98deVise, Chicago's Widening Color Gap.J.. p. 42.
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community's resources and particularly its schools, actually began
with the invasion stage.

As the newer group moved into a community,

the age level of the families often dropped back into the period
where there were more children of school age.

Negro families were

less likely to send their children into the Catholic schools whose
,

enrollment represented about one-fourth of the total school enrollment of the city in 1967.

The non-white fertility rate had also

been higher than the white rate for the same age group.

Further-

more, the newly arriving families were often of a lower socioeconomic status than the established residents and thus there was more
doubling up of families in order to afford the facilities.9

These

factors placed a new burden on the community schools and contributed to the decision of white parents to withdraw their children
from the public schools as overcrowding and racial tension rose.
Througi.1out the 1960' s white out-migration had steadily increased.

In 1960 the white population of Chicago was 2,712,000.

In 1965 this number dropped to 2,484,000, representing 68.6 percent
of the city's population.
estimat~d

9

The Real Estate Research Corporation

the total white population of the Chicago Standard
..

RERC,Preliminary, pp. 21, 70-74.
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Metropolitan Area would be about 2,300,000 in 1970. 10

With the

drop in white population there had not been a corresponding drop
in the real number of white children in the public schools.
Indeed, the white enrollment increased until the 1967 headcount.
In this year the Chicago Board of Education began classifying
Puerto Rican students separately and the Caucasian count dropped.
When the Puerto Rican count is added to the Caucasian, the drop of
white students does not occur until 1969.

However, the steady

increase in Negro students from 236,00 in 1963 to 313,000 in 1969
represented a much faster increase in the numbers of Negroes rather
than of whites.

Therefore the percentage of Negro students rose

from 46.5 percent in 1963 to 53.9 percent in 1969.

11

In areas experiencing Negro invasion a drop in white attendance at public schools was often experienced.

The Real Estat0

Research Corporation explained this situation by pointing out that
white households with school age children were among the first to
lOReal Estate Research Corporation, Report prepared for the
Board of Education, City of Chicago, April, 1968, Projections of
Population and School Enrollments by Community Area for the City of
Chicago: 1970 and 1975 (Chicago: Board of Education, 1968), pp.
II-2, II-3, IV-5. Hereinafter referred to as RERC, Projections.
While this report was issued three months after the busing decision,
the general information would have been available to Board members
through the school system demographers.
11

Chicago Public Schools, Teacher Observation Headcount, (Hand
tabulated Xeroxed copies, ~hicago, 1963, 1969).
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move from changing neighborhoods.

Other families transferred

their children to Catholic schools, private schools, or used the
permissive transfer program of the public school system to transfer
their children out of a changing school. 12
By 1967 the black belt had reached the city limits along
Roosevelt Road and gone beyond Cicero Avenue along Lake Street into
the Austin Community.

The northern border of the west side was de-

terminded by the Galena line of the Northwestern Railroad.

By com-

paring the ethnic maps on page 120 with the map of Negro distribution
on page 121, it may be seen that Polish and Italian neighborhoods
. were unyielding borders which channeled Negro expansion as it moved
west.

The Bohemian community along Cermak Road represented the

southern border of the Negro west side.
The south side Negro community had extended to 99th Street
by 1967, almost totally filling in the area between State Street
and Cottage Grove Avenue.

New expansion occurred west along 63rd

Street to about Darnen Avenue and south bordering Halsted Street to
g5th Street as may be seen on the map.

Eastward expansion into the

conununities of Avalon Park and South Shore was also evident.
In a "Comparison of Racial Enrollment and Block Statistics"
12 RERC, Preliminary, pp. 70-74.
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the Real Estate Research Corporation divided the city into three
sections (see map on following page).

In the area north of Chicago

_Avenue an estimated 2,184 Negro students, representing 4.4 percent
of the increase in the total elementary school city enrollment,
entered the public schools while twenty-four city blocks were
changing from white to non-white.

In the west corridor 15,543

Negro students, representing 31.2 percent of the total increase in
elementary enrollment, entered the public schools while 172 blocks
were changing.

In the south section 32,081 students, representing

64.4 percent of the total increase in elementary enrollment, entered the public schools while 853 blocks were changing.

From this

data it was observed that Negro migration in the west section was
most significant since 31.2 percent of the increase of Negro enrollment occurred in the confined area in which only 16.4 percent of
the Negro block expansion occurred.13

In the period from 1965 to

13RERC, Preliminary, pp. 65-67. RERC, Projections, pp. vi-8,
vi-9. The data given here is from the Preliminary Report which was
available in December, 1967, when the busing decision was being
made. The Projection Report was issued four months later but most
of the conclusions were already expressed in the Preliminary Report.
Most of the changes in the later report were updatings of statistical estimates. The Projectio~ Report divided the city into four
sections separating the south into southeast and southwest areas.
In the later report the total non-white enrollment increase was
lowered from 49,808 to 48,508 students. Of this 2.4 percent enrolled in the north section, 30.3 percent enrolled in the west
section, 24.7 percent enr~lled in the southeast section and
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1967 Negro enrollment in elementary schools of District Four which
serves Austin rose from 466 to 2,786 students.14
That this expansion was also relatively rapid may be seen by
o~serving-on the map of Negro expansion on page 130 that Negro

penetration into the Austin area had not reached a twenty-five
percent ·proportion in any of the corrnnunity's neighborhoods in 1965.
This rapid expansion westward along Madison Avenue may in part be
explained by the strong resistance of residents of Cicero to
nori-white penetration.

Thus, geographical expansion of the Negro

oelt-turned north and further west into Austin.15
It is obvious from this data that a neighborhood school
policy would result in segregated schools as neighborhoods change.
Furthermore, static school boundaries will result in a period of
overcrowding as change-over and piling-up occur and place great
strain on inflexible school plants and facilities.

The neighborhood

42.6 percent enrolled in the southwest section. For this data the
elementary school headcount statistics were used, and the high
school enrollment was not included.
14chicago Public Schools, Teacher Observation Headcount,
(Hand tabulated Xeroxed copies, Chicago, 1965, 1967). Hereinafter
referred to as Headcounts. The map of Superintendent Districts
on page 150 shows the large area served by District Four.
15RERC, Projections, pp. vi-6, ix-2.
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school policy failed to meet the challenge of integration.
Changing contiguous school boundaries had often failed to keep
white students in changing schools.

Yet altering school boundaries

on the theory that a neighborhood may be "stabilized" during a
period of change-over had been a major policy of the Chicago Board
of Education.
In 1964 the Board had adopted a statement claiming its desire
to "increase the interracial association of students," and recognizing "a responsibility to help preserve, as far as possible,
such associations in areas where they now exist."

In order to

achieve this goal it asserted that "it is its policy to seek and
take any possible steps which may help to preserve and stabilize
the integration of schools in neighborhoods which already have
an interracial composition. 11 16

The difficulty with such a policy

is that "integration" in a changing neighborhood had represented
only a temporary stage between occupation by a white group and the
final consolidation as a Negro neighborhood.
Efforts of the Board to increase integration through attendance area adjustments, voluntary permissive transfer programs,
16Board of Education, City of Chicago, Proceedings, Board of
!ducation, City of Chicago, (Chicago: Board of Education, October
27, 1964), p. 542; (November 12, 1964), p. 548. Hereinafter
referred to as Proceedings, date of meeting, page number.
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open enrollments in vocational and technical high schools, and the
planning of new building facilities had been evaluated in Superintendent Redmond's Report as meeting "with varying degrees of suece SS . 1117

If a 15 percent criteria for integration was applied

(used by the Chicago School System in implementing the busing plan
of 1968), in which at least 15

~ercent

of the students are Negro

and at least 15 percent, of the students attending the same school
are white, then only thirty-eight Chicago elementary schools were
integrated to this level in 1964.

By 1967 twenty-five of these

schools still fell into this category.

However, the proportion

of Negro students rose in all but four of these schools during the
period between 1964 and 1967, although the percentage of Negro
students increased by less than ten percent in thirteen more
schools.

18

17 James F. Redmond, Increasing Desegregation of Facilities,
~tudents, and Vocational Educational Educational Program, Report
to the Board of Education, City of Chicago, August 23, 1967
(Chicago: Board of Education, 1967), p. B-4. HereinafLer referred
to as Redmond Report.
18Headcounts, 1964, 1967. During this period 10 percent
attendance by one race was still being considered the basis of
integration. In 1967 Puerto Rican students were listed separately
in the teacher observation headcounts. It was apparent that most
school teachers had listed Puerto Rican students under the white
category.prior to this time. In computing the above 1967 integration data Puerto Rican students were considered as white.
There were over four hundred elementary schools in the Chicago
system in 1964.

134
This limited degree of success was more apparent in considering some elementary schools in the southeast area of Chicago.
In 1965 District Twenty-two was created and three of its seven
elementary schools fell within the fifteen percent definition of
integration (although O'Keeffe Elementary had only 14.3 percent
white students).

By 1967 O'Keeffe Elementary had only 44 white

students in a school body of 1198, and it was obvious that the
other two schools were rapidly segregating (see chart next page).
In early 1967 the Chicago Region Parent-Teachers Association
made a study of the stabilization policy of the Board of Education.
They observed that the Negro population of the city had increased
from 837,656 to 974,839 between 1960 and 1966.

During this period

the white population was estimated to have declined from 2,712,748
to 2,490,043.

Seyenteen of the seventy-five Chicago comrnunitLes

were predominately white (less than 3 percent non-white).

Oniy

nine communities were identified as integrated (between 24.9 percent
and 43.6 percent non-white), and five of these communities were
considered markedly unstable, as the non-white percentage was
iµcrea.sing rapidly. 19
19Illinois Congress of Parents and Teachers, Chicago Region,
"A Study of Stabilization of Integrated Schools," Chicago, April 6,
1967, p. 5 (Mimeographed). The difference between the Real Estate
Research Corporation's estimate of non-white population and that
of the Parent-Teachers Association is the result of the Real Estate

TABLE 1
INCREASING SEGREGATION IN SELECTED SCHOOLS
OF SOUTHEAST SIDE OF CHICAGoa
Total Enrollment

Year

Bryn Mawr Elementary--South Shore
1114
634

1964

Negro

Other

385

17

1207

529

666

12

Annex

1209
200

375
51

799
148

35
1

Annex

1302
200

279
57

1005
161

1
2

230

12

1965
1966
1967

1964

White

Mann Elementary--South Chicago
907
623

1965

1002

541

417

12

1966

1041

543

574

14

1967

1155

275

858

22

686

10

1964

O'Keeffe Elementary--South Shore
1195
323

1965

1334

184

1101

4

1966

1380

80

1296·

4

1967

1198

44

1149

4

aData compiled from Chicago Public Schools, Teacher Observation Headcount, (Hand tabulated Xeroxed copies, Chicago, 1964,
1965, 1966, 1967, Districts Fourteen, Seventeen, Twenty-two).
After 1965 all three were in District Twenty-two. Variations from
total enrollment occurred as only students present on the day of
the headcount were reported.
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The Parent-Teacher study noted that elementary schools
located on the border of the expanding Negro community were not
remaining integrated.

Indeed, the schools were changing in racial

composition much faster than the neighborhoods were changing.

In

the nine integrated communities 48 percent of the schools were
Negro, 18 percent were white and 34 percent were integrated.
study

~onsidered

The

over ten percent enrollment of white or Negro

students to be the basis of integration.

Only one-half of the

integrated schools were considered to be likely to remain integrated for any length of time.

As the study noted, "The school is

. at once the 'most tender' of the community institutions in reaction
to racial change and the most important potential instrument for
stability. 1120
One of the most identifiable characteristics of the unstable
integrated school was overcrowding.

In order to meet the demands

of an enlarged student body, schools often surrendered services
and special purpose rooms.

The Parent-Teachers Association recom-

mended that every effort be made to retain and expand special
Research Corporation's estimating an undercount of the non-whites
in the 1960 Census and including an incremental adjustment for
migration between 1960 and 1965.
20 .
Ibid., pp. 6-7.
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services in unstable integrated schools. 21

A brief description of

two such schools may shed some light on the difficulty involved in
attempting to use school policy to overcome socioeconomic problems
in a community.
In 1963 the Bryn Mawr school had 989 students of whom 80 percent were white.

In 1967 the school, with a branch, had 1522 stu-

dents of whom 22 percent were white.

Mrs. Jeanne Junker, principal

of the school, reported that the teacher turnover at the school
was less than average.

The curriculum had been enriched with a

Junior Great Books course, a bi-weekly paperback book fair, a cultural enrichment program, an art study program in conjunction with
the Art Institute and an eighth grade music program.

In 1970 the

school and its two branches had 1912 students of whom 43 were white.
At the Mann school white students represented 91.8 percent of
enrollment in 1963.

~he

By 1967 the white enrollment was only 23.3

percent of the student body.

Six classes in typing were offered.

A humanities program in conjunction with the Art Institute and a
Junior Great Books course were enriching the curriculum.

In 1970

the white students represented 1.1 percent of the student body. 22
21 Ibid.
22southeast Economist (Chicago), January 25, 1968, p. 1.
Headcounts, 1970 (District Twenty-two).
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The Chicago Region Parent-Teachers Association study, which
appeared five months before the Redmond Report, did not mention
busing out some of the excess enrollment as a possible means of
stabilizing an integrated school.

In December, 1967, four months

after the Redmond Report suggested busing as one possible method

.

of decreasing segregation, the Real Estate Research Corporation
observed:
A stable balance between white and non-white population within
the city of Chicago will occur only if nearly all future net
non-white population growth takes place in the suburbs. At
present the reverse is true--nearly all such growth is occurring within the city . . . . [The] conclusion is inescapable
that attainment of a stable population balance between white
and non-white groups within the city of Chicago requires a
major shift in the location of future non-white population
growth to the suburbs . . . . educational policy . . . must
be directed in part at shifting future non-white population
growth to the suburbs.23
The Real Estate Research Corporation suggested that "one
mechanism for encouraging such a shift would be undertaking policies that would continue the expansion of non-white residential
areas directly toward and beyond the city limits on both the \iest
and south sides."

The report questioned the use of busing as a

method of achieving long term racial integration.

It pointed out

.that b:using non-white students out of schools in racially changing
23RERC, Preliminary, p. 12.
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neighborhoods, in an attempt to stabilize the white population near
those schools, would probably fail.

Failure would occur as it

became impossible to find white families to move into those vacancies created by even a normal exodus of white families from the
neighborhoods. 24
Indeed, the report

'

argued~

. . . stabilization of white population in this part of the
city [contiguous to black belt] would probably just divert nonwhite population growth to one or more other parts of the
city. In those other parts racial transition will occur
faster than if the busing policy had not been adopted. For
non-white population expansion must occur somewhere.25
One undeniable factor in integration was that white students
must continue attending a school if it was to remain integrated.
The existence of a large parallel system of schools in Chicago
could offer a means of "escape" from the public schools by white
students as integration occurred.

Forty-three percent of the white

students in Chicago attended parochial schools in 1967, while only
seven percent of the non-white students attended these schools.
However, by 1967 the enrollment in parochial schools had dropped
.from about one-third to around one-quarter of the combined public

2 5Ibid., p. 13.

Underlining in original report.

r
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and parochial enrollment.26
This drop was the result of the reduced birth rate beginning
in 1961, the movement of Catholic families to suburban areas,
rising costs of private education, newly imposed ceilings on class
sizes and urban renewal projects which reduced the number of
school age children in some neighborhoods.
expand~ng

Furthermore, the

Negro population did not utilize private and parochial

schools to the extent that other ethnic groups had in the past.
But not all non-public schools were experiencing contraction.

In

the integrating community of South Shore private and parochial
. schools were expanding facilities to accommodate new students while
the white enrollment in the public schools of the community was
dropping between 1964 and 1967.27
The leading Negro newspaper in Chicago had been critical of
the Superintendent of Catholic Schools in the Chicago Archdiocese
for supporting Chicago Schools Superintendent Willis and the
26 1.b1°d.,

pp. 10 ' 24 .

RERC, Projections, pp. vii-25, vii-26.

27New World(Chicago), August 11, 1967, pp. 1, 3. Headcounts,
1964, 1967. The South Shore Commission reported two Jewish schools,
four Catholic schools, a Greek Orthodox school and the Faulkne~ ..
School operating in South Shore. deVise, Chicago's Widening Color
Gap, p. 108. South Shore was serviced by District Seventeen in
1964. By 1965 an expansion of school districts in Chicago created
District Twenty-two to service the South Shore Community.
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neighborhood school policy.

However, there is little to indicate

that any leader of this Church defended segregation.

Indeed, the

Catholic Interracial Council had been critical of Willis' policies
concerning integration and Monsignor John Egan of the Chicago
Chancery Office had been active in supporting community organizations which endorsed integration.

The Interreligious Council

on Urban Affairs had been originated by Msgr. Egan and included
participation by representatives of the following churches:

Roman

Catholic, Episcopalian, Illinois Synod of Lutheran Churches in
America, Presbytery of United Presbyterians, Church of the U.S.A.,
Rock River Conference of the Methodist Church, and the Jewish
Council on Urban Affairs.

It was reported that prointegration

groups within Austin and the northwest side of Chicago received
aid from this short-lived council.28
Although some community organizations such as the Back of
the Yards Council dated back to 1939, these groups tended to rise
and fall with the development of issues within the community.

The

Inter-Religious Council on Urban Affairs defined a community
28

Chic~go Daily Defender, October 14, 1963, p. 11.
Tribune, January 21, 1968, Section 10, p. 4.

Chicago

r
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organization as having a broad base of citizen participation rather
than representing some vested interest.

Its leaders were to be

identified with and accepted by sub-groups within the corrnnunity,
and its goals and programs must have been arrived at democratically.

The discontentments which the organization expressed were

to be widely shared, and the group had to be able to focus and
channel the discontent into an organized plan of action relating
to specific problems.

This definition would exclude those groups

which Bouma and Hoffman, in a study of school integration, warned
would arise to use school oriented issues not from genuine concern
. for educational problems but to serve their own power interests.29
The fifty-one corrnnunity organizations identified on the map
following this page consisted of numerous smaller affiliates.
The South Shore Corrnnission, organized in 1954, claimed 3500 memhers in 1967 .in a corrnnunity of 85,000 people with a large Jewish,
Irish, and Negro population.

The South East Connnunity Organization

established in 1960, claimed 158 affiliates in a corrnnunity of
60,000 described as Jewish, Catholic, and about one-fourth Negro
29
. Ipter-Religious Council on Urban Affairs, Dire~to~y of
Community Organizations in Chicago, 1967-1968 (Chicago: InterReligious Council on Urban Affairs, 1967), pp. 6-9, 29 .. Ponald
H.. Bouma and James Hoffman, The Dynamics of School Integration:
Problems and Approaches in a Northern City (Grand Rapids, Michigan:
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1968), p. 16.
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Council on Urban Affairs,Directorylof Community
Chicago: Inter-Religious Council on Urban Affairs,
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in population.

One stated goal of this organization was to elimi-

nate prejudice.30
In the Austin community the Organization for a Better Austin
was established in 1967.

It claimed 160 affiliates serving the

area of 126,000 predominately Greek, Jewish, Italian, and Irish
,

residents.
area.

About 6,000 Negroes· were estimated to have entered the

The purpose of this organization was "to unite all elements

in Austin in an organization concerned with the common problems of
the area."

To the north of Austin the Organization for the North-

west Communities had been formed in 1967.

Fifty affiliates were

said to represent the 82,300 residents who were white and predominately Roman Catholic.

Among the stated goals of this organi-

zatioh were neighborhood conservation and the study of city
.
31
p 1anning.
In March, 1967, a survey was made of participants in com-·
munity organizations.

In analyzing the

result~

Bogue and McKinley

of the Interuniversity Social Research Committee observed that
whites who reported membership in local clubs and associations
were not. any more likely to endorse civil rights for Negroes
30 Inter-Religious Council on Urban Affairs, Dir~~-t~~y, p. 30.
3libid., pp. 21-22, 24, 30 (Quote).
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than their non-participating neighbors.

However, active members

in Parent-Teachers Associations were significantly more likely to
hold liberal views in their attitudes toward civil rights.

In

general, the authors concluded that active members of organizations
tended to hold more liberal views than inactive members and nonparticipants, but the chasm between white and Negro was marked,
with a_ majority of whites interviewed opposing integration.

It

was observed that the views of "whites active in PI'A (and similar
groups) are as far removed from the views of active Negroes as
the mass of whites is from the mass of Negroes, for such groups
. recruit not only disproportionate numbers of liberal whites but
also disproportionate numbers of even more liberal Negroes. 11 32
The rise of community organizations represented the growing
concern of citizens with the changes occurring in their neighborhoods.

The attempts of these organizations to deal with change

were bound to meet with varying degrees of success as they met
resistance from vested interest groups and dissension within the
community.

The success of organizations such as the Woodlawn

3.2P_onald_ J. Bogue and Richar9 McKinlay, Militancy For and
Against Civil Rights and Integration in Chicago: Summer, 1967,
Report Number 1 of the Interuniversity Social Research Committee,
August, 1967 (Chicago: Community and Family Study Center, 1967),
pp. 30-35 (Quote from p. 32).
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Organization and the Coordinating Council of Community Organizations on the southeast side of Chicago in bringing about the
eventual retirement of Superintendent Willis brought some hope to
those who saw the superintendent as an obstruction to integration.
But the fight which centered on Willis also helped to polarize
factions within the city, and a countermovement of white resistance
to

in~egration

developed.

An underlying weakness of many community

organizations was that in issues of integration there was little
_support from the white community and much outright resistance.
City wide organizations with members who often live in suburiJs,
. such as the Human Relations Council and the Better Schools Com··
mittee, would openly support integration plans, but grassroots
organizations often faltered.
Thus, in the South Lynne community on the southwest side of
Chicago, the ·community council had been severely criticized by
Father Lawlor, a local leader of whites who had formed block clubs
to stop Negro penetration into the area west of Ashland Avenue
between 59th and 67th Streets.

The community council was criti-

cized for not dealing effectively with panic peddlers and youth
gangs and not stopping the decline of small business districts.
The council was condemned for its part .in making Lindbloom High
School a technical school.

In becoming a technical school its
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contributing area was extended further throughout the city and
large numbers of Negro students entered the building which was
we~t

o_f Ashland. _ Within a few years the student body became

Rredominantly Negro.33
. Father Lawlor expressed the views of many whites regarding
the perils of stabilization in a neighborhood when he stated, "I
came to feel that everybody panics, nobody stays.

The very root

of the current racial crisis is the fear inspired by violence that
occurs mostly along [racially changing areas]."

He professed, "I

do not blame this condition on the generality of the Negro population . . . for they too are victims of this violence."

For

advocates of Father Lawlor integration was "not an issue" because
they would move if the boundary line between white and Negro was
not held.

People were experiencing a fear that control of their

lives and their neighborhoods was not in their own hands but in
those of "unconscionable bureaucrats. 11 34
By _1960 the South Shore community was integrating.

Germans,

Russian Jewish, and Irish ethnic groups remained dominant with the
33New World (Chicago), February 9, 1968, pp. 1, 16. ,
Proceedings, June 26, 1963, p. 2371.
34 New World (Chicago), February 9, 1968, pp. 1, 16.
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ten percent Negro population concentrated in an area west of
Stony Island outside of School District Twenty-two.

The median

family income for the entire census area was $7,888 but 34.1
percent of the families were earning over $10,000.
percent of the housing was owner occupied.

Only 21.1

While 2 percent of the

housing was considered substandard, only 6.2 percent of the
housing units had been built since 195o.35
By utilizing the factors affecting Negro migration discerned
by the Real Estate Research ·corporation, it could be predicted that
South Shore was likely to undergo further transition.

The white

ethnic groups of the area were not likely to organize in open resistance to Negro penetration as had occurred in South Lynne.

The

large number of rented units made white outmigration more likely.
While housing units were not particularly low priced or substandard,
deVise had pointed out that the Negro belt did not typically expand
into areas of lowest quality housing.

It was expanding along the

paths of least resistance, typically into areas of middle income
residency adjacent to the Negro belt.36
35Factbook, p. 100-01. The Real Estate Research Corporation
estimated that the actual non-white population of South Shore was
about twelve percent as the census had underestimated non-white
population. RERC, Projections, Appendix, p. 2. ·
36RERC ,_ Preliminary,~ p. 6 7.
Gap, pp. 15, 42, 66-73.

de Vise, Chicago's Widening Color
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In December, 1967, the Real Estate Research Corporation
observed that middle-income Negroes were moving into every section
of South Shore in dispersed but quite substantial patterns.

An

Interuniversity Social Research Committee report estimated that
the Negro population in the area had risen from 7,579 in 1960 to
31,581 in 1966, representing 43.6 percent of the total community
population.

In the fall of 1965 a new school superintendent's

district had been created to serve the schools of South Shore east
of Stony Island Avenue, the northern tip of the South Chicago
community and a fraction of the Avalon Park community (see map
on following page). 37
This new district, which had the backing of the Friends of
the Chicago Schools Committee, was created for the expressed purpose of stabilizing the integrated schools in the area.

It was

pointed out·that a special staff in the smaller new district could
work closely with community groups, especially the South Shore
Commission which had provided constructive leadership in the past
and had demonstrated its willingness to work for integration.

A

special program for South Shore included reducing class sizes to
.th.irty .st:u.dent.s a.nd saturating the curriculum with special course
37 RERC, Preliminary, pp. 9, 69-70. deVise, Chicago's Widening
Color Gap, p. 146. Proceedings, April 15, 1965, pp. 2336, 2427-36.
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Duplicated with revisions from Real Estate Research Corporation, Report prepared for the Board of Education, City of Chicago,
December, 1967, Preliminary Findings and Projections of Population
and School Enrollments for Chicago, Illinois: 1970-1980 (Chicago:
Board of Education, 1967), p. 26A.
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offerings and supplementary staff. 38
A cluster plan under which the attendance areas of South
Shore, Hirsh, and Bowen High Schools were combined had been put
into effect in January, 1965.

The purpose of this plan, suggested

by the Havighurst Survey, was to aid stabilization by allowing
students to choose between the three high schools.

However, the

result was that white students transferred out of predominantly
Negro Hirsh High School into the other less integrated schools.
In the spring of 1967 Dr. Redmond discontinued the plan.

High

school branches created in the Bradwell and Luella Schools also
. tended to withdraw white students from the South Shore and Bowen
High Schools as the percentage of white students was always substantially higher in the branches than in the main buildings.

The

Bradwell Branch was discontinued in 1968 and the Luella Branch
38

.
Proceedings, January 27, 1965, pp. 2071-72; March 25, 1965,
p. 2325; April 15, 1965, pp. 2336, 2437-36. The Friends of the
Chicago Schools Committee had been created in 1965 in compliance
with a r~commendation of the Hauser Report to establish a "committee of outstanding community leaders, broadly representative of the
city at large and biracial in composition," to work with the Board
on problems relating: to school integration. Advisory Panel on Integration of the Public Schools, Report to the Board of Edu.c.a.tio.n.,.
City of Chicago, March 31, 1964, Integration of the Public Schools-Chicago, Philip M. Hauser, chairman (Chicago: Board of Education,
1964}, p. 38.

152
was abandoned in 1969.39
As representatives of the school system attempted in various
ways to deal with the problem of stabilization, fear grew among the
residents of South Shore.

In response to complaints of a growing ·

crime rate in the area Paul Hartrich, president of the South Shore
Corrnnunity Organization, enumerated the services available in the
corrnnunity.

Police protection had been increased and a citizens'

radio patrol, maintained by area citizens, Negro and white, had
been established to assist the police in law enforcement.40

Police

statistics actually showed a decrease in the crime rate in the
Fourth Police District which included the area to the south of
76th Street, although the Third Police District, which included
Woodlawn, had one of the highest crime rates in Chicago.

In

response to the influx of young families which were replacing the
older residents in the conununity, a tenant referral service had
been established to aid new arrivals in securing apartments.

The

South Shore Open Housing Conunittee had an expressed goal of helping
39Headcounts, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1968, 1969 (Districts
Fourteen, Seventeen, Twenty-two). Proceedings, August 11, 1964,
p. 2713; February 23, 1967, p. 2560; April 12, 1967, pp. 2741-45;
April 26, 1967, pp. 2743, 2838-40; June 28, 1967, p. 3338.
40New World (Chicago), February 16, 1968, New Chicago Supplement, p. 15; February 16, 1968, p. 5; February 23, 1968, p. 5.
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white as well as Negro families in the area to create an integrated
community . . With the strong influence of University of Chicago
faculty and students residing in the area, and the numerous pro.
grams aimed at stabilizing the area, South Shore might have
appeared to be moving toward becoming one of Chicago's few integrated communities.

But'in 1967 Chicago sociologists had already

classified South Shore as a slowly changing neighborhood rather
than an integrated one.4 1
While Mrs. W. Lydon Wild lived in South Shore, another Board
of Education member lived in the area directly south of the
changing community.

John Carey's position as a steel union offi-

cial was directly related to the major steel companies which were
located in the South Chicago community.

In 1960 Poles and Mexicans

were the dominant group among the foreign stock and an established
Negro element had remained stable at about five percent of the
population.

The median family income for the entire census area

was $6,949 with 23.2 percent of the families earning over $10,000.
While income was relatively low, the 41 percent owner occupied
41

..
Ibid. Maurice Moore and .James McKeown, A Study of Integrated Living in Chicago, Report Number 4 of the Interuniversity
Social Research Committee, December, 1968 (Chicago: Community and
Family Study Center, 1968), p. 2. This report was prepared during
1967.
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housing would have indicated a degree of stability for the community, although deVise ranked the community 194th in economic rank
among the 250 communities of the Ch~cago Metropolitan areas.4 2
By 1966 it was estimated that little change had occurred in
the percentage of Negroes in South Chicago.

Negro students in

School District Seventeen, which served the southern part of the
commun~ty,

had actually declined as the result of the creation of

District Twenty-two in 1965.

The new district then served South

Shore and the South Chicago area north of s3rd Street.

However,

in this northern portion the Mann Elementary School showed a rapid
,increase in Negro enrollment from 26.6 percent in 1964 to 55.1
percent in 1966. 43
To the west of the southern half of South Chicago lies the
corrnnunity of Calumet Heights.

In 196G Poles, Russians, and Germans

were the leading nationalities among the foreign stock and only
nine Negroes had been counted in the census.

The median family

income fqr the entire census area was $8,611 and the two census
t_r_a_c,t_s __i,n the m.i.d_dl_e of the community were above $9,000.

In

42· •..
Factbook, pp. 106-07.
.
. 43 deVise, Chic~go' s Widening Color Ga_E, pp. 146, 152. Headcounts, 1964, 1965, 1966.(Districts Seventeen, Twenty-two). The
public elementary schools serving the community were: Mann,
Sullivan, Coles, J. N. Tho!p, P. Sheridan.

r
155
stability of housing Calumet Heights remained very high with 77.2
percent of the units being owner occupied and about seventy-three
percent of the units being single-family structures.

In 1966 the

.
. economic
. ran k among 250 communities
. .
community
was ran k e d 68th in
of the Chicago Metropolitan Area.

In this year it was also esti-

mated that the Negro population of the cormnunity had advanced to
1,224 people representing 6.2 percent of the total population.
This increase was reflected in an increase of Negro students in
the community's elementary schools from 67 in 1964 to 315 pupils
in 1966.

The McDowell Branch of Caldwell Elementary School, in

the northwest corner of Calumet Heights, accounted for 269 of these
students. 44
To the south of Calumet Heights lies the community Qf South
Deering.

In 1960, among the numerous native born Americans,

Yugoslavians, Russians, and Poles were the leading nationalities
of foreign stock.

In the Chicago Housing Authority's Trumbull

Park Homes 125 Negroes represented less than one percent of the
total corrnnunity population.

The median family income for the

en.t.i_re. ar.ea. was $7., 768 with 27 .1 percent of the families earning
4

4Factb6o~, pp. 110-11. deVise, Chicago's Widening Color
Gap, pp. 146, 154. Headcounts, 1964, 1966 (District Seventeen).
The public elementary schools serving the community were: Hoyne,
McDowell, Warren, Buckingham, Earhart.

r
over $10,000.

Only 1.8 percent of the housing units were consid-

"'"·· ered substandard and 72. 2 percent were owner occupied with about
seventy-nine percent of the units being single family structures.
In 1966 South Deering was ranked 174th in economic rank among 250
communities of the Chicago Metropolitan Area.

The Negro population

was estimated to have dropped to 57 individuals although 59 Negro
~tudents were counted in the community's elementary schools.45

The Avalon Park community lies to the west of South Shore
and the northern portion of South Chicago.

In 1960 Irish and

Germans remained the leading nationalities of foreign stock.
Census data recorded only six Negroes.

The median family income

for the entire census area was $8,697 with 40.3 percent of the
families earning over $10,000.

Only 0.4 percent of the housing

units were considered substandard and 74.2 percent were owner occupied with about seventy percent of the units being single fami.ly
structures, about one-fourth having been built since 1.940.

In

1966 Avalon Park was ranked 122nd in economic rank among 250 communities of the Chicago

Met~opolitan

Area.

The Negro population

had .leaped to an estimated 3,161 and further penetration was
.,

45

Factbook, pp. 116-17. deVise, Chicago's Widening Color
Qal?_, pp. 146, 156. Headcounts, 1964, 1966 (District Seventeen).
The public elementary schools serving the community were: Anthony,
Burnham, Goldsmith, Luella, Marsh, Bright.
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occurring.

The number of Negro students in Caldwell Elementary

school, the only Avalon Park public school in District Seventeen,
had advanced from twenty-five in 1964 to 221 in 1966.46
An incident occurred in Marynook, an area in Avalon Park,
which was indicative of a serious problem in developing a school
integration policy which would not have negative effects on
conununity.

the

In the spring of 1962 a large number of Negro students

were transferred into Avalon Park Elementary School which served
the Marynook neighborhood.

When protests against the move failed

to change the policy, thirty white families sold their homes to
Negro buyers within a few months and it appeared that the area
would change over rapidly.

The efforts of the local Parent-Teacher

Association, home owners' group, and the pastor of the neighborhood
Catholic Church helped to slow down the succession process considerably, and· it was not until 1967 that the school fell below tne
10 percent criteria for integration.

However, in an attempt to

keep white students in the school, the Board of Education was
obliged _to make numerous changes in attendance areas and graduates
46Factbook, pp. lb4-05. deVise, Chicago's Widening Color
Gap, pp. 145, 155. Headcounts, 1964, 1966 (District Seventeen).
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of the school were allowed to attend any high school. 4 7
In reviewing the data concerning the five communities in the
south Shore area it could be seen that most were experiencing some
degree of new integration.

South Shore and Avalon Park were

changing rapidly as the black belt reached the community borders
,

and advanced phalanx-like into· the areas.
beginning to change.

Calumet Heights was

The northern portion of South Chicago, bor-

dering on South Shore was integrating.

Only South Deering, still

somewhat remote from the expanding belt, was apparently stable.
On the northwest side of Chicago the western arm of the black
belt was advancing into the Austin area.

Situated on the western

edge of Chicago, this community extended from Fullerton Avenue
(2400 North) at its northern tip to Roosevelt Road (1300 South)
at its souttern edge with Kolmar Avenue (4500 West) and the Chicago
and Northwestern Railroad tracks as its eastern border.

The

extreme length and size of this community with its 125,133 residents counted in the 1960 census made generalizations hazardous,
but if the five northern census tracts were excluded, no census
tract p.r.ea varied more than $771 from the median family income of
47Moore ?-nd McKeown, A Study of Integrated Living in Chicago,
pp. 54-55. Headcounts, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966 (District Sixteen
and after 1964, District Twenty-seven). Chicago Sun-Times, June 19,
1965, p. 3. Proceedings, June 16, 1967, pp. 3247-48, 3270.
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$7,602 for the entire census area and 27.4 percent of the families
earned over $10,000.

Only 37.7 percent of the housing units were

owner occupied and 4 percent were judged substandard while three
of the four tracts directly south of Ohio Avenue (600 north) varied
from 11.6 percent to 21.6 percent substandard units with owner
occupancy as low as 22.3 percent.

The census counted thirty-one

. t h e community.
.
48
Negroes in

In 1966 Austin ranked 104th among the 250 communities of the
Chicago Metropolitan Area.

It was estimated that 774 Negroes lived

in the community in April, 1966, but 1,995 Negro students were
counted in the area high school and elementary schools in October,
1966.

The Real Estate Research Corporation pointed out that

resistance to Negro movement in the nearby areas of South Lawndale,
Cicero, and Humboldt Park had intensified penetration into. Austin,
and an annual transition rate of thirty-six blocks occurred between
1964 and. 1967.

In 1964 only the May and Young Elementary Schools

were integrated above the 10 percent criteria.

By 1966 the May and

Spencer schools were over fifty percent Negro (see chart on next
page).

The Young School, in the northeast corner of the community,

:rema.in~P.

48

stp.bi.li.z.ed at near 10 percent for the entire decade of

Factbook, pp. 64-65.

TABLE 2
INTEGRATION IN SELECTED SCHOOLS
OF THE AUSTIN COMMUN IT Ya
Year

Total Enrollment

Negro

Other

1964

May Elementary
847
571

184

12

1965

917,

575

259

19

1966

1035

400

597

38

1967

1559

244b

1308

41

0

7

1964

White

Spencer Elementary
971
936

1965

1116

870

103

L~9

1966

1304

592

694

18

1967

1325

227c

1091

7

1964

Young Elementary
585
757

74

0

1965

797

704

91

2

1966

798

685

104

9

1967

845

729d

112

4

aData compiled from Chicago Public Schools, Teacher Observation Headcount, (Hand tabulated Xeroxed copies, Chicago, 1964,
1965, 1966, 1967, District Four). Variations from total enrollment
occurred as only students present on the day of the headcount were
reported.
Puerto iican Students Included in White Students Count
b41 students

C69 students
160

dg students

161
1960.

This was because Negro migration continued west and south

into Austin rather than northward.49
In April, 1967, the Interuniversity Social Research Committee
sent interviewers into the Austin area to poll white residents on
attitudes toward integration.

Over one-half of the people ques-

tioned in the sampling were Roman Catholic, about one-third were
Protestant and less than two percent were Jewish.

In ethnic back-

ground one-third were of British, German, or Scandinavian descent,
about one-third were Irish and less than one-fifth were Italian.
The remainder were of Polish or other central and eastern European
.ancestry.

Two-fifths had lived in Austin over ten years while

about one-fourth lived in the community two years or less.

Mem-

bership in church related clubs was claimed by about one-fourth of
the interviewees.

Another 17 percent were members of parent-

teachers associations.

Only eighteen of the approximately 198

people a,nswering questions claimed membership in neighborhood

improvem~nt 4r block clubs.
aztions was not ascertained .

Active membership in these organiThirty-seven percent had school-age

. . . . 4_99eVise, Chicago's Widening Color Ga£, pp. 145, 152. , RERC,
ProjectionsL pp. x-1, x-2. Headcounts, 1966 (District Four).
444 Negro students in special schools for the handicapped have
not been counted.

r
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children.SO
Austinites expressed great concern about conditions in the
community.

Although 87 percent considered their neighborhood a

good place to live, 27 percent considered the immediate area as
dangerous and 58 percent felt their area would be worse in the
future.

About two-thirds thought Austin would be integrated

within five years and another 17 percent saw the community as
probably all Negro within this period.

Nearly one-half of the

survey respondents living in integrated blocks said they were
against Negroes living there.

In all-white blocks 29 percent

expressed opposition to integration of their neighborhood and
only 5 percent said they would favor integration.

Almost one-

half of the interviewees said they intended to move within the

-,

next two y\ars although 39 percent said they would not move . .) ...
When compared to two other Chicago communities and two
suburban areas which were surveyed, Austinites rated their schools
"poor" far more frequently.

It was ascertained that this dissat-

.isfaction was associated with the number of Negroes in the local
..... 5?Richard McKinlay and Ethyl Shanas, Austin: Civ:i·l Rights
and Integration in a Chica£$o Community, Report Number 3 of the
Interuniversity Social Research Committee, August, 1968 (Chicago:
Community and Family Study Center, 1968), pp. 1-10.

52

ibld., pp. 10-20.
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school.

While only 8.7 percent of the Austinites with no Negroes

in their school rated the schools "poor", 31.8 percent of the
respondents in areas with over one-half Negro enrollment considered
their schools to be substandard.

The most frequent specific com-

plaints were that schools were overcrowded (21.8 percent) and "too
much integration" (16.7 percent).

When questioned if white and

Negro students should attend the same schools, almost seventy percent said they should, but 23.3 percent favored different schools.
Regarding the degree of integration 54.1 percent of the respondents would not object if the school planned to make each classroom
one-fou,th Negro.

When the planned integration was to be one-half

Negro, those not objecting dropped to 40.2 percent of the
. •
52
Austinites.

All

i~dicators

in Austin pointed to a rapid succession

through the invasion and consolidation stages in the southern
portions.

The area was situated directly in the path of the

we.stern expansion of the Negro belt.

It could be estimated that

52oavid Street, Race and Education in the City: Findings
on Chicago, Report Number 5 of the Interuniversity Social Research
Committee, January, 1969 (Chicago: Community and Family Study
Center, 1969), pp. 5-9. The other communities surveyed were:
Ashburn, Rogers Park, Elmhurst, River Forest.

r
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over 5000 whites had left the community between 1960 and 1966.53
Almost one-half of the whites interviewed intended to move within
two years.
easier.

The large number of apartment units made mobility

The composition of ethnic groups was not likely to pro-

duce any organized resistance to penetration.

Reports of panic

peddling and blockbusting by real estate agents had been registered
with the Chicago Council on Human Relations, and disturbances with
racial overtones plagued Austin High School.54
The community of Belmont-Cragin was directly north of Austin,
being s\parated by the Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul Railroad
tracks.

In 1960 Poles remained the largest foreign stock group

with Italians and Germans representing the other leading nation·alities.

Only three Negroes were counted in the community of

60,883 persons.

The median family income for the entire area was

$7,547 and 25.8 percent of the famili.es earned over $10,000.

Over

53

deVise, pp. 143, 145. McKinlay and Shanas, Austin: Civil
Rights and Integration in a Chicago Community, p. 4. The decline
in white.population was computed by adding the estimated increase
in Negro population in Austin between 1960 and 1966 to the estimated decrease in total population between 1960 and 1966 and reducing the sum by 30 percent to account for white replacement as
indicated by the McKinlay and Shanas survey in which 29.9 percent of
the interviewees had lived in the area for less than six years.
54

~hicago Daily Defender, October 29, 1965, p. 4.
Sun-Times, December 8, 1965, pp. 1, 48.

Chicago
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one-half of the housing units were owner occupied.

By 1966 it was

estimated that 349 Negroes lived in the community but no Negro
students attended the two public schools in District Four, which
served the western half of the area.

Belmont-Cragin was placed

118th in economic rank among the 250 communities in the Chicago
Metropolitan Area.SS
The small community of Montclare was situated directly west
of Belmont-Cragin.
ethnic groups.

In 1960 Italians and Poles were the leading

Only one Negro was counted in the census among

11,802 r\sidents of the area.

The median family income was $7,843

with 28.3 percent earning over $10,000.
housing units were owner occupied.

Almost two-thirds of the

In 1966 fifteen Negroes were

estimated to be living in the community but no Negro students were
counted in the Locke School which served the area.

The economic

rank of Montclare was 107th among the 250 communities in the
Chicago Metropolitan Area.56
The community of Dunning ran west from Austin Avenue to
Pontiac and Cumberland Avenues.

It was bounded by Belmont Avenue

SSFactbook, pp. 52-53. deVise, Chicago's Widening Color Gap,
pp. 145, 151. Headcounts, 1966 (District Four).
56 Factbook, pp. 50-51. deVise, Chicago's Widening Color Gap,
pp. 145, 151. Headcounts, 1966 (District Four).
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on the south and Irving Park Road on the north.

Poles and Germans

were the leading ethnic group, but large numbers of Italians were
moving into the area in 1960.

Two Negroes were counted in the

census among 41,626 inhabitants.

Median family income was $7,953

with 30.8 percent earning over $10,000.
units were owner occupied.

Four-fifths of the housing

In 1966 twenty-one Negroes were esti-

mated to be living in the community, but no Negro students were
counted in the three schools and one branch serving the area.
Dunnin7was placed 76th in economic rank among the 250 communities
in the Chicago Metropolitan Area..57
Portage Park Community was directly east of Dunning and only
its four western census tracts were in the School District Four
area.

Poles, Germans, and Italians were the leading foreign stock

in 1960.

Seventeen Negroes were listed in the census among 65,925

inhabitants, _of which 24, 903 lived in the four western tracts.
The median income in the western section varied from $7,210 to
$8,532

w~th

the percentage earning over $10,000 ranging from 23.1

percent to 33.8 percent.

About seven-tenths of the housing units

in the western area were owner occupied.

In 1966 an estimated 140

Negroes lived in the community, but no Negro students were counted
57 Factbook, pp. 48-49. deVise, Chicago's Wid~ning Color Gap,
pp. 145, 151. Headcounts, 1966 (District Four).
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in the 0. A. Thorp and Smyser Schools which were in District
Four. 58
These four communities to the north of Austin were well above
the main movement of Negro expansion.

They were not integrated,

nor were they likely to experience integration in the next decade.
While no studies had been made ·regarding attitudes toward integration,

~he

large number of residents of central and southern

European background indicated that some resistance to penetration
might be expected, but the question would indeed be academic.

The

integration of schools in these areas would not be the result of
integrating communities.
In the meantime, the schools in southern Austin were rapidly
resegregating.

By June, 1967, the North Side Boundary Committee

of the Chicago Board of Education had been working for months with
representatives of the Austin community to reduce overcrowding at
the Spencer School.

It was reported that "many

pla~s

have been

considered and eliminated because of certain elements in the plan
or because of rejection by a significant section of the community."
Consideration was given to transferring 1400 students among most
of the schools in Austin south of North Avenue to relieve

58 Factbook, pp. 43-44. deVise, Chicago's Widening Color Gap,
pp. 145, 151. Headcounts~ 1966 (District Four).
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overcrowding.

This plan was abandoned because of the magnitude of

numbers of students being transferred.

Instead, a plan for moving

288 students from the Spencer to the Hay Elementary School was
--------

considered.

An attempt to stabilize a school by moving students

to another school in a nearby area was very unlikely to solve any
problems.

As integration of the second school occurred, white

parents were likely to withdraw their children and sell their homes
to Negroes as had happened in Marynook.

A plan to stabilize

schools without causing further segregation was needed.
have to be found soon.

It would

As the Real Estate Research Corporation

observed, when considering the exodus of whites from Chicago,

"Any

policies aimed at achieving racially integrated education by
stabilizing the racial balance in public schools must take effect
almost immediately. 11 59

59Proceedings, June 28, 1967, pp. 3310-11, 3339 (First
quote). RERC, Preliminary, p. 14 (Second quote).

r

CHAPTER V
-rN'TELLIGENCE AND RECOMMENDATION FUNCTIONS:
A PLAN EMERGES
Negro community spokesmen hailed the departure of Benjamin
Willis from the Chicago

S~hool

Superintendency as "positive in

itself and ending an era which was marked by a vigorous defense
of the racial status quo."

However, they held reservations about

the ability of Superintendent Redmond to alter "the same social,
political and economic forces that have successfully maintained
the racial status quo [which] will continue operating inside and
outside of the Chicago School system."

As a yardstick against

which future progress in school desegregation could be measured,
it was pointed out that over 90 percent of Negroes in public
elementary programs were in racially segregated schools in 1966.
In high schools over 71 percent of the Negro students were racially
segregated.

At the same time almost 76 percent of white children·

on the elementary level and about 69 percent of white pupils at
the secondary level attended public schools in which less than
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10 percent of a minority group were present.l
Certainly Redmond would not be able to alter these statistics
without the backing of his policy-making Board.

Two incidents may

reflect the difficulty he would encounter in obtaining any consensus from this body on matters of integration.
'

In January, 1967, the United States Office of Education
released a report criticizing the segregation in the Chicago
Public Schools.

A liberal Board member, pointing out the diffi-

culty of initiating integration policies in a city which was
residentially segregated, complained that "discriminatory practices
by city landlords, lending institutions, and real estate brokers
have accentuated the residential confinement of Negroes."
the

F~deral

Even

Housing Authority had been responsible for increasing

segregation 0y choosing housing project sites in all-black areas.
At this time a movement to prohibit discriminatory practices in
housing was underway in the state.

In May the Board unanimously

supported a resolution to pass a meaningful fair housing law.
1Harold M. Baron, Racial Segregation in the Chicago Public
Schools, 1965-1966, A pamphlet prepared by the Research Department
of the Chicago Urban League, September 20, 1966 (Chicago: Urban
League, 1966), pp. 1 (First and second quotes), 6-9, 18. The
Urban League used the 10 percent guideline to define segregation.
The statistics were based on an elaborate analysis of the racial
headcount taken in the Chicago Public Schools by teachers.
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In Chicago, "Project Good Neighbor" had been initiated by the
Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities to disseminate
information on integration.

But when Redmond requested that the
wit~

Board grant permission to distribute Council leaflets dealing

fair housing questions in the schools, the Board denied the request
in a five to four vote.

Apparently a majority of Board members

were willing to endorse principles but did not wish to involve the
school system in any controversy in the communities regarding these
principles. 2
Another incident indicates the growing inclination of the
Board to disregard recommendations from the superintendent.

The

Caldwell Elementary School in Avalon Park was about 30 percent
Negro in October, 1966, and the growing number of black students
was seen as a threat to the stability of the school.

In ordei to

alleviate fears of white residents and stabilize the racial mixture
at the school, the superintendent recommended that a number of
bl~ck

students be transferred to the almost all-white Warren

Elementary School further south in Chicago Heights.

The plan was

2u.s. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Report of
Office of Education, "Analysis of Certain Aspects of Chicago Public
Schools Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, January,
1967" (Washington, D.C.: ERIC Microfilms, June 21, 1968), ED015969.
Chicago Daily News, February 20, 1967, p. 3 (Quote). Chicago
Sun-Times, May 25, 1967, p. 3.
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rejected by the Board in a seven to one vote, on the grounds
that the students at the Caldwell School did not want to transfer.
When Redmond requested that the matter be referred back to the
Board South Side Boundaries Committee, Mrs. Wild replied, "Doctor,
we've had all that. 11 3
Changes were made in the administration of the permissive
transfer program.

In February, 1967, Redmond commented:

While relieving overcrowding in some high schools the permissive transfer program has also had a marked effect on
integration. Despite housing patterns only four high schools
have no Negro pupils enrolled; two far Northside high schools
have an enrollment of more than 10 percent Negro students as
a result of the permissive transfer programs. In some schools,
however, white children taking advantage of the permissive
transfer plan have endangered integration as the percentage
of white versus Negro students decreased sharply. In order
to prevent resegregation and to contribute to the stabilization of communities, eight integrated schools should be
eliminated from any list of sending or receiving schools.4
In accordance with this observation six high schools had
been dropped from the transfer program in 1966.

In the spring of

1967 Austin and South Shore High Schools, in rapidly changing
3Chicago Public Schools, Teacher Observation Headcount,
(Hand tabulated Xeroxed copies, Chicago, 1966, 1967, District
Seventeen). Hereinafter referred to as Headcounts. Chicago
Sun-Times, January 17, 1967, p. 14.
4 Board of Education, City of Chicago, Proceedings, Board
of Education, City of Chicago, (Chicago: Board of Education,
February 23, 1967), p. 2560. Hereinafter referred to as
Proceedings, date of meet~ng, page number.
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connnunities, were also withdrawn from the list of sending schools.5
But the Board did allow an exception.

At a public hearing

on the permissive transfer program held in April, 1967, the room
was packed with protestors from Bogan High School on the southwest
side of Chicago.

These people complained of the Board's "under-

handed and tyrannical tactics in making decisions without consulting the community," and threatened to "meet with total opposition any plan that even in the smallest way jeopardizes the
peighborhood schools."

They warned that any attempt to allow

outside students to transfer to Bogan would cause white parents
· to run to the suburbs.

In the face of this opposition the Board

dropped Bogan from the list of receiving schools.

It was con-

tended that by withdrawing its branches back to the main building
the school would be at the city-wide average of facility utilization.

This capacity ratio was determined by comparing the

·number of students in a school to its facilities.

If the ratio

was above the city average, the students at the school qualified
5Proceedings, February 23, 1967, p. 1560; April 12, 1967,
pp. 2837-2838. James F. Redmond, Increasing Desegregation of
Faculties, Students and Vocational Education Programs, Report to
the Board of Education, City of Chicago, August 23, 1967 (Chicago:
Board of Education, 1967), pp. B-4, B-5. Hereinafter referred to
as Redmond Report. Also see above chapter iii, pp. 83-84. The
excluded high schools were Austin, South Sho~e, Waller, Harper,
Calumet, _Morgan Park, Harrison and Tilden.
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to transfer to other schools which were below the city average.6
When Warren Bacon, an outspoken Board member who advocated
desegregation policies, was asked if Bogan should be forcefully
integrated, he replied, "No they are living in the nineteenth
century.

Perhaps in another century or two they might catch up

to modern day thinking . . . . I think we have enough schools in
Chicago where we can move ahead positively without bothering with
Bogan."7
Not all integrationists agreed.

The vice president of the

Organization for the Southwest Community asked that Bogan be put
. back on the transfer list and stated, ''We are shocked at the
Board's capitulation to the local pressure of Bogan property
owners' leaders on the issue of desegregation."

Representatives

of Mather and Sullivan High Schools on the far north side of the
city also expressed their support of the transfer program.8
6proceedings, March 22, 196l, p. 2671; April 12, 1967, pp.
2740-42~ 2837-38.
Chicago Sun-Times, April 13, 1967, p. 8
(Quotes). The ratio was based on assuming the school had a nine
period day and then computing overcrowding on the basis of how
many students the school was built to hold. The city-wide average
was 132.1 percent more students than the capacity of all the
schools. If a school exceeded this percentage, it was a receiving
school.
7chicago Sun-Times, April 13, 1967, p. 8.
Brbid.
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Obviously, any choice of communities for purposes of integration would

hav~

to consider the hostility of the residents

and the effect this would have on the program.

Cognizant of the

vast differences between connnunities within the city, Redmond
called for more experimentation within a more decentralized
school system.
cern

~mong

He identified three distinct major areas of con-

the vast ghetto areas, the fringe middle class areas

and the peripheral areas of the city "where communities know
neither integration nor crowding nor lack of opportunity and where
city-wide techniques for sociological change have been questioned. 11 9
Redmond saw the need for a saturation of all areas with
innovative skills, services and programs.

He emphasized building

programs and facility development to help stabilize existing
integrated neighborhoods and "make possible experiences of multiracial, multi-cultural education" by building "ahead, not behind
·the movement of people."

The schools had to be made more at-

tractive if they were to be a factor in a city-wide plan to stabilize neighborhoods and provide for future growth.

The need for

programs to reduce class sizes, introduce innovative teaching
9James F. Redmond, "Chicago Schools: Problems and Perspectives" (Speech delivered at University of Chicago, Chicago,
Illinois, December 6, 1966). (Typewritten copy).
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techniques, and provide better working conditions for teachers
was reiterated by the new superintendent. 10
In January, 1967, the Chicago School Superintendent had a
more specific set of problems placed before him by the federal
government.

The United States Office of Education presented to

the Chicago Board a brief of complaints about segregation in the
schoo~

system which had been garnered over the prior few years.

Special attention was paid to the segregation of faculty through
assignment patterns, questionable boundary and student placement
patterns, the lack of non-white students in the apprenticeship
. training program, and the development of open enrollment for
vacational and trade schools.11

In April, 1967, with a government:

grant, the Chicago School staff and advisors began to consider
school desegregation policies which would remedy the problems
presented in·the government's complaint.
The Redmond Report, as the Chicago School response came to
be called, admitted the segregation of the school system in the
four aforementioned areas.

It went on to complain that the

lOibid.
llu.s. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Report of
Office of Education, "Analysis of Certain Aspects of Chicago Public
Schools Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, January,
1967" (Washington D.C.: ~RIC Microfilms, June 21, 1968), ED015969.
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Chicago system did not have the necessary staff to explain planned
changes in order to gain necessary public support and called for
more sophisticated communication and the development of a community
relations department.

The report emphasized that "people are not

going to accept and support what they do not understand or believe
in."12
Regarding desegregation, the report observed that the task
of obtaining quality and integrated education was made formidable
by the large influx of children from rural families who had "suffered every form of deprivation."

This influx had also resulted

in a rapid increase of minority children as compared with the
percentage of white children in the schools.

This change in

population "in large measure, reflects residential changes within
the city which have been a cause for serious concern by those
responsible or deeply interested in the future of Chicago."

The

report quoted the Chicago Region, Illinois Congress of Parents
and Teachers statement that "unless this trend is reversed the
city will continue to find its problems and expenses multiplying
at the same time that its resources and tax base decline."

Thus,

the report summarized its major problem as "achieving extended
12'Redmond Report, pp. 1, A-3, B-16, C-5, D-7, D-8 (Quote),
D-9--D-25.
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integration while at the same time stabilizing the city through
reassurances to the white community. 11 13
In considering the implementation of school desegregation,
plan consultants brought in from outside the school system agreed
that the immediate short range goal must be to anchor the whites
that still resided in the city.

The major problem was seen to be

in fringe areas which were undergoing racial change.

White people

in these fringe areas were generally ''less secure economically and
~:;ocially

than their middle class counterparts" who lived on the

periphery of the city.

Much of the "integration" which city offi-

. cials had calculated existed in fringe areas which would soon become black segregated areas.

Attempts to integrate schools by

changing boundary lines in fringe areas often
exodus.

hasten~d

the white

The consultants observed, "There is little reason in pre-

cedent for whites to believe that the school and neighborhood will
remain integrated, and white perception of the situation is the
determining factor in the consecutive resegregation of
13rbid., pp. B-3 (First quote), B-4 (Second, third quote),
B-5 (Fourth quote).
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neighborhoods. 11 14
The consultants concluded that while the fringe areas should
be integrated, it was imperative that policy makers "avoid forcing
the extreme pressures of school integration exclusively upon such
vulnerable neighborhoods."

To alleviate the pressure it was sug-

gested that school administrators limit the minority percentage
intro4uced into fringe schools and shift some of this pressure into
more remote and unthreatened neighborhoods.

While the committee

was divided, it was suggested that Negro students be assigned,
without choice, in transfers from their neighborhood. school to a
. remote receiving school.

This position was taken because of the

historical fact that few Negroes transferred when a choice remained
open to them.

Because of the possibility of Negro rejection of the

imposition of a compulsory plan and the apprehension that parents
in the sending areas might have, the recommending committee was
unable to present a unanimous report.15
In- selecting receiving schools it was suggested that criteria
14

Ibid., pp. B-15, B-16, B-17 (First quote), B-18, B-19
(Second quote). John E. Coons, Professor of Law, Northwestern
University, was one member of the panel who had been an outspoken
critic of the lack of a positive integration policy in the
Chicago Schools.
15rbid., pp. B-19 {Quote), B-20.
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include non-threatened areas of somewhat higher income families in
single residence homes relatively distant from the sending area.
If schools in the receiving area did not have sufficient space for
new students, it was recommended that mobiles and additions be
used.

To maintain a stable racial proportion in the schools, a

quota system was endorsed as "the only feasible short range approach
that will anchor sufficient members [numbers] of whites to make
meaningful integration even a long range possibility. 11 16
In specific plans the Redmond Report introduced some important innovations in Chicago school policy.

In a union of inte-

gration and stabilization policy, it called upon the entire white
community to share in the responsibility for integration by maintaining fixed racial proportions in the schools.

In fringe area

schools which were already experiencing integration, it was
recommended.that the number of minority students be limited to a
"viable racial balance."

In order to keep this viable balance it

would be necessary to transfer some minority students living in
the racially changing school attendance area to other schools which
were not threatened by racial inundation.

It was suggested that

geographic blocks which were predominantly Negro within the

16

Ibid., p. B-21.
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integrated school attendance area be selected, and the pupils in
these blocks be assigned to schools in non-adjacent areas of the
city where integration would result.

Transportation would be

provided with adult supervision on the buses between the sending
and receiving schools.17
In order to minimize opposition and allay any fears which
might result in white flight from the receiving area, it was
recommended that the number of students allowed to transfer from
a sending school should be limited to not more than 15 percent
of the total student body in a receiving elementary school.

As

students from non-contiguous attendance areas would also be
eligible to attend the high school of the receiving school, it
I

was recommended that this number be limited to 25 percent of the
total student body in the high school.

Provision was also to be

made for additional educational staff and services to meet the
needs of the newly enrolled pupils.

The staffs of the rec·eiving

school were to be given in-service education in human relations.18
Besides the non-contiguous assignment program, an intracommunity pilot program was recommended in which the racial
17Ibid., pp. B-6, B-7.
lSibid., pp. B-7, B-17.
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percentages in selected schools of one area of the city would be
equalized.

The transfer of students between these intra-community

school3 would also require the busing of pupils.

The non-con-

tiguous and intra-community programs represented the two most novel
plans for the Chicago schools.

They were considered "short-term"

recommendations, policies which could be put into effect within
three years. 1 9
Other short term recommendations included:

a continuation

of the voluntary permissive transfer program; continuation of the
examination of school attendance areas with racial integration as
a factor to consider in establishing attendance boundaries; selection of school sites in accordance with the Armstrong Act which
required that integration be considered; development of cooperative
programs with private and suburban school systems.

A magnet school

offering superior instruction and programs in integrated classrooms
and drawing from a city-wide area was proposed for an intermediate
term objective, to be implemented within three to seven years.

A

long range plan called for a feasibility study on the possibility
of establishing educational parks. 20
When the Redmond Report was presented to the Board it was
l9Ibid., p. B-8.

ZOibid., p. B-21.
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accepted by a ten to one vote.

Judge Scheffler abstained on the

grounds that acceptance involved the Board in making commitments
it could not keep.
quotas was illegal.
no cost

~rejections.

He further contended that establishing racial
Scheffler also complained that the Report made
It was reported that the study deliberately

avoided considering costs in order to keep the Board from becoming
involved in arguments about whether it could afford the proposals. 2 1
Board President Whiston accepted the Report in principle but
reminded everyone that the Board members did not promise to
authorize every specific proposal.

He pointed out that meetings

would have to be set up with Mayor Daley as the "plan affects the
public and public finances to such a great degree that the mayor
is certain to be interested in it."

Mrs. Green and Mrs. Wild also

had reservations about particulars in the Report and Mrs. Wild was
concerned with the lack of funds for any immediate implementation.2 2
Board Vice-President Murray observed that the Report appeared
to end the neighborhood school concept, but concluded that the
21 Proceedings, August 27, 1967, p. 534. Chicago Sun-Times,
August 24, 1967, pp. 1, 4; August 25, 1967, pp. 3, 19. Chicago
Dally News, August 25, 1967, p. 6.
22 Proceedings, August 27, 1967, p. 524 (Quote). Chicago
Daily News, August 25, 1967, p. 6. Chicago Sun-Times, August 24,
1967, pp. 1, 4 .
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recommendations are "proper and right and should be implemented as
soon as possible."

Mrs. Malis felt the plan should be implemented

immediately in light of racial change occurring in Austin, Lake
View, Lincoln Park and South Shore communities.

She, however, did_

later express doubts about forcing children to bus on a nonvoluntary
basis.

Redmond stated that in drawing up the Report "we didn't

back away from things because someone thought they might conflict
with law. 1123
Although the plan designated no specific areas, opposition
to it was widespread in the peripheral areas of the city.

An

Illinois Senator from the southwest side promised to meet with
other politicians to stop the Report from being implemented.

While

protests were especially strong in the Bogan High School area, the
Kilbourn

O~ganization

of the northwest side and Operation CreJcent,

a suburban based group, were vocal in their opposition.24
Representatives of the Negro community also found fault with
the Report.

Al Raby of the Coordinating Council of Community

Organizations was opposed to the quota plan as stigmatizing Negro
23 Proceedings, August 27, 1967, p. 534. Chicago Sun-Times,
August 24, 1967, pp. 1, 4; August 25, 1967, pp. 3, 19. Chicago
Daily News, August 25, 1967, p. 6.
24

Chicago Sun-Times, August 24, 1967, p. 3.
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children and implying "that a black Chicago would be undesirable
and that Negroes will always be underpaid."

Raby had been influ-

ential in stopping government funding in 1965 and again tttreatened
to ask the government to withhold its support.

While the Chicago.

Urban League praised the Report, by November, 1967, it was demanding
that a clear statement of priorities be issued along with a timetable for implementing the major features.

The Urban League showed

more concern that education in the ghetto be improved and the
intermediate range magnet schools and long range educational parks
be developed than in the busing proposal.

Indeed, one Negro news-

paper was emphasizing that quality education in already integrated
schools would be most effective.

The Negro press displayed no

great enthusiasm for busing to integrate in the period of 1967
following the Redmond Report.25
The Catholic press reflected the mixed feelings which Church
members had toward the Report.

In one article entitled, "Redmond

Plan met with 'cautious' enthusiasm by Catholic educators," James
25 chicago Daily News, September 11, 1967, p. 34 {Quote).
Above, p. 109. Chicago .Daily Defender, November 28, 1967, p. 8;
December 5, 1967, p. 13. In late December, 1967, the Chicago
Daily Defender did carry a series on the Educational Park concept
which articles described as the "most specific proposal being discussed today . . . in keeping with the principles of integration
and quality education." Chicago Daily Defender, December 18,
1967, p. 6.
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McDermott of the Catholic Interracial Council supported the plan
arguing, "it gives the changing neighborhood a fighting chance for
establishing interracial stability," and the quota plan was seen
as an "opportunity for further interracial contact and not as some-:
thing devised as a barrier impeding integration."

However, other

spokesmen felt the plan "writes off the present children in the
inner city" by not emphasizing programs to alleviate their plight.
Fr. Mallette, a pri:est in an inner city parish criticized the plan
for not considering the growing demand for local control of neighborhood institutions, and Rev. John T. Richardson, the executive
vice-president of DePaul University of

Chicag~

pointed out that

the "plan could be dangerous if it engendered the feeling that our
education system alone could solve our racial problem. 11 26
Despite complaints that the Redmond Report was not being
implemented,· and even an announcement by an assistant superintendent of Chicago Schools that busing would probably not begin
until September, 1968, work was in progress during the surmner of
26 New World (Chicago), September 1, 1967, pp. 1-2. The
Redmond Report did recognize the plight of ghetto children and
recommended that a "purely voluntary transfer plan be available"
to them. Observing that "few families will avail themselves of
the opportunity," the authors postulated that the offer would have
"symbolic importance. It would suggest that the interests of the
Negro child in the ghetto have not been subordinated to an allencompassing policy of neighborhood stabilization." Redmond
g_eport, p. B-21.
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1967.

United States Senator Dirksen of Illinois was considering

submitting a proposal in Congress to forbid the use of federal
funds to achieve racial integration by busing.

School officials,

however, felt $5p0,000 could be obtained under the Civil Rights
Act to bus Negro children out of fringe areas where the racial
balance of schools had been upset and an exodus of white families
was threatened.27
Funds would be an issue in the busing program, but, as John
Coons had observed in a civil rights report in 1961, paid transportation was critical to the success of any transfer program.
Another caveat not so easily observed was that transfer students
should be carefully screened to avoid sending children from culturally deprived backgrounds into an area where their poor social
attitudes, preparation and interests might confirm stereotypes.

28

However, as the plan developed this problem tended to resolve
itself.
27chicago Sun-Times, August 25, 1967, pp. 3, 19. Chicago
Daily News, August 25, 1967, p. 6. Chicago Daily Defender,
December 7, 1967, p. 17.
28John E. Coons, "Chicago," Civil Rights U.S.A.: Public
Schools Cities in the North and West, 1962, A Report to the United
Stated Commission on Civil Rights (Washington, D.C.: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Off°ice, 1962), pp. 23233. Joseph Pois, The School Board Crisis: A Chicago Case Study
(Chicago: Educational Methods, Inc., 1964), p. 20.
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Another problem rested in the lack of any accepted guidelines
defining racial imbalance.

Neither the courts nor the 1964 Civil

Rights Act had set any fixed ratio as the basis for an integrated
school.

Adam Clayton Powell had suggested a "community ratio"

which would allow only a 20 percent deviation from the ratio in
the community.

Obviously, the committee which drew up the busing

plan for the Redmond Report considered the community ratio to be
untenable for the city in which over 50 percent of the public
school students were Negro.29

The 15 percent quota for elementary

schools and 25 percent quota for high schools appears to be an
arbitrary figure chosen on the basis that it would not create
undue unrest

~n

segregated white areas marked for integration.

Other cities had initiated busing programs prior to the
Chicago plan.

A questionnaire was sent out by the Chicago admin-

istration to 128 cities asking reasons for busing, details about
how it was carried out and an evaluation of the success of the
program.

Of the 104 cities which replied, about three-fourths

were busing students other than the handicapped.

The most common

reason given for transporting students was t.hat they lived beyond
29James Bolner, "Defining Racial Imbalance in Public Educational Institutions," Journal of Negro Education, XXXVII (Spring,
1968), 118. Northwest Times(Chicago), February 8, 1968, p. 1.
Headcounts, 1967.
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a given distance from the school.

However, twenty-eight systems

listed overcrowding as a factor, twenty-nine systems listed integration as a purpose and another eleven gave the improvement of
the educational program as a goal.

A surprisingly few students

were being bused--about 20,000 in all the replying cities.30
It was often difficult to relate many aspects of these other
busing programs to the particular problems of Chicago.

The

Evanston, Illinois plan, mentioned frequently during the busing
decision controversy in Chicago is a good illustration.

Located

just north of Chicago, this community of about 80,000 population
differed considerably from Chicago in social and economic status
as well as ethnic composition.

With about one-fourth of its

population contained in a Negro ghetto near the

g~ographic

center

of the relatively compact suburb, it was not difficult to adjust
boundaries and bus students in a two-way plan to achieve integration.

Nonetheless, the implementation of the plan had taken

30Francis B. McKeag, past Assistant Superintendent, School
Planning, Chicago Public Schools, private taped interview held in
his office, Chicago, Illinois, August 30, 1971. Thomas S. Teraji,
past Director, Division of Attendance Area Studies, Chicago Public
Schools, private taped interview held in his office, Chicago,
Illinois, May 30, 1973. Mr. McKeag referred to his personal files
to answer questions about other plans. Some of the responding
cities were: Syracuse, Rochester, Berkeley, Seattle, Evanston,
Los Angeles, and Philadelphia.
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three years and was not actually begun until September, 1967.

The

two-way program, in which both white and Negro students were trans£erred, became a major aspect of the comparisons and debates in
the Chicago imbroglio.31
Philadelphia was a city which was more easily compared to
Chicago.

About one-third of its population was Negro and over

one-half of its public school enrollment consisted of black students.

It had a large Roman Catholic system in which the student

body was about 90 percent white.

A busing program which began in

1964 had originally been designed to relieve overcrowding.
Beginning with a few hundred students the program had expanded to
over 1000 pupils.

Philadelphia authorities were reported to see

little evidence that the busing program had stabilized any neighborhoods and were introducing the magnet school and educational
park concepts.
During the Chicago busing decision

controvers~,

studies of

the Philadelphia program were published pointing out that Negro
students being bused into formerly all-white schools did better on
31 chicago's Ameri~an, December 28, 1967, p. 4. Southeast
Economist (Chicago, January 7, 1968, p. 1. Northwest Times
(Chicago), January 18, 1968, p. 6. Pierre deVise, Chicago's
Widening Color Gap, Report Number 2 of the Interuniversity Social
Research Committee, December, 1967 (Chicago: Community and Family
Study Center, 1967), pp. !35, 139.
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achievement tests than students from their neighborhood who were
not bused.

The effect was more pronounced in the earlier grades

than for students at a sixth grade level.

The study was reported

to also indicate that white students in receiving schools
performed better than children in all-white classrooms although
no effect was discernible in the sixth grade.

The children being

bused in Philadelphia were chosen at random rather than being
selected to avoid cultural clashes.3 2
Specific information about racial stability in neighborhoods
of the city was a critical factor in determining the details for
the busing plan.

The Board had authorized the Real Estate Research

Corporation to. make a detailed study of demographic patterns in
the ciuy.

The Interuniversity Social Research Committee, con-

sisting of locai universities, was conducting studies of attitudes
on integration in selected neighborhoods.

Chicago Board demog-

raphers also had access to racial spot surveys.

All students in

the public schools filled out a slip with their address, and
teachers indicated the race of the student on the form.

Local

Sun-Tim~s, February 25, 1968, pp. 20, 44. Northwest Times (Chicago), February 1, 1968, p. 8. The effects of
busing in Chicago will be considered in the next chapters of this
dissertation. The effects of busing in other cities are noted here
as an indication of the information which was being made available
to Chicago citizens by their local press.
32chicago
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school administrators then plotted the racial composition of each
block in their district.

These spot surveys, filled out in

September, 1967, gave a relatively accurate indication of the race
:of public school students in each block of Chicago. 33
A choice of communities from which to obtain students for
,busing was not difficult to make.
South-Shore and south Austin areas.

All evidence pointed to the
Community organizations in

South Shore had been asking the School Board to allow some form of
-planned integration to help stabilize the community, and Julian
Klugmann of the South Shore Commission reported that his organi· zation had specifically requested an intra-community plan in the
_fall of 1967. 34
In South Shore the Bryn Mawr, Mann, and Caldwell Schools had
been resegregating.

In 1963 the Bryn Mawr was over 80 percent

white while in 1967 only about 22 percent were counted as white.
At the Mann the comparable figures for these years were 92 percent
33Teraji, May 31, 1973, and McKeag, August 30, 1971. Chapter
iv of this study deals in detail with numerous aspects of the data
available to the school administration planners.
34chicago Sun-Times, December 29, 1967, p. 8. Ter'aji, May 31,
1973, and McKeag, August 30, 1971. Corrnnunity demands for stabilization in South Shore and relief from overcrowding in Austin are
described in chapter iv of this study.
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and 24 percent, while they were 95 percent. and 35 percent at the
Caldwell.

These schools were overcrowded, and action would have

to be taken immediately to keep the remaining white students in
the building. 35
In the Austin area overcrowding at the May and Spencer
Schools had beome a severe problem.
fifty~five

Classrooms had fifty to

pupils, and rooms normally used for such services as

the library and auditorium had been pressed into use for classes .
.A new upper grade center (middle school) was to be built but was
not near completion.

Recommendations to adjust boundary lines in

· seven schools in order to relieve overcrowding at Spencer were
abandoned on the basis that 1400 students would have been required
to change their scho.ol affiliation.

A substitute proposal scheduled

about 300 students in the seventh and eighth grades of the Spencer
to be transferred in September, 1967, to the Hay School which had
space made available when it was closed as a branch of Steinmetz
High Schoo1. 3

?

35Proceedings, January 10, 1967, p. 2436.
36Proceedings, June 28, 1967, pp.' 3309-10, 3339-40.· Teraji,
May 31, 1973, and McKeag, August 30, 1971. Stanley Ptak, past
Principal of the May School, private taped interview held in his
office, Chicago, Illinois, August 14, 1972.
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the sending communities precluded any serious consideration of it
for receiving schools.

In retrospect, one planner recognized that

no community was likely to have a majority of its citizens favor
this social experiment.38
Thus, demographic data and geography determined the areas
into which the students would be bused.

The areas directly south

of the three schools in south Chicago were relatively stable and
middle-class communities.

None of the schools in the area were

integrated at a 10 percent level although most of them had Negroes
in attendance.

~ny

of the schools were filled to capacity and

.would require mobile units in order to accommodate new students.
The Austin area offered a more comfortable situation.

The com-

munities to the north were stable, middle class, and the schools
were not crowded.

Unlike the area south of South Shore, these

communities did not rest in the path of the expanding Negro ghetto.
The busing of black students into the northern area was not likely
to create a situation which might hasten an exodus of white residents as was possible in the southern area plan.39
No organizations were contacted during the time the plan was
38Teraji, May 31, 1973.
3 9Proceedings, January 10, 1967, pp. 2431, 2433, 2436, 2438.
Above, chapter iv, pp. 153-68.
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being conceived.

Local administrators in sending schools were

contacted for particular information and were aware that a plan
was being developed, but the number of people aware of specifics
was kept to a minimum.

One planner reported that the adminis-

tration, "wanted the Board to get the report Lbusing plan] without
'

too much flak from the community. 11 40
action.

The Redmond Report required

Legal and moral imperatives were present.

The decision

to implement the busing plan, however, belonged to the Board, not
the administration.

The new Superintendent of Schools was observing

the relationship in which it was his duty to recommend but the
Board's task to make decisions.

The way was open for the Board

to bear the burden of accepting or rejecting a very controversial
program.
On December 28, 1967, during the Christmas recess of the
schools, the initial busing recommendation was submitted to the
Board.

The official statement was rather brief.

Attention was

called to the Redmond Report and its observation "that any plans
undertaken by the Board of Education to promote stabilization and
40 McKeag, August 30, 1971, (Quote). Ptak, August 14, 1972.
Julian Lewitt, Principal of the Sayre Elementary School, August 12,
1972, Telephone interview, Chicago Illinois. Robert Bell, Retired
Superintendent of District Four, containing the· Austin community,
private interview at Schurz High School, Chicago, Illinois, June
22, 1972.
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integration must be implemented immediately, if they are to be
effective."

Data from the preliminary report of the Real Estate

Research Corporation regarding school enrollment was cited to
justify the decision to bus from the Austin and South Shore areas ..
Specific schools were not mentioned; rather, the recommendation
utilized the rationale that
overcrowding and racial imbalance in some of the elementary
schools of the Austin Area dictate the need for implementing
the Non-Contiguous Attendance area recommendation of the
Desegregation Report immediately
arid
overcrowding and racial imbalance in some of the elementary
schools of the South Shore and related areas urge that
immediate steps be taken to implement the Intra-Community
Pilot Program which is a short term recommendation in the
Desegregation Report.41
Board President Frank Whiston was reported to have no
comments at the time the busing recommendation was made.

Vice-

president Thomas Murray felt the Board should delay action until
further studies could be made of the effects of
in other cities.

inte~ration

plans

Mrs. W. Lydon Wild objected to the assignment

of students to different schools according to the blocks they
lived on as "herding ch{ldren like cattle."

She favored deferment

41Proceedings, December 27, 1967, pp. 1032-33. Pertinent
data from the Real Estate Research Corporation is discussed in
chapter i~ pp. 123, 126-3~, 138-40, 148-50.
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of the plans and indicated she would probably oppose the final
plan which was to be presented on January 10, 1968.

Warren Bacon

observed that the plans represented a move to stabilize already
integrated schools and cautioned that not to use vacant classrooms
in outlying all-white areas would be indefensible in view of the
Board's pressing financial needs.

Cyrus Adams, considering the

loss of white students in the public school system, urged that,
"this is a trend we've got to arrest.
work, but we've got to try."

This plan may or may not

Mrs. Louise Malis spoke of the need

for stabilization and prophetically observed, "We will never get
·a consensus from an entire community, no more than we can get a
consensus on this Board. 11 42
As presented, the rationale for the plans was based on the
proclaimed Board policies of stabilization and relief from overcrowding which now became entwined in a discernibly resolute
desegregation policy.

An outright rejection of the .plans would

have been difficult to justify for any Board member who might have
been inclined to do so.

A request that the recommendation be

deferred to another meeting (a common Board policy on new business)
was voted down with only the Board president and vice-president
42chicago Sun-Times, December 28, 1967, pp. 1, 20 (Quote).
Chicago's American, Decem~er 28, 1967, p. 1.
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favoring deferment.43

The Board would now enter the first phase

of its encounters with community reaction.
Three of the four major Chicago newspapers announced their
guarded approval of a busing program.

The Chicago Daily News,

while considering the plan to be controversial not only on an
emotional plane but also at practical and educational levels, concluded that the program should be tried as "the future of the
entire city is at stake in the battle to stabilize neighborhoods
and to upgrade the quality of education throughout Chicago."
Chicago's American favored busing as "no other approach has been
suggested

. that seems likely to accomplish the goals of

improving the schools and stopping the exodus of white families
from an expanding Negro core."
busing program,

th~

In considering protests against the

newspaper stated, "It is up to the opponents

of this plan to come up with something better.

They cannot merely

block it and hope for some alternative to turn up." ·On the other
hand the American's sister paper, the Chicago Tribune, contended
that "nobody ever told the school board that its job was to make
over the community in terms of some abstract sociological
43Proceedings, December 27, 1967, p. 1033.
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principle. 11 44

The Tribune continued to oppose the busing plans

during the period the decision was being made.
Early newspaper reports announced that 5000 pupils were to
be bused in a two-way plan, moving both white and black students,
to begin January 29, 1968.

These accounts identified the Spencer

and May Schools in the Austin district as sending schools and
suggested that schools to the south of the South Shore District
Twenty-two would·be designated as receiving schools.45

As the

plans developed, the number of pupils to be bused decreased, the
two-way plan was dropped, and the date for commencing the program
.was pushed back as the Board expanded the number and scope of its
hearings with the public.
That the transportation of 5000 students was ever seriously
contemplated by the school administration seems highly unlikely.
Francis McKeag, who was Assistant Superintendent for School
Planning, has denied that this number was being considered.

When

44Editorial, Chicago Daily News, December 28, 1967, p.14.
Editorial, Chicago Sun-Times, December 29, 1967, p. 23. Editorial,
Chicago Tribune, January 11, 1968, p. 12. Editorial, Chicago's
American, December 27, 1967, p. 24.
45chicago Daily News, December 28, 1967, p. 3. Chicago's
American, December 27, 1967, pp. 1, 4; December 28, 1967, p. 1.
Chicago Tribune, January 7, 1968, p. 28; January 8, 1968, p. 5.
Chicago Sun-Times, December 28, 1967, pp. 1, 20. Chicago Daily
Defender, December 27, 1967, p. 4.
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the initial recommendation was introduced to the Board in December,
1967, the superintendent estimated the cost to bus fifty children
for a school year would be $5700.

If the total $150,000 he asked

to be appropriated for the plan was to be spent only on buses,
1300 would have been the maximum number of students which could
have been involved.

A number approximating this figure was being

considered when the plans were introduced to the Board in December,
1967.

However, as the Board's representatives met with community

groups, adjustments were "made in plans discussed in order to
minimize opposition in communities."

One official observed,

"Every time we went out to the community the thing got smaller. 11 46
The contemplated two-way busing referred to the South Shore
area where community organizations had been working with the Board
in attempting to stabilize the area.

Both the South Shore Com-

mission and· the South East Community Organization had supported
the Redmond Plan in principle.

However, the South Shore Commission

was much more adamant in its demands for a two-way busing plan
involving thousands of students than the South East Community
Organization which encompassed the area where receiving schools
46McKeag, August 30, 1971 (First quote). Proceedings,
December 27, 1967, p. 1932. Teraji, May 31, 1973 (Second quote).
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would be located in District Seventeen.47
The president of the South Shore Commission expressed the
belief that "many people want to raise their children in integrated
communities but are afraid of 'inundation' and deterioration of
education.

Guaranteed racial quotas is reassuring to both whites

and Negroes who want to prove that integration can work."

In

attempting to create this stable integrated community, several
busing plans were discussed with school officials.

The Com-

mission's representatives expressed the belief that a two-way
busing plan, involving fourteen schools and integrating all with a
racial composition of 65 percent white and 35 percent Negro, was
a workable design.48

However, school officials did not concur.

On January 3,

1968, the Assistant Superintendent for Planning announced a plan
to a group of principals and parent-teacher association presidents
that involved compulsory busing of only Negro students.

This

scaled down plan was immediately attacked by liberal white elements
47 Lester Mouscher, staff member of the South Shore Commission,
telephone interview, Chicago, Illinois, August 26, 1971. Southeast
Economist (Chicago), January 7, 1968, pp. 1, 7; January 11, 1968,
p. l; February 29, 1968, p. 7.
48chicago Daily Defender~ January 10, 1968, p. 5 (Quote).
Chicago Tribune, January 6, 1968, p. 4. Southeast Economist
(Chicago), January 7, 1968~ p. l; January 11, 1968, p. 1.
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in the community.

In a letter to the Superintendent of Schools,

the chairman of the Seventh Ward Independent Voters of Illinois in
south Shore complained that the announced plan discriminated
against black children by eliminating the busing of white students ..
The letter predicted "substantial opposition and resistance
to compulsory busing which affects only Negro children."

The

compromise plan was considered to be a capitulation to white backlash sentiment and the "fears and prejudices of some individuals
in the communities of the receiving schools."

It was further con-

tended that by reducing the number of pupils to be bused and not
providing white students to replace the Negro students being trans£erred, the compromise plan had destroyed any possibility of
stabilizing the neighborhoods and schools of South Shore.

As an

example it was pointed out that under the school administration
plan the percentage of Negro students in the Bryn Mawr School would
only be reduced from 77 percent to about 70 percent.49
The South Shore Commission also opposed the school administration's proposal.

The organization's president announced that

the plan was "so meager that the commission would prefer that the
49saul Mendelson (a letter to James Redmond, from private
file of Mr. Mendelson, Chicago, Illinois, January 5, 1968).
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board drop it."

The commission contended that "few South Shore

residents voiced disapproval of the original plan.

Now, however,

the commission is trying to mobilize all South Shore residents in
opposition to the compromise proposal. 11 50

The commission appar-

ently felt the integration of nine nearly all-white schools in
District Seventeen and the relief of overcrowding in the three
predominantly Negro schools were not sufficient palliatives for the
apparent abandonment of the stabilization aspect of the plan.
While city-wide organizations such as the Catholic Interracial Council, the Women's Committee of the National Conference
of Christians and Jews, and the Leadership Council for Metropolitan
Open Communities had expressed their support of the proposed busing
plans, these organizations did not necessarily reflect the grass
roots opinion of a majority of people.

The city-wide Chicago

Parent-Teacher Association had given its immediate support to the
busing proposal, but its president had warned that the organization
was not in favor of large scale busing and expected opposition to
busing from hoth black and white parents.
association feared opposition from factions

Furthermore, the
not immediately

involved in the busing plan and requested that the rest of the
SOChicago Tribune, January 10, 1968, pp. 1, 2 (First quote).
Southeast Economist (Chicago), January 11, 1968, p. 1 (Second quote).
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city should leave the involved communities alone to work out their
problems, because, "if it isn't worked out, both communities will
g 0 . 1151

Numerous conflicting public opinion polls were presented
which supported or refuted the contention that the busing program
would be accepted.
In a poll by the Seventh Ward Independent Voters of Illinois,
175 respondents· favored provisions by the Board to increase opportunities for integration of students in the Chicago Public Schools
while only seven people expressed opposition.

When busing was

,proposed as a method of integrating schools and relieving overcrowding, 157 pollees favored busing while only twenty were opposed.
When questioned on preference between the one-way plan, the two-way
plan or another plan, only three favored the administration's oneway plan while 137 respondents expressed approval of the two-way
plan and. another twenty pollees desired other busing plans.52
However, this independent survey was open to serious question
regarding the adequacy of the crass-section of the population being
polled if a true picture of public opinion was desired.

In a WGN

51 southeast Economist (Chicago), January 21, 1968, p. 1.
Chicago's American, December 27, 1967, p. 1 (Quote).
52copy of poll obtained from private file of Mr. Mendelson.
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radio survey taken in January, 1968, on "Chicago Speaks," over 60
percent of the respondents expressed opposition to busing as a
means of achieving racial balance in the schools.

A little over

19 percent favored busing, and over 20 percent had no opinion.

Iq

the segregated white northwest area of Chicago, a Lerner Press
survey showed overwhelming opposition to busing.

The poll asked,

"Should busing be used as a method of stabilizing racial balance
in the schools?"

Over 95 percent of those who mailed in their

questionnaires expressed opposition to busing.53

While these

surveys were also not controlled to represent adequate cross
sections in public opinion, they did represent a strong opposition
to the busing program and lent credence to the statement of one
South Shore mother who proclaimed, "When the South Shore Commission stands up and says it represents the thinking of the
community, I take issue. 11 54
While opposition to the busing program was reported to be
53 chicago's American, January 11, 1968, p. 4. Northwest
Times (Chicago), January 25, 1968, p. l; February 1, 1968, p. l;
February 8, 1968, p. 1. Three separate surveys were reported over
a three week period by the Lerner Press. The exact figures were
broken down into city arid suburban respondents. They were:
January 28, 1968
City--97.4%
Suburbs--97.5%
February 1, 1968
City--95.3%
Suburbs--96 %
February 8, 1968
City--95.6%
Suburbs--96.1%
54chicago Tribune, January 10, 1968, p. 2.
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slow in organizing in the southeast receiving communities, antibusing petitions were being circulated, and Board member John
Carey denounced a "barrage of vicious propaganda" by neighborhood
papers in the far south side of the city.

Other Board members

complained of numerous and often obscene telephone calls.SS

Fears

'

of some parents, especially of ·a two-way busing program, were
expressed by one mother who stated,
We moved out of South Shore to put our children
schools. Now we're faced with this busing.
day it was no longer safe for our daughter. My
to walk her to school and that was too much for
Shore schools are not safe.S6

in decent
. We left the
husband had
us. The South

South side protests against busing continued to mount even
after the compromise plan which deleted two-way busing was announced.

At a rally held in the Croatian Hall on the south side,

a petition signed by 7SOO who opposed busing was presented to
Board President Whiston.

Liberal spokesmen denounced the compro-

mise plan as inadequate.

The opposition of numerous white parents

was obvious, but black parents expressed opposition also.

The

one-way busing program singled out Negro children as the only
students to be forced to bus.

Furthermore, the plan would have

SSchicago Sun-Times, January 11, 1968, p. 32 (Quote).
Chicago Tribune, January 7, 1968, p. 2.
S6southeast Economist (Chicago), January 7, 1968, p. 2.
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no effect upon the majority of the city's Negro pupils who attended
all-black ghetto schools.

Parents of children attending the desig-

nated south side sending schools expressed opposition on the basis
that "most Negroes in this community [South Shore] moved here
because of better educational facilities."

Black parents expressed

the belief that their children had little to gain through the
busing program.57

On the south side the Board faced almost uni-

versal opposition from all factions in the community.
Opposition in the northwest receiving communities was
expressed at numerous meetings organized by protest groups and
held in public park field houses.
rallies.

Emotions ran high at these

The Board was criticized for discontinuing the Steinmetz

High School branches in elementary schools.

This action had

produced vacant elementary school classrooms on the northwest side.
A school administration official was reported to have left a
meeting after being asked if Negro youngsters would be searched for
weapons before being allowed into school buildings.
ticians were beginning to respond to the clamor.

Local poli-

United States

Congressman Roman Pucinski, chairman of the House of Representatives'
57

chicago Tribune, January 10, 1968, pp. 1, 2 (Quote).
Chicago Daily Defender, January 11, 1968, p. 4. Southeast
Economist (Chicago), January 11, 1968, pp. 1, 2.
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Subcommittee on Education, attended meetings along with numerous
state senators and representatives and city aldermen.

One ex-state

representative characterized the reaction of residents on the
northwest side as "the sleeping dragon of democracy is awake and
preparing to turn against a totalitarian school board. 11 58
:_~,c

:-,,_White parents in the. fringe integrated areas of Austin tended

to favor the busing plan.

The Organization for a Better Austin,

representing about 190 neighborhood groups in south Austin,
announced its full support for the proposed busing plan.

Emphasis

was placed on the relief of the severe overcrowding in the sending
schools.

While no one could seriously believe that the plan would

racially stabilize the sending schools which were already over 80
percent Negro in racial composition, stabilization of the rest of
the community certainly appealed to some white parents.

Because

of the severe overcrowding in the Austin schools, Negro parents
were also willing to accept the busing plan although there was
little support among black parents for the integration aspects
58 Northwest Times, (Chicago), January 11, 1968, pp. 1, 6
(Quote). Chicago Tribune, January 9, 1968, p. 1. Creation of
high school branches as a possible method of filling empty elementary school classrooms is examined in chapter iii, p. 81-84.
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of the plan. 5 9

Thus, in the Austin plan, the Board was not faced

with the complete opposition of all the involved conununities.
In the period between the announcement of the busing proposal
on December 27, 1967, and the formal presentation of the plan at
the January 10, 1968, meeting, school officials had contacted
numerous concerned recognized conununity organizations, parentteacher associations and lower echelon school officials in order
to both explain the plans and work out further details.

When the

first plans had been originally formulated, some contacts had been
made in the sending schools before the first announcement, but
receiving schools were contacted only after the proposal was presented to the Board.

All meetings concerned with formulating the

plans were held privately, and the press was not invited to these
meetings.

On the basis of an Illinois law requiring public boJies

to hold open meetings, a south side lawyer brought suit for an
injunction against the busing plans because the planning sessions
were not open to the public.

However, the court refused to take

action on the basis that the meetings did not come under the tenet
59Northwest Times '(Chicago), January 11, 1968, p. 1. Ptak,
August 14, 1972, and Bell, June 22, 1972. One administrator
remembers a conunent by a white parent who app~oved of the plan
because it would allow the community to share its "black" with
other communities.
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of the law.60
At the January 10, 1968, Chicago Board of Education meeting
the complete plans were presented for approval.

In the Austin area

the May and Spencer Elementary Schools were designated as sending
schools in a non-contiguous attendance area plan.

Pupils in grades

one to six were to be transferred from selected blocks in the
integrated school area to eight all white receiving schools located
about four to seven miles away in the Belmont-Cragin, Montclare,
Dunning and Portage Park communities.

The initial percentage of

children received was not to exceed 11 percent of the total enroll·ment of the receiving school.

In September, 1968, pupils in the

seventh grade were to be transferred, and in September, 1969,
eighth grade pupils would be added.

As these grades were added,

the total percentage of transferred pupils was not to exceed 15
percent of the total enrollment of a receiving school. 61
Geographic blocks within the integrated May and Spencer
attendance areas were chosen on the basis that they were predominantly Negro and essentially at the greatest walking distance
60chicago Tribune, January 9, 1968, p. 1; January 10,, 1968,
p. 2. Chicago Daily Defender, January 10, 1968, p. 5. Northwest
Times (Chicago), January 11, 1968, p. 8; January 18, 1968, p. 7.
Southeast Economist (Chicago), January 11, 1968, p. 1.
61Proceedings, Janua~y 10, 1968, pp. 2430-35.
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from the May and Spencer Schools.

The designated blocks were to

be considered attendance areas of the receiving schools.

As long

as a student lived in one of the blocks, he was to remain in
attendance at the receiving school.

Upon graduation the student

would attend the Steinmetz High School to which the receiving
elementary schools contributed.62
A total of 573 pupils was to be involved in the program.

The

May School was to transfer 317 pupils to five schools, and the
Spencer was to transfer 256 pupils to three schools.

As a result

of opening empty classrooms the average number of pupils per room
·actually dropped in five receiving schools.

In two schools the

class size increased and in one it remained constant.

It was not

necessary to use mobile classrooms to accommodate students at any
of the receiving schools.

As some receiving schools had no lunch-

rooms, provisions were to be made for facilities.

An adult who

was to travel with the students on the bus would remain at the
receiving· school as an aide and lunch supervisor.63
In South Shore area the Bryn Mawr, Mann, and Caldwell Elementary Schools were designated as sending schools in an intra-community
busing plan.
62Ibid.

Six of the nine designated receiving schools already
63Ibid., PP· 2431, 2433.

TABLE 3

PROPOSED RACIAL PROPORTIONS AND AVERAGE CLASS SIZE
BEFORE AND AFTER PROPOSED BUSING PROGRAM
AUSTIN PLANa
School

May

Number
Involved

317

Sending to:

Average
Class Size
Before

Average
Class Size
After

38.5
30.6
(with 18 classroom additions
just completed)

% Negro

% Negro

Before

After

83.9

77.4

Bridge

50

31.1

32.6

o.o

10.8

Burbank

47

32.9

31.4

0.0

10.8

Lyon

75

33.3

31. 9

0.0

10.8

Sayre

55

33.7

32.7

0.0

10.8

O.A. Thorp

90

32.9

32.6

0.0

10.8

256

37.7
(with 12 mobile
classrooms)

29.0

82.4

74.9

10.5
10.1
10 .0

Spencer
Sending to:
Smyser

66

33.0

33.0 .

Locke

95

32.5

33.8

o.o
o.o

Dever

95

32.5

32.4

0.0

anata compiled from Board of Education, City of Chicago,
Proceedings, Board of Education, City of Chicago (Chicago: Board
of Education, January 10, 1968, pp. 2431, 2433.
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2M
had small proportions of Negro students, an indication of the fact
that the receiving communities were in the path of the historical
direction of expansion of the Negro belt in the city.

Two area

schools had been dropped as receiving schools on the basis that
they were already over 15 percent Negro.

Whereas the initial

percentage of Negro children was not to exceed 11 percent of the
total enrollment of the receiving school in the Austin plan, the
proportion was immediately set at 15 percent in the South Shore
plan.64
A total of 462 pupils was to be involved in the program.

The

·Bryn Mawr School was to transfer 206 pupils to three schools; the
Mann was to transfer 141 pupils to four schools; the Caldwell was
to transfer 115 pupils to two schools.

All the schools would have

their average class size reduced; however, it would have been
necessary to ·1ocate mobile classrooms at five of the receiving
schools in order to accomplish this.

Particulars regarding desig-

nated blocks, to be considered as attendance areas of the receiving
school, were similar to the Austin plan.

The right of transferred

students to continue on to upper grade centers and high schools
serving the receiving schools was essentially the same as in the
64rbid., pp. 2436-39.

TABLE 4
PROPOSED RACIAL PROPORTIONS AND AVERAGE CLASS SIZE
BEFORE AND AFTER PROPOSED BUSING PROGRAM
SOUTH SHORE PLANa

% Negro

% Negro

Before

After

Average
Class Size
Before

Average
Class Size
After

206

35.7

30.2

76.5

72.7

Luell~

67

33.2

32.0

3.2

11.0

Sullivan

79

35.6

34.4b

2.5

11.1

Warren

60

32.8

32.6

3.1

9.6

141

37.0

30.2

74.3

70.8

Sending to:
Hoyne

40

34.1

34. 7

1.3

12.0

Buckingham

30

34.3

33.7b

0.0

10.8

Coles

48

33.4

32.2b

6.1

13 .1

Burnham

23

31.2

29.7

0.0

12.2

Caldwell

115

18.2

32.4

61.1

57.7

Sending to:
Anthony·

56

31.9

31.0b

14.1

Goldsmith

59

31.6

31.lb

13.8

School

Bryn Mawr

Number
Involved

Sending to:

Mann

anata compiled from Board of Education, City of Chicago,
Proceedings, Board of Education, City of Chicago (Chicago:, Board
of Education, January 10, 1968, pp. 2438, 2439.
hrhe addition of mobile classroom units would be required
to obtain these average class sizes.
215

r

216
Austin plan.

Provisions for bus and lunchroom aides were also

. · 1ar. 65
simi

The plans presented to the Board in January, 1968, had
simply filled in geographic and administrative details left open
in the earlier Redmond Report.

The Board members could have been

surprised neither with the general tenor of the presentation nor
with the selection of the two areas in which the city was experiencing its most rapid racial change.

With the plans before it,

the question now became, "How would the Board go about acting
upon its superintendent's proposals?"

CHAPTER VI ·
PRESCRIPTION FUNCTION:
A DECISION IS MADE
By the time the Board members met on January 10, 1968, to
consider the formal busing proposals of the school administration,
community action was already well-developed.

The initial announce-

ment of the plans was thoroughly covered in the newspapers.
Meetings were held in the concerned communities by organized and
ad hoc groups.

While some groups announced their support of the

proposals, most of the meetings were called to protest the plans.
As opponents of busing became more organized, they turned
received the support of local politicians.

~o

and

The support of these

political representatives served to strengthen the anti-busing
elements in ·i.:he communities and to exert pressure upon members of
the Board of Education.
An incident may serve to indicate the growing concern of
politicians over the busing issue and the alignment of the Board
president against implementing the plans.

On the day the plans

were formally presented to the Board, an estimated thousand
217
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demonstrators packed the corridors of the Board of Education
building to protest against any favorable Board action.

Before

the Board convened, Frank Whiston met in a closed door meeting
with neighborhood political leaders.

The president was reported

to have said, "If I were a betting man, I would not expect busing
this year."

When the Board did vote to make a decision in February,

Peter J. Miller, a state representative from a northwest side
district, was reported to have declared, "Whiston said the busing
would not take place in 1968.
dent in a bad light.
· talked to us."

This [Board action] puts the presi-

I don't doubt that he was sincere when he

Miller then turned to Whiston and said, "But this

puts you in a position where you didn't keep your word--you were
voted down. 11 1
While Whiston and Miller denied having made these statements,
Whiston's previous positions on matters of desegregation would lend
credence to the possibility.

However, events during and following

the Board meeting indicated that the faction opposed to implementing the plan met strong resistance from the rest of the Board
1chicago Daily News, January 10, 1968, pp. 1, 8 (First quote).
Chicago Sun-Times, January 11, 1968, pp. 1, 32 (Second and third
quotes). Christopher Chandler of the Sun-Times and Edmund Rooney
of the Daily News reported substantially the same story about the
Whiston encounter with Miller before and after the Board meeting.
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members.

This resistance could well have been bolstered by the

manner in which the plans were introduced by the Superintendent of
Schools.

Redmond again reminded the Board that while it was his

role to recommend, it was the Board's duty to set policy.

He

commented, "I am recommending deferral and referral to a Board
Committee in order that you may· have hearings to hear the people."
He indicated that the plans were initial proposals and could "be
modified (some are saying we are not doing enough; some are saying
we are going too far)."

He suggested that the plans be implemented

"on or about Monday, January 29, 1968 [the beginning of the second
half of the school year], but pointed out that the date could "be
altered, [sic
dition)."

J (although Spencer and May are in critical con-

He left little doubt as to where the responsibility

for the busing decision rested when he stated, "The Board of Education must have an opportunity to examine our recommendations and
give us direction on the policy of transporting children. 112
Apparently not all Board members remembered the clashes
between the Board and its previous superintendent over the decisionmaking roles of each body.

Redmond's meticulous observation of the

2Board of Education, City of Chicago, Proceedings, Board of
Education, City of Chicago (Chicago: Board of Education, January
10, 1968, pp. 2430 (Quotes), 2432, 2435, 2437, 2441. Hereinafter
referred to as Proceedings, date of meeting, page number. Chica.go
Sun-Times, January 10, 1968, pp. 1, 32.
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rights and responsibilities of the Board led one member to complain,
"He dumped these plans in our laps at the last minute, and then
asked us for directions. 11 3
During the meeting Whiston called for extensive hearings and
an indefinite deferral of action on the plans.
disagreed and urged speedy action.
act with urgency.

However, Bacon

He said, "I think we ought to

It is so ingrained in this board to put off

these crucial decisions, and it's high time we decided to act."
Further discussion led to the decision not to hold hearings in the
communities but only at the Board of Education building.

When the

· final vote came, Carey moved for deferral of the reports with no
definite date set.

Bacon moved to amend the motion to put a limit

on the hearings and set the last Board meeting in February for the
Board to act one way or another on the proposals.

When the roll

was called, Green, Friedman, Bacon, Adams, Malis, and Oliver voted
for the amended motion.
against the motion.

Whiston, Murray, Wild, and .Carey voted

Scheffler was absent.4

As the Board members left the meeting, they were greeted by
3chicago Daily News, January 12, 1968, p. 4.
4 chicago Sun-Times, January 11, 1968, p. 32 (Quote).
Northwest Times (Chicago, January 18, 1968, p. 1. Proceedings,
January 10, 1968, pp. 2435, 2441.
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numerous angry politicians.

State Representative Hyde was reported

to have said that fifteen state representatives would promise to
obtain more state aid to build more schools in overcrowded Negro
neighborhoods if the Board would drop the busing plans.
proposals were not as positive.

Other

Board members were warned that a

school tax referendum would be voted down, and state aid would
not be_ increased unless the busing plans were shelved.

United

States Representative Roman Pucinski, addressing the crowd in the
lobby, stated, "Any school board member who doesn't have the courage to come out and talk to you in your community should turn in
·his resignation."
members.

For two hours the politicians haggled with Board

When they left, they _had a promise that the Board would

hold hearings in the communities·. 5
The following day Whiston created a committee under the
chairmanship of Mrs. Wild to hold hearings.

Adams, Bacon, Friedman,

and Malis, all proponents of the plan, were originally appointed,
but Adams and Bacon refused to serve.

At this time Adams said he

would vote reluctantly to abandon the plans because of the furor
encountered.

He declined to serve on the committee, stating:

5chicago Sun-Times, January 11, 1968, p. 32. Chicago
Tribune, January 11, 1968, p. 2 (Quote). Northwest Times (Chicago),
January 11, 1968, p. l; January 18, 1968, p. 1.
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[it] won't hear anything that I have not heard several times
before over the last four years. In order to be fruitful,
hearings such as these must be two-way streets. In this case
I don't feel there will be communication either way. The
committee won't hear anything new and the people won't listen
to anything the committee says. These particular plans (for
Austin and South Shore) are dead in my opinion. I feel it
was a mistake to postpone implementation of the plan even
though I voted for postponement. I become surer of this the
more I think about it . . . . As I understand it the politicians persuaded the board to hold meetings in the community
after the meeting [of the Board on January 10, 1968]. That
wa~ wrong. The whole thing is improper.6
Bacon contended that Whiston never asked him before announcing
the members of the committee.

He expressed his belief that the

hearings would be "an exercise in futility," and expressed the
·belief that "the president and board are hell-bent on killing the
busing plan."

Regarding the advisability of hearings he stated,

"I don't think matters of principle like integration should be put
virtually to a vote like this.

It's fallacious to think people

6chicago Sun-Times, January 12, 1968, pp. 1, 16. Chicago
Tribune, January 13, 1968, pp. 1, 2; January 19, 1968, pp. 1, 2.
Northwest Times (Chicago), January 18, 1968, p. 1 (Quotes).
Readers of the Chicago Tribune at the time may have been confused
by some of its reports. On January 13, it reported that Adams
"would vote reluctantly to scrap plan because furor has killed it."
On January 19, it stated he felt the "board should vote down busing
plan without hearings." This second report lent a different
connotation to Adam's statement which conflicted with the Tribune's
prior report and the January report in the Northwest Times.
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should vote on ,something we know is right. 11 7
The committee, with Green appointed to replace Adams and
Bacon, set about establishing a set of guidelines for determining
who might speak at the hearings.

It passed over the request that

only parents of public school children be permitted to speak.
Rather, it required that representatives of established school
oriented civic organizations and community groups submit formal
written requests to be heard.

The schedule of the meetings was

to be established after all requests were submitted by a January
26, 1968, deadline.

Two meetings were to be held in each of the

·three school districts which were affected by the plans.

In order

to allow full participation by citizens the meetings were to be
scheduled in the evening between 7:00 P.M. and 9:00 P.M.

Only

one speaker was to be allowed for each organization accepted and
the speech was limited to five minutes.

The speaker was to submit

ten copies of the original statement on the night of the presentation so that they could be compiled for the full membership of
the Board (Scheffler was ill and no longer attending meetings).8
7chicago Tribune, January 13, 1968, p. 2 (Third quote);
January 19, 1968, pp. 1, 2 (First and second quotes). Northwest
Times (Chicago), January 18, 1968, p. 1.
8chicago Tribune, January 17, 1968, p. 4.
January 24, 1968, pp. 1397.
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The Board had a short information bulletin drawn up summarizing the salient points of the plans.

These fact sheets were

sent: to the organizations chosen to speak and any other individual
who requested one, as well as the metropolitan and community news
media.

Separate fact sheets were developed for the two plans,

but the majority of the information applied to both proposals.
The Austin area fact sheet is duplicated in its entirety below.
Where data for the South Shore area differed, the changes are
inserted in brackets beneath the corresponding section.
January 26, 1968
KNOW THE FACTS ON THE CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION BUSING PROPOSALS9
AUSTIN AREA
WH"l?

-

To
To
To
To

relieve serious overcrowding at May and Spencer Schools.
promote stabilization througrout the Austin Area.
increase desegregation in District Four.
improve educational experiences for all children.

- To relieve serious overcrowding at Bryn Mawr, Mann and
Caldwell Schools.
- To promote stabilization throughout the greater South Shore
area.
- To increase desegregation in District Seventeen.
- To improve educational experiences for all children.
911 Know the Facts on the Chicago Board of Education Busing
Proposals: Austin Area," and "Know the Facts on the Chicago Board
of Education Busing Proposals: South Shore Area." Mimeographed
handouts prepared for the Chicago Board of Education, January 26,
1968.
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HOW?
- Transfer predominantly Negro pupils from selected blocks in
the integrated school area to all white receiving schools
where space is available. The blocks from which these pupils
are transferred will become part of the receiving school
attendance area.
- Only pupils in grades 1-6 will be included in the plan at
this time. As these pupils progress the seventh grade will
be added in September, 1968 and the eighth in September, 1969.
- No kindergarten children will be transferred.
- No students will be transferred from the receiving schools.
- Students graduating from the receiving elementary school will
be eligible to attend the high school to which the receiving
school contributes.
The plan proposed is similar in many respects to the Evanston
plan instituted in September, 1967.
- Transfer predominantly Negro pupils from selected blocks in
the integrated school attendance area to the basically all
white receiving schools. The blocks from which these pupils
are transferred will become part of the receiving school
attendance area.

HOW MANY?
573 pupils in grades 1-6 will be involved in this program.
May and Spencer Schools will transfer pupils to O.A. Thorp,
Lyon, Burbank, Bridge, Smyser, Sayre, Locke, and Dever
Schools. Children with severe Jocial adjustment or physical
problems, or with mental handicaps will be provided for
under established procedures for children needing special
education classes and services.
- 462 pupils in grades 1-6 will be involved in this program.
- Where receiving schools currently have grades 1-5, pupils
in grades 6-8 will attend the upper grade centers assigned
to the receiving school until they graduate.
- Bryn Mawr, Mann and Caldwell Elementary Schools will, transfer
pupils to Burnham, Luella, Sullivan, Warren, Hoyne, Buckingham, Coles, Anthony and Goldsmith Elementary Schools.

J
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AVAILABILITY OF SPACE
Adequate space exists in these receiving schools to permit
each school to enroll up to 15 percent of its total enrollment from the sending school.
- Some classrooms are currently available to meet the needs of 1
the transferring pupils. A quota will obtain which will
limit the number of Negro children transferred to a receiving
school 15 percent of the total enrollment of that school.
- Mobile classrooms will' be needed to care for transferring
pupils at some of the receiving schools.
TRANSPORTATION
Only insured and reliable carriers will be considered in
providing the means of transportation.
- Students involved in the sending program who reside at an
excessive distance will be transported from a convenient
point in their residential area to the receiving school and
returned at the end of the school day.
- Pupils will be picked up and released within two blocks of
their residences. The Child Welfare Attendant will escort
children who must cross any main thoroughfare.
- The average daily travel time will be 20 minutes. The bus
schedule will provide 30 minutes to cope with unusual
weather conditions.
- Adult supervision on the buses will be provided through an
assignment of a Child Welfare Attendant. A plan will be
given the attendant to make certain that all children are
in attendance.
LUNCH
Where receiving schools have no lunchroom, children will
bring their lunch from home and will follow the procedure
that schools normally use for children who live too far to
go home for lunch, especially in severe weather.
- The adult who supervises on the bus will be available for
supervision during the lunch hour.
ILLNESS AND ACCIDENT
Children in any school who become too ill to remain in
school or have an accident that requires medical or parental
attention are generally called for by a parent or other
authorized relative -or neighbor.
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- In emergency cases the ill or injured child would be cared
for in the same manner as is now the practice when a parent
is not at home or cannot be reached.
PUPIL ACHIEVEMENT
- Cities which have bused Negro.children to white schools
report that the bused children in general made much greater
academic gains than their counterparts who were not bused
even though the latter were provided with a strong compensatory education program ..
- Quality education programs will be offered in all of the
receiving schools.
All studies show that the white children of the receiving
schools show no loss in academic achievement.
COST
- Chartered buses--,$32. 00 per bus capable of accommodating
55 pupils and 1 adult. 11 buses will be required for this
program. 50 percent of the total cost is reimbursable from
the State of Illinois. 11 Child Welfare Attendants at a
total cost of $4,950 per month.
- Total cost of transportation program--$11,990 monthly,
without considering the state reimbursement.
- Chartered buses--$32.00 per bus capable of accommodating 551
pupils and 1 adult. 9 buses will be required for this
program. 50 percent of the total cost is reimbursable from
the St~te of Illinois. 9 Child Welfare Attendants at a
total cost of $3,950 per month.
- Total cost of transportation program $9,810 monthly without
considering the state reimbursement.
ADULT SUPERVISION
- Adult supervision on the buses and during the lunch period
will be provided through the assignment of a Child Welfare
Attendant. This person will also be available to assist in
providing comfort to pupils who need special attention during
the school day and to assist in the school generally under
the supervision of the principal.
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STAFFING
- New divisions in the receiving schools needed to accommodate
the new pupils will make possible the transfer of interested
teachers according to the established transfer policies and
procedures. Additional divisions required in the receiving
schools will be offset by the .loss of teaching divisions in
. the sending schools.
While the Board was preparing to meet with concerned corn'

rnunity organizations, pressures for and against busing continued
to mount.

Even before the hearings committee had set up guide-

lines, forty-eight requests to speak had been submitted for consideration.

In the City Council, aldermen had moved to defer passage

of the school budget levy because it included funds for the purpose
of busing.

In response, the president of the Woodlawn Organization

announced that he would ask the federal government to cut off
school aid pending the positive action of the Board on the busing
proposals.lo
A pro-busing rally was held in the Resurrection Catholic
Church hall in south Austin.

About 1500 people were reported to

have listened to speakers representing mothers of students
attending the May and Spencer Schools and the Organization for a
Better Austin.

Both black and white parents in this fringe area

tended to support the busing plan on the basis that it would
lONorthwest Times (Chicago), January 25, 1968, p. 1. Chicago
Tribune, January 18, 1968, p. 4; January 19, 1968, p. 2. Chicag~
Sun-Times, January 19, 1968, pp. 9, 20.
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relieve overcrowding in the schools and help stabilize the neighborhoods of the desegregated community.

Two hundred parents from

the May and Spencer Schools later marched on the Board in support
of busing.

These parents also organized a boycott of the May and

Spencer Schools to protest the severe overcrowding.

The United

States representative whose district included the south Austin
area as well as unaffected suburbs and a Negro area in west
Chicago, announced his support of the busing proposal.

The 30th

Ward Democratic Organization of the Austin area also supported
busing.11
The majority of the support for the announced busing plans
-

.

•

came from groups in the fringe areas of south Austin and city-wide
organizations.

Predominantly Negro organizations such as the

Urban League, the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People and T.he Woodlawn Organization were joined by the
Citizens Schools Committee and the Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities in supporting busing.

The Citizen Schools

Committee, representing 230 civic groups, criticized legislators
for reflecting the bias of their electorate and pointed out that
llchicago Daily News, January 18, 1968, p. 1. Chicago
Tribune, January 17, 1968, p. 4. New World (Chicago), January
26, 1968, p. 3. Chicago Daily Defender, January 25, 1968, p. 6;
. February 14, 1968, p. 4.
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neighborhood schools were not the exclusive property of the neighbors.

Rather, the schools belonged to the residents of the entire

city, and school problems could only be solved with reference to
the whole system and the good of the entire city.

The president

of the Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Corrnnunities promised to appoint a committee to discuss implementation of the busing
proposals with Redmond, Whiston, and Daley.12
Many groups with religious affiliations supported the busing
proposals.

The Church Federation of Greater Chicago was among the

first to announce its approval of the busing plans.

Ninety-one

ministers of the Methodist Church Northern Illinois Confederation
voted to endorse the plans with. only nine Chicago ministers withholding support.

The executive director of the Union of American

Hebrew Congregations announced the support of his organization.
The Organization for Northwest Communities also favored the plans.
This pro-integration group formed in 1967 in predominantly white
north Austin was sponsored by the Corrnnunity Renewal Society, a
part of the United Church of Christ.

On January 24, 1968, the

Chicago Conference on Re·ligion and Race announced that its members
12Chicago Daily Defender, January 25, 1968, p. 6; February
14, 1968, p. 4. Chicago Tribune, January 16, 1968, p.2; January
18, 1968, p. 27. Northwest Times (Chicago), January 25, 1968
p. 17.
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were preparing a plan "similar to, and· in support of, the busing
plan propased by Chicago Schools Superintendent James F.
Redmond. 11 13
The Conference represented the Catholic Archdiocese, the
Church Federation of Greater Chicago, and the Chicago Board of
Rabbis.

In a formal declaration the Conference called on the

Chicago School Board to approve the busing programs.

It announced

that busing programs-in religiously affiliated schools would be
undertaken, however, even if the public schools did not initiate
their program.

Clergy associated with the Conference were called

upon to announce the support of their Church for the busing proposals to their laity.

While the news media observed that the

Church busing plans were nebulous, the announcement of the program
was important in that it cut off the possibility of using the
religiously affiliated schools as an escape for parents involved
in the public school plans.14
The moral admonitions of the Churches were met with
13chicago Daily News, January 18, 1968, p. 1. Chicago Tribune,
January 13, 1968, p. 2; January 19, 1968, p. 2, Northwest Times
(Chicago), August 10, 1967, p. l; February l,· 1968, pp. 1, 11;
February 8, 1968, p. 3. New. World (Chicago), January 26, 1968,
p. 1 (Quote).
14chicago Daily Defender, January 25, 1968, p. 4. _New World
(Chicago , January 26, 1968, p. 1. Northwest Times (Chicago),
February-1, 1968, p. 11; February 8, 1968, p. 3.
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resistance by numerous organizations in the communities.

These

organizations often contained such epithets as, "taxpayers,"
"property owners," "homeowners," "protective," and "concerned
parents," in their titles.

Some of the most vociferous organ-

izations were not in areas directly affected by the public school
busing plan.

"Operation Crescent" was headed by a suburban lawyer

whose opposition to civil rights and open housing antedated his
involvement in protesting the busing plans.

The "Concerned

Catholic Parishioners" had drawn its greatest strength in the
southwest side Bogan High School area.

This organization had taken

stands against various changes in Catholic Church rituals and the
introduction of a new catechism·series which placed more emphasis
on social issues.

It was outspoken against busing and

recom..~ended

reducing Sunday contributions to the local church to five cents as
well as withholding payments to the city-wide church building fund
as a protest against the involvement of the Catholic.Church.ls
Bogan area residents also protested against the implications
of the Redmond Plan.

They demanded that public hearings be

extended to consider the.entire contents of the Redmond
15concerned Catholic Parishioners, "Fact Sheet No. 3" Chicago,
February 25, 1968. (Mimeographed.) These flyers were handed out
by volunteers in front of churches. Southeast Economist (Chicago),
February 1, 1968, p. 2.
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recommendations and complained that their area had no representation in the membership of the Chicago Board of Education.

When

a motorcade was organized by leaders of the Concerned Catholic
Parishioners of the Southwest Side to protest the Board's desegregation policies, it was joined by members of south Chicago organizations such as the Murray Park Civic Organization, the Bogan
Women,-the Concerned Parents of Bogan, the Hegewisch Property
Owners, the Southwest Property and Homeowners Protective Association, the Southwest Side Polish Homeowners, and Operation
Crescent. 16
These organizations drew much of their support from people
who feared the violence and racial changeover that had accompanied
the desegregation 0f neighborhoods in the past.

The fact that the

busing plan was designed to alter this pattern did not alleviate
these fears.

At public hearing after public hearing this element

of the community shouted down pro.;...busing speakers in. a protest that
they did -not believe any plan would change the historical pattern.
A good deal of the protest came from white ethnic groups that
drew heavily from first or second generation immigrants to the city.
The significance of this observation, however, is clouded by the
16 chicago Tribune, January 17, 1968, p. 4.
Economist. (Chicago), February 1, 1968, p. 2.
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fact that the city.has always been a port of entry for those seeking
new opportunities.

As descendents of earlier immigrants have pros-

pered, they have tended to move further from the city and some of
its problems.

Thus, to a great extent, it is the later immigrants

who have lived in areas which experienced desegregation with the
new Negro community.

It would be unfair and nonproductive to con-

clude that this group was any more or less prejudiced than other
Americans.
A possible fault in the busing plans rested in the fact that
the city could not reach out into suburban communities where fear
of innundation and previous unpleasant experiences with desegregation were absent.

But suburban areas have not been receptive to

proposals from the Chicago system for exchanging students.

The

Catholic busing program did involve busing children from the innercity to suburban parishes, but the number of children remained
small and has even declined.

One Chicago administrator observed

that suburban systems were in effect saying, "We ran away from it
and we want to stay away from it . . . what do you think we left
Chicago for. 11 1 7 While this was an obvious oversimplification, it
was unlikely that any suburban school administrator would wish to
17Interview with Teraji, May 31, 1973.
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become involved in this controversy when it could be avoided.
The inability of some white people to understand the problems
of Negroes ran the gamut from open hostility to a subtle desire to
stabilize their neighborhoods by limiting the further penetration
of Negro families.

In protesting the busing proposals one south-

east side leader admonished, "Let the Negroes work hard like we
had to do and pull themselves up by their own bootstraps."

On the

northwest side a protester claimed Willis "built a great educational complex for Negroes in their own neighborhoods and that
they should stay there.

These are not ghettoes."18

The chairman of the Seventh Ward Independent Voters of
Illinois observed that few Negroes had attended block councils to
discuss busing proposals.

He surmised that "there was too little

evidence on the part of white people in South Shore of a real
desire to foster integration, rather than to accept it where it
already existed."

Negroes, thus, were free to come "to the con-

clusion that whites here were interested exclusively in containment
and stabilization and not in integration as a positive affirmation
18New World (Chicago), February 2, 1968, p. 1.
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of racial equality and democracy. 11 19

Indeed, a perusal of the

positions taken by various groups indicates that the greatest
support for the busing plans came from white residents of areas
which had already experienced integration.

The greatest oppo-

sition came from whites not only in those neighborhoods chosen as
receiving areas but also whites in non-integrated neighborhoods.
These factors, coupled with the one-way aspect of the busing plans,
could not have appeared very promising to any Negro who might have
sought a white alliance for the successful implementation of a
busing plan.
A poll taken for Fortune magazine during October and November,
1967, had indicated strong support in the black corrnnunities for
integration.

About 77 percent of 300 Negroes interviewed in

thirteen cities indicated they favored integration limited to education, jobs and housing. 2 0

But there is little to indicate that

Negroes in Chicago supported the busing program in its specifics
on the basis of integration.

Indeed, the busing program, as pro-

posed, met with Negro opposition, especially on the south side.
l9saul Mendelson, "A Reaffirmation and an Apology," (an open
letter from the private file of Mr. Mendelson, Chicago, Illinois,
February, 1968).
20Roger Beardwood, "The New Negro Mood," Fortune, LXXVIII
(January, 1968), 147-48.
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Black parents complained that the busing plans should have involved
all-Negro and all-white segregated schools rather than schools
which were already integrated.
urged two-way busing.

Black Alderman Willian Cousins, Jr.,

Others argued that stability was the

respon~

sibility of the whole conununity and using black children to maintain racial balance was "racism at its worst."

One mother angrily

exclaimed, "We will not allow our children to become helpless pawns
in a desperate scheme to forestall the inevitable exodus of whites
. nor do we particularly care to stem that exodus. 11 21
As has already been established, many liberal white groups
on the south side opposed the compromise busing plan on the basis
that the one-way plan was a surrender to white backlash and discriminated against Negro children.

The transfer of Negro students

from the three sending schools without replacing them with white
students would not significantly alter the racial composition of
the schools nor help to stabilize the neighborhoods ..

A speaker

for the South Shore Gardens Betterment Association opposed the
busing program on the grounds that action by the Board would upset
the plans formulated by the group to stabilize the integrated
21chicago Daily Defender, February 7, 1968, p. 24. Southeast
Economist (Chicago), January 21, 1968, pp. 1-2; February 8, 1968,
p. 2 (First quote); February 15, 1968, p. 1 (Second quote).
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neighborhood as it would speed the exodus of whites. 2 2

By the•

time the first hearing on the south side was held, it was becoming
apparent that the South Shore plan was not likely to be accepted.
Three public hearings were scheduled for the south side.

The

first, February 5, 1968, met at South Shore High School and was
open to District Twenty-two groups only.

The majority of the

speakers expressed opposition to the Board plan.

The Sullivan

Parent Teachers Association, representing a receiving school with
a largely Mexican student body, called for more studies to prove
the necessity of busing.

The Bradwell Parent Teachers Association

represented a predominantly white school which was not involved in
the plan as its student body was already over 15 percent Negro.
A poll of its membership resulted in 291 responses favoring the
neighborhood school policy, 31 responses favoring a two-way plan,
and 36 responses favoring the one-way busing plan.

The Coles

School, with a predominantly white student body scheduled as a
receiving school, tallied 100 votes in opposition with only 5
favoring the busing plan.

The Mann School, with a student body

almost three-fourths Negro and scheduled as a sending school,
2 2chicago Daily Defender, January 30, 1968, p. 4. Southeast
Economist (Chicago), January 11, 1968, p. l; January 21, 1968,
p. 1.
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expressed general opposition to the Board plan.

Their poll showed

148 respondents favored the neighborhood school policy, 139 respondents desired a two-way plan, 90 voted for one-way busing, and
41 responses indicated no preference.

The Bryn Mawr School, with

a student body over three-fourths Negro and scheduled as a sending
school, expressed opposition to the one-way busing plan on the
grounds that it would not stabilize the schoo1.23
The two meetings at Bowen High School in District Seventeen
reinforced the impression of almost total opposition to the Board's
plan.

The Hearings Committee had relaxed its original rule against

· allowing speakers from groups which were not established schooloriented organizations.

Some of these groups had been newly

organized to oppose the busing program.

All the Parent-Teacher

Associations announced their opposition to the plan.

In the three

south side meetings only six of forty-one speakers favored any
program even close to the Board's proposa1.24
In contemplating the results of the South Shore hearings
Bernard Friedman expressed doubts about the success of the Board
23southeast Economist (Chicago), February 8, 1968, p: 1.
24 southeast Economist (Chicago), -February 11, 1968, pp. 1, 3;
February 15, 1968, p. l; February 18, 1968, p. 2. Chicago Tribune,
February 13, 1968, p. 1. The meetings were scheduled on February 8
and February 12 at 7: 00 P .M. at Bowen High School.
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plan.

H~

felt that much of the opposition expressed had been

rational, and that the plan would not accomplish stabilization of
the area.

In contradiction to another Board member he did not

feel that the opposition to busing was the fault of the school
system staff.

Rather, he felt it was a symptom of the Board's

inability to act.

He criticized the Board for responding to, but

. . . .
not initiating,
new p 1ans. 25
Mrs. Wild claimed to be still undecided about the plan but
expressed her concern with the strong opposition, as she felt the
busing proposal could not succeed without community support.

The

compulsory aspect of the proposal also bothered Mrs. Wild, as she
thought much of the opposition was because the plan was not voluntary.

Cyrus Adams also felt a voluntary plan would be useful in

reducing opposition to the plans.

In speaking of the strong emo-

tional objections of northwest side residents to busing he stated,
[it] seems to stem from a psychotic fear by parents that if
we bus any children,now into their schools, next week we'll
be busing their children out. The voluntary approach will
knock out that prop and unmask remaining ogposition such as
'we don't want Negro kids in our schools' ,26
25southeast Economist (Chicago), February 15, 1968, p. 1.
26 southeast Economist (Chicago), February 15, 1968, p. 1.
Chicago Tribune, February 11, 1968, p. l; February 13, 1968,
p. 1 (Quote).
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The situation in the Austin area differed from that in South
Shore.

Both whites and blacks in the sending areas tended to

support the Board plan.

Negro parents, concerned with the over-

crowded conditions of their schools rather than with integration,
were willing to accept the one-way busing proposal.

White resi-

dents in Austin who favored busing seemed most concerned with the
stabilization aspects of the plan.

However, most residents of the

northwest side, where the receiving schools were located, were
adamantly opposed to the busing plan.

The school superintendent

of District Four, which encompassed both areas, felt compelled to
announce at one meeting that:
the people are worried. They think if these pupils are bused
in it will ruin the neighborhood. The important thing to
remember, however, is control. These kids will be spread
through ~he grades. No white child will be disestablished
from a lunchroom facility. The kids will not be roaming
around t~e neighborhood after school. They will be brought
in under supervision and bused back home immediately after
classes.27
Obviously, the plan lacked some aspects of a successful integration scheme.

Racist emotions arose at numerous meetings.

At

27 stanley Ptak, Past Principal of May School, taped interview
held at his office, Chicago, Illinois, August 14, 1972. Ptak
emphasized the fact that his selling point to Negro parents was
relief from overcrowding and not integration. Robert Bell, Retired
Superintendent of District Four, containing the ·Austin community,
private interview at Schurz High School, Chicago, Illinois, June
22, 1972. Northwest Times (Chicago), January 11, 1968, p. 1
(Quote).
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one assembly of the Organization of Northwest Communities a resolution was introduced to have an I.Q. test administered to all
children being bused.

While the resolution was defeated, it was

recalled and then tabled.

One state representative refused to

speak at the meeting as thirty-five Negroes were present.

The

same representative had implored parents at an earlier meeting
"not to make this a racial battle," which evoked a retort from the
audience, "But it is!"

The constant barrage of such outbursts had

led the editor of the local newspaper, the Northwest Times, to
observe, "Anyone who doubts that the main busing opposition has
its roots in racism need only have attended one of the citizens'
organizational meetings held on the Northwest Side during the
past 10 days. 1128
The first two Board hearings on the northwest side were held
at Steinmetz High School in the receiving area.

While Board member

Green was applauded, the Board's human relations staff member was
booed when she tried to explain the busing p1lan rationale to the
audience.

A representative of the Austin-Irving Council on the far

northwest side reported that a poll showed almost all their members
opposed busing, despite earlier reports that members were "not
28Northwest Times (Chicago), January 11, 1968, p. 6 (Quote);
editorial, January 18, 1968, p. 6; February 1, 1968, p. 1.
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crazy about the transfer program, but they see the cultural and
economic need."

The president of the Smyser Parent Teachers

Association, a receiving school, reported that the vote was 402
to 18 against the busing proposal.

She expressed fear of a two-

way busing plan, argued that children should not be used to increase integration, and suggested that the money set aside for
busing be spent on education classes for the parents of the children designated for busing so that they could help their children
by_ themselves.

The president of the Locke Parent Teachers Asso-

ciation called for the replacement of Redmond, argued that the
main idea of the busing plan was to break up the family, contended
that the plan was communistic, and questioned the proposal on the
basis of moral, health, and discipline problems.

Another speaker

protested that the northwest side had no representative on the
Board.

At the second meeting the one speaker who favored busing

was booed down by the audience in the capacity filled auditorium.29
The third hearing at Austin High School in the sending area
presented a different picture.

About five hundred persons attended

the meeting at which nine of ten speakers supported busing.
Another five scheduled speakers, representing the May and Spencer
I

2 9Northwest Times (Chicago), January 11, 1968, p. 1 (Quote);
February 22, .1968, p. 3.
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Schools, did not attend as a protest against the hearings which
they felt should not have been held at all.

The one Negro who did

speak complained that when seventh and eighth grade students at
the Spencer School had been transferred to the newly created Hay
Upper Grade Center, the Board had not felt it necessary to hold
public hearings.

He saw the hearings as providing a platform for

persons to "spew forth venom and racism disguised under community
concern."

He summarized his reasons for supporting the busing

program when he stated, "We are sick and tired of seeing our
children being led down the path of educational mediocrity.
gration is a secondary issue.

Inte-

May and Spencer are overcrowded,

and we want those vacant classrooms filled. 11 30
Other speakers chided the Board for having "so little respect
for its own prerogatives'and legal responsibilities" that it felt
it had to "ask permission of communities with underused schools to
share public facilities that are paid for out of public dollars."
Censures were directed toward legislators who had instigated the
30Northwest Times (Chicago), February 29, 1968, p. 6. While
public hearings had not been held in the months long efforts of the
Board to reduce overcrowding at the Spencer, many meetings were
held with community groups. Resistance from segments of the Austin
community, especially in white areas contiguous to the racially
changing are~ had resulted in the abandonment of numerous plans.
Proceedings, June 28, 1967, pp. 3310-11, 3339.
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hearings while being "mainly responsible for the financial crisis
facing the Chicago Schools."

The single speaker who opposed the

busing plan called for the building of new schools in south Austin
and West Garfield Park (an area due east of south Austin).31
On February 14, the Board announced that two additional citywide meetings would be scheduled to meet at the Jones Commercial
High School located near the city's downtown area.

In contrast

to the six hearings scheduled within areas directly concerned by
the plan, these meetings were programed to allow organizations
throughout the city to express their opinions on the busing plan.
Friedman had objected to accepting speakers from community organizations all over the city.

He preferred that city-wide organi-

zations (which tended to be more favorable to the busing plans)
be scheduled for these meetings.32
If any Board members hoped to find greater support for the
busing plans at the city-wide meetings, they must have been disappointed.

At the first meeting speakers opposed to the busing plans

outnumbered the plans' proponents by over two to one.
Chicago Region

Parent-Te~chers

While the

Association representative spoke in

31Northwest Times (Chicago), February 29, 1968, p. 6.
3 2 southeast Economist (Chicago), February 18, 1968, p. 2.
Chicago Daily News, Februa~y 28, 1968, p. 6.
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favor of the plans, representatives of seventeen local PI'A groups
expressed their opposition and only two locals voiced some support
for the plans.

This split between the parent group and its locals

reflected a debate at an earlier general regional meeting at which·
efforts to have the regional PI'A take a stand against busing were
defeated by a reported two to one margin.

When the executive

board of the PI'A announced its favorable stance regarding busing,
the board was accused of adopting the policy without the approval
of the membership of its locals.

"Concerned parents" groups began

to arise in opposition to the liberal stance of the larger PI'A
body.33
The second city-wide meeting was sparsely attended, but proponents from city-wide groups established a slight numerical edge
over opponents of the plans.

Speakers representing the American

Friends Service Committee, the Chicago Youth Centers and the
Chicago Urban League joined several other religious and civic
groups in expressing support.

They were joined by the United Auto

Workers and the Chicago Teachers Union whose executive council had
finally come out in support of the plans.

Again, the opposition

33chicago Sun-Times, February 27, 1968, p. 3. Chicago Tribune,
February 27, 1968, p. 13. Southeast Economist (Chicago), February
4, 1968, p. 2.
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came from local PTA groups, taxpayers' groups and southwest community groups.

Operation Crescent and the Kilbourn Organization,

two avowedly anti-civil rights

group~,

also sent speakers to pro-

test the plans.34
The attitude of
a predictable path.

poli~icians

regarding the busing plan followed

There were no signs of any elected officials

risking the loss of votes by antagonizing their constituencies.
Indeed, some men with political ambitions appear to have seized
the occasion as an opportunity to further their careers.

The

leader of the suburban based Operation Crescent was accused of
creating agitation in order to draw attention to himself and keep
funds flowing in from contributors.
of governor of Illinois.

He later ran for the office

A dissenter on the southeast side of

Chicago later ran for a ward committeeman's office, and on the
northwest side a barkeeper who achieved some prominence in his
opposition to busing ran for local office.35
Opponents of the busing program turned to politicians to help
defeat the plans.

One northwest side protestor proclaimed that

34chicago Sun-Times, February 28, 1968, p. 9.
February 28, 1968, p. 2.

Chicago Tribune,

35Editorial, Southeast Economist (Chicago), February 4, 1968,
p.

4.
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"every alderman voting for the busing plan should be defeated in
the next election."

The Chicago aldermen did not vote directly

on Board of Education policies, but they did vote to accept the
Public School budget.

In general, local politicians had little

reason to fear accusations that they favored civil rights actions.
Thirty-five of the fifty aldermen were on record as opposing integration through the building of public housing projects in their
wards.

All the northwest side aldermen had expressed their oppo-

sition to the busing proposal.

They endorsed the neighborhood

scQ.ool policy, and one denounced the plan as "just something to
appease those [Negro] people."

Another said that the proposal was

not fair to the children being bused, as it would be difficult for
them to adjust to their new situation.

The complaint was regis-

tered that "the residents are afraid Negroes are going to start
buying houses around here," and "besides the racial aspect . . .
a number of northwest siders oppose busing on general grounds. 11 36
The involvement of politicians brought back memories of the
period when Chicago schools were deeply enmeshed in political
scandals.

Board member Carey cautioned) "Politics was taken out

36 chicago Sun-Times, August 24, 1967, p. 4. New World
(Chicago), February 2, 1968, p. 1 (First quote). Northwest Times
(Chicago), January 18, 1968, p. 1 (Latter quotes).
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of the schools many years ago.

It seems to me that this is an

attempt to make a political football out of a very serious problem."
The president of the Chicago Parent-Teachers Association reminded
Chicagoans of the period when "teachers sought jobs through their
aldermen; building and other contracts were awarded politically;
principals were transferred on a moment's notice, without justification:1137
However, the involvement of the schools in a controversial
social issue was bound to bring politicians into the melee.

The

mayor of the city might have ended some of the involvement of local
politicians by openly endorsing the plan as a necessity to meet
federal guidelines for desegregation.

He could have reviewed the

busing rationale in the public media in an attempt to win wider
support for the plans.

But the mayor had usually operated under a

political maxim not to become involved in local controversies, and
he chose not to risk his or his party's popularity by endorsing
the plans.
When asked about the busing proposals the mayor responded,
"I don't know enough about these questions and ideas.

All,! want

37chicago's American, January 11, 1968, p. 4 (First quote).
Southeast Economist (Chicago), February 1, 1968, p. 1 (Second
quote). Above pp. 17-20.
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are the best schools."

He contended that the Democratic party had

no official view on busing and stated, "This would be political,
and the children should never be subject to politics."

Asked if

he had discussed the subject with the school Board president, Daley
replied, "I never interfere with their administration and won't as
long as I'm mayor."

Regarding public hearings, the mayor stated,

"This is a matter for the Board of Education, but I feel very
strongly that any program today should have maximum participation
in the neighborhoods.

If the majority of people do not want some-

thing, who in government has the right to set themselves above the
majority."

He elucidated, "I am a democrat with a small 'd' .

it's up to the people to decide.finally, because these are the ones
who make up our city."

The Chicago Daily News saw the mayor's

response as "the kiss of death" for any busing plans, and quoted
an unidentified Board member as conunenting that the mayor's position
"will get certain Board members who were not enthusiastic to begin
with to vote against the plans. 11 38
38chica o's American, January 11, 1968, p. 1 (First,·third,
fifth quotes . Chicago Tribune, January 12, .1968, pp. 1-2 (Seco:i.d,
fourth quotes). Chicago Sun-Times, January 12, 1968, p. 16.
Chicago Daily News, January 12, 1968, p. 4 (Sixth quote). Word
order and punctuation vary in the numerous newsp~per accounts of
the mayor's interview but the quotes are in agreement on the substance of the statements. The mayor's involvement in School Board
matters is discussed in chapter ii, especially pp. 21-24.
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William J. Cullerton, a prominent Democratic northwest side
politician, observed that in 1947 the city council had passed an
ordinance prohibiting the interference of council members with
Board of Education matters. However, he contended, "This is a
matter concerning a community that has been one of the finest in
the city.

Our homeowners and taxpayers are proud of their homes,

and I do not intend to permit anything to prevent the area from
maintaining this high standard of living."

At anti-busing rallies,

where emotions ran high, politicians implored audiences to remain
calm with entreaties such as, "Daley is working hard to make this
'a beautiful city . . . . If you move to the suburbs, sooner or later
you will be faced with the same thing there.
leave.

Don't leave, don't

You must stay. 11 39

Some politicians did more than implore; they threatened to
use their positions against the Board.

Edwin Fifielski, an alder-

man on the city finance committee, told how he voted in committee
against releasing a tax levy ordinance for the Board and would work
against the referendum for school funds proposed for the following
June.

This threat could not carry much weight as the northwest

and southwest sides had voted against prior school referendums.
However, the schools were continually seeking more financial aid
39No~thwest Times (Chicago), January 11, 1968, pp. 1, 6.
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from the state.

The Bette~ Schools Committee, consisting of the

city's top businessmen, was working with the Board's president to
raise 174 million dollars in 1968.

One member pointed out, "Sooner

or later we will need the assistance of the legislature."

A

southwest side state senator on the appropriations committee had
stated, "I intend to take whatever action is necessary to guarentee
that state funds will not be used for busing. 11 40

The weight of

such combined threats could not be taken lightly by Board members.
The Republicans in the city could not have been oblivious to
the possibility of obtaining the white backlash vote in the
November, 1968, elections.

The Cook County Republican Central

Committee Chairman issued a statement opposed to busing.

Most of

the Republican senators and representatives in Chicago formed a
group of about twenty to "develop a positive legislative program
to strengthen neighborhood schools in the city."
included:

Their program

restricting funds so that state money would not be used

for busing for the purpose of curing racial imbalance; creation of
an elective non-partisan, non-political school board to give the
people a voice in school board matters; provision of funds to
provide improved police protection on school premises and around
40Northwest Times (Chicago), January 11, 1968, p. 1. Chicago
Tribune, January 18, 1968, p. 1 (First quote). Southwest Economist
(Chicago)·, January 4, 1968, p. 2 (Second quote).

~~~~~~~~~~
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school grounds.41
It was obvious that many legislators were expressing their
own values rather than merely reflecting their constituencies'
opinions.

Henry Hyde, a northwest side representative who later

served as speaker of the house in the state legislature, said he
would oppose the busing plans "with every drop of blood in my body."
He argued that children should not be used as pawns because of
"what eggheads at the University of Chicago think is desirable."
He attacked the composition of the Board of Education as it "is
appointed on reconnnendation of a nominating connnittee which is
'hundreds of miles out to the left and chooses its nominees to
agree with it.

The people have no voice.

The Board should be

elected by the people from specific geographic area.s. 11 42
Peter J. Miller, another northwest side representative, was
critical of the city administration's role in the busing issue.
He criticized the mayor for not acting to quell the busing proposals.

·Referring to the mayor's intervention to end a Chicago

4 1chicago Daily News, January 12, 1968, p. 4. Northwest Times
(Chicago), February 8, 1968, p. 2 (Quote). Chicago Tribune,
January 16, 1968, p. 2.
42Northwest Times (Chicago), January 11, 1968, p. 6. The
role of the Connnission on School Board Nominations is reviewed in
chapter ii, pp. 19-22.
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teachers' strike in early January, he said, "If he [Daley] can
stick his nose into the business of teachers' strikes, why doesn't
he stick his nose into this and stop this ill-advised program."
In what he saw as the absence of leadership from downtown politicians, the representative recommended that protestors join the
Greater Northwest Civic Association, which had been formed to
fight against the busing proposals.

It was also suggested that

representatives from the Greater Northwest Civic Association attend
meetings of the more liberal Organization of Northwest Communities
to make their protest known.43
Opponents of busing came from both political parties and the
most outspoken came from

area~

marked for receiving schools.

A

northwest side Democratic leader, Parke J. Cullerton, supplied
buses to take groups from the eight northwest receiving schools
to protest at a Board meeting.

When members of the Greater North-

west Civic Association talked of the secession of their area from
the city, local politicians disowned the idea, although suburban
politicians expressed their guarded favor.

The Association

demanded that Redmond be fired; a northwest side woman be appointed
to the Board; the Redmond Plan be rejected with a reaffirmation of
43Northwest Times (Chicago), January 25, 1968, p. 1.
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the neighborhood policy; and future plans be submitted to the
people for their prior consent.44

While Mayor Daley dismissed the

threat of secession as the emotional reaction of a few individuals,
the Chicago Sun-Times had carried the secession announcement on its
first page.

The incident served as one more reminder that the

educational issues in busing would not be separated from political
issues in the minds of many Chicagoans. 45
The politician who became one of the most articulate spokesman
for the opposition from the northwest side was Roman Pucinski, U.S.
Representative and Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Education.
At a meeting held during the beginning of the busing controversy,
Pucinski had been hissed, apparently because of his identification
with liberal civil rights legislation.

However, he soon proved

that he did not consider busing to be a solution for Chicago's
school integration difficulties.

Pucinski contended that federal

guidelines did not require integration and expressly forbade the
use of federal funds for busing.

He pointed out that court

decisions had not compelled school systems to integrate their
44Northwest Times (Chicago), January 25, 1968, p. 1.
45Northwest Times (Chicago), January 11, 1968, p. 6; February
22, 1968, p. 3; February 29, 1968, p. 1. Chicago Sun-Times,
February 26, 1968, pp. 1, 24; February 27, 1968, p. 18.
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schools by busing in cases where segregation was de facto.

He

argued that the busing program gave no assurance that the sending
schools would not be crowded again in the future.

He pointed out

that federal aid was available for the May and Spencer Schools to
combat overcrowding and criticized the Board for not having found
ways other than busing to solve the problems at the sending
schools. 46
Pucinski argued that the children to be bused were being used
as pawns by "those so committed to the idea of total integration
that they will use any means to get it."

He felt the bused chil-

dren would suffer from the loss of federally funded remedial programs which would not be available at the receiving schools which
were not in areas eligible for federal aid under the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act.

He contended that quality education

would suffer in the receiving schools as the bused children would
be unable to keep up with the academic pace of their. white classmates, and the entire class would have to slow down.47
Pucinski also expressed the fears of white residents of the
46 Northwest Times (Chicago), January 11, 1968, p. 6; editorial,
January 18, 1968, p. 6.
47Northwest Times (Chicago), January 25, 1968, p. 8. The
validity of these arguments is considered in detail below in
chapters vii and viii.
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northwest side that the busing program would lead to the racial
change-over of their schools and neighborhoods.

The transition of

the May School from a predominantly _white to an almost totally
black student body was attributed to a Board decision four years
earlier to allow
This

permissi~e

transfers to attend the May School.

contention ignored the social dynamics of the expanding

Negro ghetto on the city's west side and disregarded a salient
feature of the non-contiguous plan, which was to relocate black
students in an area that was not experiencing racial change.
However, it did reflect the fear of white residents that the implementation of the plan would result in a diminished number of white
buyers who would consider purchasing homes in the area.48
The Chicago Tribune in its opposition to busing did not see
racism as an issue.

Rather, it 'pointed out that the bused children

would lose time in traveling to and from the receiving school.
The trip in itself represented safety problems and the distance
of a child from his home would make it difficult to act in situations when the child's health was impaired.

The newspaper also

observed the fear of busing opponents that the plans represente<l
only the first step in a more extensive program with a loss of the
4 8 rbid., January 22, 1968, p. 3.
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parents' right to send their children to a school in their
neighborhood.49
The preliminary report on population projections and school
enrollment prepared by the Real Estate Research Corporation was
used by the Tribune to discredit stabilization as an attainable
goal through busing.

The report had observed that stabilization

of some neighborhoods would only serve to divert the expanding
black population into other parts of the city.

The newspaper em-

phasized that only a policy which diverted Negro expansion into
suburban areas would further over-all racial stabilization in the
entire city.SO
When the Board met on

Fe~ru~r:.Y

28, 1968, to consider the fate

of the busing proposals, there could be little doubt that numerous
factions had presented their opinions.

There could also be little

doubt that the decision would rest with the Board itself and not
the school system staff.

It was perhaps only symbolic, but cer-

tainly pertinent, that at the height of the controversy the school
superintendent had left the city with his assistant superintendents
499hicago Tribune, January 10, 1968, p. 2.
SOEditorial, Chicago Tribune, January 7, 1~68, p. 28. The
pertinent findings of the Real Estate Research Corporation are
discussed above in chapter iv, pp. 123-150, passim.
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of school planning and integration to attend an educational conference.

One Board member had complained that the administration

had only presented one set of plans _for consideration, but the
Board was free to accept, alter, or reject the plans as it saw
fit. 51
When the hearings committee reported back to the Board as a
whole, it made no recommendations.

Friedman pointed out that,

while he felt a recommendation should have been made, he soon
realized that the four subcommittee members would not be able to
agree among themselves.

Thus, the report listed the dates of the

eight public hearings and noted the positions of the speakers.
Opponents of the plans numbered 106 organizations.

Another 47

organizations favored the plans, and 11 groups wished refinements.
It was noted that the South Shore plan had few advocates.

Mrs.

Malis observed that the number of members in the organizations
varied widely, and that some groups had overlapping memberships.
Mrs. Wild observed that she did not "think we heard anything
different from what we had expected before the hearings."

She

stated that the animosities encountered had made the hearings
"somewhat more difficult," and expressed surprise that the school
5 1southeast Economist (Chicago), February 22, 1968, p. 3;
February 29, 1968, p. 7.

260
staff had not prepared the communities for the idea of busing.52
An estimated 1500 people packed the Board meeting room and
corridors.

The overwhelming majority were opposed to busing.

They would return home that evening with an ambiguous victory.
The South Shore plan was returned to the school staff with the
recommendation to "work with people in the connnunity both on
preparation and revision."
returning the plan.

The vote was nine to one in favor of

Mrs. Green cast her singular vote, not

because she supported the original plan, but because she felt the
plans in general discriminated against the majority of Negro stu· dents.

She saw the great body of Negro students being "buried and

forgotten" as the receiving schools obtained all the advantages
and only a few Negroes were to be provided for by utilizing the
quota system--a system which stigmatized the black children by
labeling and numbering them.

Mrs. Malis may well have saved the

remnants of a future plan by stipulating that a revision must be
presented no later than September, 1968.53
52

Proceedings, February 28, 1968, p. 1533. Chicago Daily News,
February 28, 1968, pp. 1, 6. Southeast Economist (Chicago),
February 29, 1968, p. 7 (Quote).
53 Proceedings, February 28, 1968, p. 1533 (First quote), 1534.
Chicago Daily News, February 18, 1968, pp. 1, 6. Chicago Daily
Defender, February 29, 1968, pp. 3, 28 (Second quote).
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The Board was deadlocked on the disposition of the Austin
plan.

Friedman, Bacon, Malis, Carey, and Oliver voted for accept-

ance.

Green, Murray, Wild, Adams, and Whiston voted against the

report.

Scheffler was absent during these final meetings but his

opposition to the busing plans was well known.

Some Board members

made reference to the neighborhood school policy and the obvious
opposition of numerous Chicagoans.

Murray stated, "I have been

consistently opposed to busing only because I hate to see the last
vestige of the neighborhood school completely disappear."

He felt,

"Recent weeks prove the extent to which the public can be aroused
· over this question. 11 54
Busing supporters viewed the community opposition in another
way.

Oliver saw it as "flak . . . based on one single thing--they

don't want black children in their schools."
has no right ·acceding to that kind of demand."
Board of the 1954 Supreme Court decision that

He felt, "The Board
Carey reminded the
publi~

education

"must be·made available to all on equal terms and that segregated
education is unequal education."

He recalled the 1964 Chicago

Board policy statement on stabilization.

He reminded his colleagues

that when the Redmond Plan was submitted to the Board during the
54 Proceedings, February 28, 1968, pp. 1533-34.
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previous summer, he considered it to be "the finest document
dealing with the Chicago education problem that had been placed
in my hands since my appointment to this Board."

While not a

member of the hearings committee, Carey attempted "to listen to
many voices on this proposal, vehement voices against, moral voices
that cry for justice and equality, and muted voices that represent
the silent and inarticulate. 11 55
The busing proposal represented the first attempt to implement
the Redmond Plan.

Carey equated the adoption of the busing pro-

posals with his responsibility to provide quality education for all
· the children of Chicago.

He viewed "with regret those political

voices that lack the courage of leadership," and applauded, "those
political voices who would lean in the face of adversity."

Bacon

was more critical of the Board members themselves as the final
arbiters of the fate of the busing plans.

He stated, "The Board

did not ·have faith in its commitment, so piously made, to adopt
any reasonable plan.

All the pious utterings by the people who

voted against do not hide the fact that this Board does not have
the will, the resolve, the
55 Ibid.

commitm~nt,

to make the necessary
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changes. 1156
The Board's lack of resolution met criticism on all sides.
The Chicago Daily Defender, noting that the South Shore plan was
expected to fail, expressed surprise that the Austin plan did not
pass.

A Chicago Sun-Times editorial was almost irate, pointing

out that the Board's "resolve melted before opposition fueled by
demagoguery."

The editorial pointed out that in both plans the

Board "passed the buck back to School Superintendent Redmond
without assuring him that any new suggestions would draw more
courageous response. 11 57
On the other hand, Philip Hauser saw the five to five split
on the Board as sign of improvement in comparison to the period
during the tenure of Willis.
acquire a spine."

He stated, "It is beginning to

However, Hauser criticized the Board as still

being unable to recognize "that the hysteria of first- and secondgeneration immigrants being Americanized is not to be confused
with a majority of opinion in Chicago."

Some politicians who had

opposed the busing plans expressed their concern that the decision
56rbid., (First quote).
p. 4 (Second quote).

Chicago Sun-Times, February 29, 1968,

57 chicago Daily Defender, February 29, 1968, p. 3.
Chicago Sun-Times, March 1, 1968.

Editorial,
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"wasn't a clear-cut victory" which would end the possibility of
busing once and for all.

Indeed, Redmond did not see the decision

as final and stated that the "Board has not cut off all my options
and plans.

I will proceed immediately to make future plans.

This

was not a defeat for the plan. 11 58
It was evident even to some Board members who had voted
against implementing the Redmond busing plan that some action
regarding integration was imperative if the Chicago Board wished
to avoid federal intervention.
this problem.

Adams expressed his concern with

While he had reservations about the busing plans,

Adams apprehended the position of the Board regarding its integration policies.

The boundary policies of the Board had been

under attack, and the good faith of the Board might be established
in deference to the initiation of a busing program.

Adams

expressed a rationale for accepting a busing plan when he said,
Rather than go over boundary lines that were drawn to preserve
segr~gation, we decided to accept proposals for busing children
from overcrowded, mostly Negro schools to white neighborhoods.
If the busing element of the Redmond Plan is now abandoned, we
would have to go into the question of those illegal boundaries,
58chicago Sun-Times, February 29, 1968, pp. 3, 42 (Fi~st and
second quotes). Chicago Daily Defender, February 29, 1968, p. 3
(Third quote).
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for which our evidence is substantial.59
As early as a week before the February 28, 1968, Board
~e_t_ing,

J:her.e: w~re rumors of a compromise plan being proposed by

~dams"..:.:..:·

While the South Shore plan was definitely to be abandoned,

\the Austin-plan could:_be modified to allow parents of transfer
students ·.the. option of taking their children out of the program.
AJ:.:.. the_: time_ the. compromise was first leaked, it was denied by

almost all the Board members interviewed.

Mrs. Malis commented,

f';l _think it's· very unfortunate that a report like this would come
out at .this time [when] North side hearings are not completed yet,

,and the_ citywide hearings haven't even begun."

Friedman denied any

knowledge of_ a compromise and contended that the information referred to nothing more than a conversation between Wild and Adams.60
:..'--J.Ip:w~v~;r,_wh~n

t.he compromise was introduced at the Fepruary

28 meeting, it_ could not have been a surprise to any Board member.
Besides recommending that parents have the option to take their
children-out of the program, Adams also requested that the plan be
revised to prohibit "the transferring of children with a poor
59chicago Daily News, January 12, 1968, pp. 1, 4. The Board's
policies on integration are considered in detail in chapter iii
above.
60southeast Economist (Chicago), February 22, 1968, p. 3.
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disciplinary record or who are E[ducable] M[entally] H [andicapped],
T [rainableJ M[entally] H[andicapped] or emotionally disturbed."
He urged these changes mainly, "to cut down the flak from the
receiving schools" and assure white parents that their children
would not be bused against their will. 11 61
Adams' motion was deadlocked by the same five to five vote
with which the entire Austin Plan was sent back to Redmond.

Adams

and Wild expressed surprise that the busing supporters would not
agree to the compromise.

For her part, Mrs. Malis thought the

compromise was "appeasement" and, "making it optional won't quiet
the protesters either."

She felt a moral obligation was involved

as the "parents- of students at May and Spencer Schools want the
Board's moral support.

If we make it optional, we would be putting

the onus on them for sending their children to those Northwest Side
schools."

Mrs. Malis continued, "I personally don't think busing

is earthshakingly important.

But if the Board is going to go ahead

with a busing program, it should be a good one, not a compromise. 11 62
However, if there was going to be any busing program, it
appeared a compromise would be necessary.

The pivotal votes of

61 Proceedings, February 28, 1968, p. 1534 (First quote).
Chicago Sun-Times, February 29, 1968, p. 3 (Second quote).
62chicago Sun-Times, -February 29, 1968, pp. 3-4.
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Adams and Wild were tied to the voluntary program.

A discussion

on working out the compromise followed immediately after the
Wednesday session.

The next day, Austin community leaders conferred

with Redmond and expressed willingness to accept the compromise.

A

special meeting was called for Monday, March 4, 1968.63
When the Board assembled, Redmond took the occasion to consider some problems in the superintendent-board relationship.
Observing that groups from the May and Spencer Schools had been
bitter when discussing the fate of the busing plan, Redmond stated:
The criticism of me has been that I have not used my leadership
role to influence your opinions and decisions. There is not
one of us who could do anything in those days but question
his own conscience as a board member, as superintendent, and
as an American citizen. It was no easier for you to act than
it was for me to recommend. I firmly believe that the issue
before us points up most clearly the necessity for the division
of responsibility: me to recommend and you after deliberation
to establish policy. I have no right to ask you to change your
mind on policy any more than you have the right to ask me to
change my mind on recommendations.64
Regarding the racial issue, Redmond stated:
But above and beyond our personal feelings is an issue that
has been brought forth so forcefully in the Kerner Committee
report. As this report pointed out the issue is the assimilation of the black and white in an America which belongs to
both of us by no merit of either one of us. However, it is
63chicago's American, March 1, 1968, p. 3; March 2, 1968, p. l;
March 4, 1968, p. 11.
64Proceedings, March~' 1968, p. 1538.
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more than the issue of black and white which is our concern.
It is our responsibility to all children--the Indian, the
Japanese, the Chinese, the Puerto Rican and every other conceivable child of a minority group.
Let no one forget this and let us not forget to say it,
lest we be misunderstood in this day when everything is misunderstood because of lack of communication.
I do not believe that the Board report before us will
resolve the massive urban problems which face us. I do believe
that it does recognize your commitment and mine to the dignity
of every child in our school system.65
The amended proposal was accepted by an eight to one vote.
Scheffler and Carey were absent.

Scheffler had announced his

intention of resigning and Carey was in Springfield to ask the
state legislature to approve a raise in the tax rate being submitted
to the voters in a bond issue.

Mrs. Green cast the opposing vote.

Again, it was the quota system which she found to be anathema to
her principles.

She observed:

Now when we look at the facts, as we face them this day of
our Lord, 1968, we already have an elementary Negro proponderance. If we bused in all directions right now, we would
end up this evening with every elementary school in Chicago
having more Negro children or black or Afro-Americans, than
white children. So this means that we are setting up a system,
a quota system, which not only discriminates against these
Negro, black, Afro-Americans, but also imposes segregation
because of a 15% quota [which] is going to mean that all of
those children who are over there, not only the 85%, but all
of them are going to.have to be in segregated schools. So
this system not only means discrimination, it means
65 rbid.
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segregation.66
Mrs. Wild stated that as far as she and other Board members
were concerned, the main issue was overcrowded rooms.

The Board

could no longer tolerate overcrowding at one school while there
were empty seats in another. ·The Board's decision was not a
capitulation to "black power" but a question of doing what was
morally right.67
In accepting the compromise proposal Bacon asked for clarification of several points.

Under the amended plan the number of

students to be bused was to be kept near the 563 originally proposed.

In order to compensate for parents who would refuse the

transfer of their children, the motion authorized the superintendent to select additional sending areas in the May and Spencer
School districts.

Once students were bused under the plan, they

would continue to attend the receiving school until they graduated.
Bacon also asked Redmond to watch for any signs of staff sabotage
in which school employees might slow down implementation of the
plan or discourage parents from taking advantage of the busing.
66 Proceedings, March 4, 1968, pp. 1538-39 (Quote). Northwest
Times (Chicago), March 7, 1968, p. 1. Chicago's American, March 4,
1968, p. 11; March 5, 1968, p. 3.
67 Northwest Times (Chicago), March 7, 1968, p. 1.
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Redmond emphasized his intention to do so.68
As the school staff commenced working to achieve an implementation date set between March 11, 1968, and March 18, 1968, opposition in the communities began to organize.

Parents at the eight·

northwest side schools called for a one-day boycott to keep their
children home.

In Springfield politicians called for a ten member

joint committee to begin an investigation of Chicago protestors to
Springfield.

Bills were being introduced to prevent the Board from

using state funds for busing to promote integration.

The threat

of demonstrations and violence at the receiving schools was a
definite factor that the school staff would have to consider in
implementing the plan.69
In the midst of all the emotional turmoil, it was too easy to
miss the few voices on the northwest side which supported the
busing plan.·

As one resident observed in a letter to the editor:

How can we the minority be heard--or dare we be heard? I'm
almost afraid when I see so much emotionalism and so little
rational thinking. This thing is at high pitch, and I'm
afraid to disagree.out loud.70
68rbid.
69chicago's American, March 4, 1968, pp. l; editorial, p. 7;
March 5, 1968, p. 3. Northwest Times (Chicago), March 7, 1968, p. 1.
70chicago Daily Defender, March 11, 1968, p. 5.
Times (Chicago), February 8, 1968, p. 1 (Quote).
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CHAPTER VII
INVOCATION, APPLICATION, APPRAISAL
AND TERMINATION FUNCTIONS:
THE PLA.N IN OPERATION
On March 11, 1968,, one week after the Board made its busing
decision, 249 students boarded buses to attend classes in the designated eight receiving schools.

The children arrived at their

new schools to face jeers, placards and ominous silence from white
pickets assembled in groups estimated to consist of from 25 to 200
persons at each of the buildings.

Seventy-five policemen were

assigned to the receiving schools to insure the safety of the
bused students.

One school had been firebombed earlier in the day,

but the damage was slight, and no further violence was encountered.
The parents of 323 students had accepted the assignment of their
children to the new schools.

The absence of a large number of the

students to be bused was attributed to parents' fear for the safety
of their children.

On March 12, 1968, 290 children boarded the

buses.l
The speed with which the plan was implemented was
lchicago Daily Defender, March 11, 1968, ·p. 3; March 12,
1968, pp. 3, 4, 5. Chicago Daily News, March 11, 1968, p. 8.
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commendable.

Physical alterations such as the addition of class-

room seats were completed before the new students arrived.

Some

staff members did complain of the short time allowed to prepare
for the change of classes, the lack of clear cut definitions of
responsibilities, confusion of time tables, and ,the sparsity of
special personnel and human relations people.

The administrators

in the sending schools had been informed of the plans prior to
those in the receiving schools.2

While staff at the sending

schools did not complain of the lack of time involved, the task
of convincing parents that they should allow their children to
participate was a major problem.
The busing plan set 573 as the number of pupils to be bused
from the May and Spencer Schools.

Pupils in grades one to six who

resided in selected geographic areas which were predominantly
Negro and at the greatest walking distance from the sending schools
were eligible for transfer.

Eighteen of these areas were origi-

nally selected in which over 578 students resided.

Children were

.2 stanley Ptak, Past Principal of the May School, private
taped interview held in .his office, Chicago, Illinois, August 14,
1972. George W. Connelly, Associate Superintendent, Area C,
"Austin-Area Project: A Pupil Busing Program in District Four.
An Evaluation" (report presented to the General Committee of the
Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, July 24, 1968),
pp. 4, 8, 18, 22. (Typewritten.) Hereinafter referred to as
D.E., 1968.
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screened to exclude mentally handicapped and emotionally disturbed
students.

Notes were sent home with the children in the selected

areas telling the parents their children would be bused.

If

parents returned the approval form indicating they did not wish
their child to participate, the child was exempted.

The May-

Spencer United Corrnnittee sent representatives to visit parents
urging them to allow their children to participate.
held to explain the plan and encourage acceptance.

Meetings were
Emphasis was

placed upon the chance for a better education in less crowded
schools rather than upon integration.3
Despite these efforts, only 330 students received parental
approval.

It was necessary to add 13 supplementary blocks which

made a total of 1157 students eligible for busing.

By April 8,

1968 only 519 students had been recruited when the Board approved
a recommendation that the transfer program be closed for the year
to allow the sending and receiving schools to stabilize their
classes for the remaining school year.

Parents of the 638 students

who did not participate were surveyed to find out why they chose
3n.E., 1968, pp. 1, 2. Ptak, August 14, 1972. Chicago's
American, March 6, 1968, p. l; March 9, 1968, p. 1. Board of
Education, City of Chicago, Proceedings: Board of Education, City
of Chicago, (Chicago: Board of Education, April 10, 1968),
p. 1731. Hereinafter referred to as Proceedings, date of meeting,
page number.
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not to have their children bused.

A "Surrnnary of 'No' Responses"

prepared by the area staff is reproduced on the following page.4
The large percentage (26. 8 percent) of parents who gave no
reason for refusing to send their children precludes any pretense
to accuracy in determining anything but a general impression of
the attitudes of those parents who refused.

Preference for the

neighborhood school was the most frequently given response.

When

coupled with objections to the distance their children would have
to travel, worry that children were too young to go on the bus,
not knowing what to do if children became sick, and pronouncements
that they did not believe in busing, 35.4 percent of the 426 parents who responded could be classified as objecting to some aspect
of busing.

Another 8.6 percent either expressed fear that their

children would be harmed or worried about the prejudice their children would face.

Most of the remaining responses could be classi-

fied under problems originating at home such as conflicting work
schedules of the parents, medical reasons and intentions to move.
Eighteen parents (4.2 percent) objected to the time of year the
plan was being initiated and one parent had a mistaken idea of the
monetary cost of the plan to the parent.

These objections

4n.E., 1968, pp. 2, 3, 4. Proceedings, April 10, 1968,
p. 1731; November 13, 1968, p. 800.

TABLE 5
WHY SOME PARENTS CHOSE NOT TO HAVE THEIR CHILDREN BUSEDa

Reason Given

May School
Phase Phase
I
II

48
39
No reason given
23
15
Prefer neighborhood school
Children needed at home to
8
12
assist with younger ones
Fear of harm to children;
4
13
lack of protection
Parents work; schedule
prevents meeting or
8
preparing children
3
12
Family moving soon
7
2
10
Distance too far from home
Not at this time; wrong
0
8
time of year
Too young to go on bus; want
2
child in neighborhood
4
Prejudice facing children
0
0
0
Too many transfers
0
2
Personal reasons
5
Medical reason; under
doctor's care
2
5
Cannot buy lunch
7
0
No need to go; don't
believe in busing
0
0
Undecided (at this time)
5
0
Don't know what to do if
child gets sick
2
3
Mistaken-idea on cost
1.
0
Child doesn't want to go
0
1
Total
138 113

Phase I--first 18 blocks

Spencer School
Phase Phase Total
I
II

Per
Cent

15
44

12
17

114
99

26.8
23.2

9

0

29

6.8

8

2

27

6.3

7
0
2

7
5

4

25
24
18

5.9
5.6
4.2

7

3

18

4.2

0
6

6
4

5
0

5
0

12
10
10
7

2.8
2.3
2.3
1. 7

0
0

0
0

7
7

1. 7
1. 7

7
0

0
0

7
5

1. 7
1. 2

0
0

0
0
0

5

1.2

1
1

6s

426

0.2
0.2
100.0

0

110

Phase II--additional 13 blocks

aGeorge W. Connelly, Associate Superintendent, Area C, "Austin
Area Project: A Pupil Busing Program in District Four. An Evaluation" (report presented to the General Committee of the Chicago
Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, July 24, 1968), pp. 3-4.
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reflected problems in the execution of .the plan.

The one parent

was informed that transportation was free, but the inappropriate
date for beginning the program had its origin in the decisionmaking process of the Board.5
Despite the fact that parents of 55.2 percent of the children eligible for the busing program had denied their permission,
waiting lists occurred in some areas.

The number of students

designated for a receiving school was determined by the quota
system which governed the number of available seats in the receiving school.
to exceed 11

The total number of pupils transferring was not

perce~t

of the total enrollment of the receiving

school in the first year.

As the seventh and eighth grades came

to be included in the plan over the next two years a 15 percent
quota limit was to be required.

While it was the quota which

determined the number of students who could attend the receiving
school, the plan called for areas to be chosen to fill these
seats, not students.

Thus, if not enough parents accepted the

transfer of their children from a certain area, the quota was not
filled.

If too many parents in a designated area accepted the

transfer of their children, a waiting list occurred.6

5D.E., 1968, pp. 3-4.

6Ptak, August 14, 1972.
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Orientation of the bused children included numerous factors.
The children were to be at designated pick-up points at 8:15 A.M.
and were to board the bus at 8:20 A.M.
at twenty to thirty minutes.

The bus ride was estimated

A child welfare attendant with an

attendance list rode along on the bus and remained at the receiving
school as an aide for the day.

As some schools had no facilities

for providing lunches, students were instructed to bring their
food.

If a student became sick while at school, he was to be sent

home in a cab with an adult, after notification of the parent.
Stand-by buses were kept at the Burbank School to provide for any
unexpected early closing of a school.7
When the children arrived at their new schools, they were
assigned to classrooms according to their grade level.

Receiving

school teachers had attended a series of in-service meetings to
prepare for the transferring students.

In most cases the required

new textbooks had been ordered during the week of the March 4
decision~

and some texts were already delivered by March 11, 1968.

Seventeen new classroom teachers were assigned to the receiving
schools.

While a local newspaper complained that they were all

7Ibid. Chicago Daily Defender, March 11, 1968, p. 3.
Robert Bell, Retired Superintendent of District Four, containing
the Austin community, private interview at Schurz High Schools,
Chicago, .Illinois, June 22, 1972.
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substitutes and not assigned teachers, the teacher-student ratio
in all but two schools decreased.

At the Bridge and Lyon Schools

the ratio rose from 31.5 to 32.6 and from 32.9 to 33.2, respectively.

All the schools received additional teacher aides, and

two schools were given full-time adjustment teachers instead of
their previous half-time teach~rs.8
However, the Area C staff evaluation recognized that "many
legitimate complaints by parents might have been prevented" if
further auxiliary services had been increased.

Lack of funds was

given as the reason for not appointing full-time physical education,
library and adjustment teachers in all the receiving schools.9
Representative Pucinski had pointed out that these schools on the
northwest side were not in poverty areas as designated under the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, and thus the new students
did not bring in federal funds.
The cost of the busing program compared to a.building program is not easily determined.

During the sixty-five school day

period between March and June, the twelve buses cost $24,960.00 to
rent.

The salaries for the busing attendants and teacher aides

8n.E., 1968, pp. 4, 8. Julian Lewitt, Principal of the
Sayre Ele;entary School, telephone interview, Chicago, Illinois,
August 12, 1972. Northwest Times (Chicago), March 14, 1968, p. 1.

9

.

D.E., 1968, p. 4.
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amounted to $4,512.00 and $5,012.00 respectively for the two categories.

Another $29,609.15 and $1,779.20 were required for watch-

men and security guards.

The latter two costs were necessitated

due to the fear that the children would be harmed.

In the fol-

lowing full school year only $200.00 was spent for security.
total cost for the 1968-1969 school year was $132,424.00.

The

The

busing· enrollment during this year varied between a high of 621 in
November which declined to 570 by June due to pupil transiency and
decisions to return to the home school.

Assuming a 600 student

average, the cost per pupil was about $220.00.

These costs,

however, excluded teachers' salaries, textbooks, supplies and
educational equipment--the operating expenses of a school excluding
its physical plant.10
Thus, the cost of the busing plan should be compared to the
capital investment required to build a 600 pupil elementary school.
The Board was involved in constructing a 600 student facility at
102nd Street and Cottage Grove Avenue in 1968.

The total estimated

lOibid., p. 19. Robert M. Bell, District Superintendent,
District Four, "Austin-Area Project: The Busing Program ~n District
Four: A Second Report" (report presented to the General CoIImlittee
of the Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, August 15,
1969), pp. 4, 30. (Typewritten.) Hereinafter referred to as D.E.,
1969. Proceedings, November 13, 1968, p. 800.
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cost for construction, site and development, equipment and architectural fees was $1,495,000.

An equipment cost of $100,000 is

retained in the total cost figure on the assumption that equipping
a new school would entail considerably more expense than preparing
an existing building for additional students.

The average cost

per pupil for the entire facility was $2,491.0o.ll

When compared

to the-$220.00 per pupil cost for busing, the cost of the new
facility would be paid in about eleven years--assuming that the
cost of busing would not increase during this period.
of busing per pupil had increased each year.

But the cost

Taking the maximum

·number of students bused during a school year as the divisor, the
cost per pupil for busing in 1969-1970 was about $285 and during
1970-1971 the cost was about $30o.12

Thus, it seems apparent that

11 Proceedings, November 13, 1968, p. 812. The 102nd Street
and Cottage Grove Avenue facility was later expanded to accommodate
1000 students at a cost per pupil of $1,985.00. The Orr School,
being built for 485 students, was estimated to cost $1,294,000
about $2,668 per pupil. See Proceedings, June 11, 1969, pp. 3046-47.
12George W. Connelly, Associate Superintendent, Area C,
"Austin-Area Project: The Pupil Busing Program in District Four:
A Third Report" (report presented to the General Committee of the
Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, September 30, 1970),
p. 30. (Typewritten.) Hereinafter referred to as D.E., 1970.
Joseph J. Connery, District Superintendent, District Four, "AustinArea Project: The Pupil Busing Program in District Four: A Fourth
Report" (report presented to the General Committee of the Chicago
Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, August, 1970), p. 31.
(Typewritten.) Hereinafte~ referred to as D.E., 1971. The cost
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the cost of the busing program would pay for a schooi building
over a decade.
However, numerous other factors must be considered.
.Board building program operates on borrowed money.

The

The interest

charges on the borrowed sum would have to be added to the cost of
the building or subtracted from the yearly cost of busing if the
building cost was not incurred.

To simplify the computations it

could be assumed that the Board has the $1,495,000 in cash.

Rather

than building a plant, it invests the sum at 5 percent simple
interest and uses the interest to operate the busing program.
·This would provide $74,750 yearly, considerably less than the
$132,424 required to operate the program during its least expensive
year, but a factor in reducing the actual busing costs.

The cost

of the program to the Board is further reduced by the availability
of state funds to defray transportation costs.

In 1969-1970 this

amounted to $43,185.28, but in 1970-1971 the amount.dropped to
in 1969-1970 was $156,314.56 with a maximum of 575 bused students.
In 1970-1971 the cost was $165,800 with a maximum of 532 bused
students. As the number of students bused in the program fell
below 600, the cost per pupil was used as a constant in computing
the cost of the program compared to a 600 pupil facility.,
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$8,162.os.13
The cost of the busing program can also be questioned in
terms of the relative costs of operating a new plant compared to
the expanded use of existing facilities.

Thus, the cost of heating

and a portion of the maintenance services at the receiving schools
represent fixed costs which would increase only slightly with the
increase in enrollment.

These fixed costs would have to be en-

tirely duplicated at a new facility.

An approximation of the

saving in heating and maintenance expenditures can be made by
examining the costs in the Lyon and Smyser Schools for the budget
years January, 1967, through January, 1970.

At the Lyon School,

where the enrollment hovered around 650 during these years, there
was no appreciable difference in operations costs between the two
years budgeted without busing and the two years budgeted with the
busing program.

Indeed, a minor readjustment in the scheduling of

janitors for the building resulted in a $5,720.25 reduction in
operation staff salaries from $36,963.25 in the 1968 budget to

$31,243.00 in the 1969 budget.

An increase in salaries accounted

for the only,rise in operation expenditures from 1969 to 1970.

13n.E., 1970, p. 30. D.E., 1971, p. 31. Capital loss
through inflation can be ignored in the example as the Board
building program operates on borrowed funds. The 5% interest may
be conservative but is not unrealistic for the years involved.
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The situation did not change considerably at the Smyser
School, where the enrollment hovered around 600 students during
the period.

Again, a change in scheduling of custodial staff

resulted in a reduction of salary costs from $36,484.80 in the last
pre-busing budget to $30,964.00 in the 1969 budget.

At both

schools the heating and electricity costs did not indicate any
appreciable differences between the period when the busing plan
was in operation and prior periods.

The effects of weather and

sunlight are more apparent than the increase in student enrollment.
Maintenance costs at both schools showed absolutely no relationship
to the number of students in attendance.14
In light of this data it is appropriate to consider the
costs of providing heating, lighting and custodial staff as fixed
costs.

These fixed costs do not fluctuate considerably with minor

changes in the size of the student body such as were introduced
by the busing plan.

However, if a new building were. erected to

acconnnodate the total student body being bused, these fixed costs
would arise in the new structure in addition to similar fixed costs
in the existing buildings.

Taking the lowest figures for the four

year period considered among the two schools, we can compute a
14Proceedings, January 13, 1967, pp. 1923, 2195; January 10,
1968, pp. 2019, 2291; January 11, 1969, pp. 2045-46, 2331-32;
January 15, 1970, pp. 2215-16, 2502-03.
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reasonably accurate minimum operational cost for a new building.
This would be:

$30,964 for custodial salaries; $1,908 for elec-

tricity; $1,766 for fuel--a total of $34,638 for minimal fixed
costs.

When the $74,750 interest cost on the capital investment

is added to the fixed cost, the sum totals $109,338.

This figure

approaches the $132,424 required to operate the busing plan.

When

state aid for busing programs is added, the true monetary cost of
the busing program compared to a building program becomes insignificant.
The psychological cost of busing to the egos of the transported students is another factor to consider.

The hostility in

the receiving communities was overt in the beginning a.nd.only
veiled as time passed.

Of course, not all residents in the re-

ceiving communities were opposed to the busing plan.

Some residents

of the northwest side organized to express their favorable attitudes
toward integration.

Local school administrators reported a few

letters of support and one even received a check to help the bused
children.

Some white children invited bused students to their

homes for lunch.

Even the anti-busing organizations disavowed

threats of violence.
While no harm came to any of the bused children, their
reception in the

receiving~community

was hostile.

Besides the
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pickets stationed at the receiving schools; white parents had
organized ,a boycott keeping their children out of classes.

These

boycotts were relatively effective, keeping about 700 students out
of school on the first day of busing.

Nor did they diminish in

effectiveness during the first months of busing.

Late in March a

cycling boycott between the receiving schools was reported to have
kept 217 of 546 students out of the Smyser School.

Another, two

days later, at the Locke School resulted in 455 absences while 390
students were present.

In May, a united boycott involving the

northwest, southeast and southwest sides of the city raised the
city-wide absence rate from a normal 8 percent to 10.6 percent.
As late as 1972, a local administrator, while judging community
activity toyave diminished, requested that parents in the area
not be interviewed in fear that hostility might be awakened.15
Besides the boycotts, anti-busing adherents had called for
the defeat of a pending bond issue, an elected rather than appointed school board, moving from affected communities, use of
alternate schools, legislative intervention, court orders to
15chicago Daily Defender, March 11, 1968, pp. 3, 5; March
12, 1968, pp. 3, 4, 5. Bell, June 22, 1972. Lewitt, August 12,
1972. Chicago's American, March 4, 1968, p. l; March 5, 1968,
p. 3; March 6, 1968, p. 4; March 9, 1968, p. 1. Northwest Times
(Chicago), March 14, 1968, p. l; March 25, 1968, p. l; May 8,
1968, p. 1.
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prohibit busing.

In none of these areas were they particularly

successful.
In June, 1968, the bond referendum for the schools passed
with a 52 percent majority compared to the acceptance of a bond
issue the year before by 62.6 percent of the voters.

Heavy major-

ities in Negto wards offset the negative votes of residents of the
predominantly white northwest and southwest sides.

An

estimat~d

80 percent to 92 percent of voters in inner-city wards voted for
the referendum.

In all the northwest side wards the negative vote

varied between 53 percent and 77 percent.

In the west side ward

affected by the busing plan 94 percent of the votes cast were
affirmative.

In the two northwest side wards affected by the

busing plan 79 percent and 84 percent of the votes cast were
negative.16
Anti-busing forces were also not able to convince a majority of the voters in the city that an elected school board would
be advantageous.

In June, 1971, city voters, by a three to one

ratio, rejected a school referendum to elect members from fifteen
neighborhood districts.

The referendum was even defeated on the

northwest and southwest sides where sentiment for it originated.
16chicago Daily News, June 12, 1968, pp. 1, 6.
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The fear that elected members would become too enmeshed in politics
was considered to be a dominant factor in the electorate's decision.
Apparently, the electorate also agreed with Wild's observation
that "if we all [Board members] represented a different area .
no decision would ever be reached. 11 17
The mayor had not been immediately responsive to the demands
of residents in the western periphery of the city that Board members
be appointed to represent their areas.

Within weeks following the

busing decision Daley announced that he would attempt to appoint
members to represent a more equitable geographical cr.oss-section
of the city.

He also expressed the desire to appoint members who

would be sensitive to the feelings of the "average man in the
neighborhoods."

However, it became apparent that these were not

his only considerations in making appointments.

The retirement of

Scheffler soon opened a position on the Board.
the terms of Whiston and Murray expired.

When

At the same time
liber~l

members of

the nominating committee were able to exclude the names of the
president and vice-president of the Board from the list of nominees,
Daley appointed them without the recommendation.

To balance the

17"Feminine Angle Magazine," Chicago Sun-Times, June 6,
1971, pp. 1, 28; June 9, 1971, p. l; editorial, June 10, 1971;
June 11, 1971, p. 2. Southeast Economist (Chicago), February 29,
1968, p. 7 (Quote). Chicago Tribune, June 7, 1971, p. 5.
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appointment of the two conservative Board members Daley chose Mrs.
Carey Preston, a Negro from the southeast Hyde Park area of the
city.

The western areas of the city remained without represen-

tation.18
The overriding importance of keeping a man of his choice in
the Board presidency was again apparent in the mayor's choices in
1968 and 1970.

Bacon, an outspoken critic of Board policies, was

challenging Whiston for the presidency.

The appointment of Jack

Witkowsky to replace Oliver on the Board resulted in a six to five
vote for Whiston.

Two years later, Wi~kowsky was ready to join

with the minority of five to elect Bacon rather than Whiston.
Despite the fact that he was renominated for his position Witkowsky
was passed over by Daley and Gerald Sbarbaro was appointed to the
Board.

The significance of Sbarbaro's residency in the west side

Austin area is clouded by the importance of his critical vote in
reelecting Whiston.19
In 1969 two more vacancies occurred with the retirement of
Adams and Green.

Daley's choices for their replacement were both

l8chicago Daily News, March 16, 1968, p. 2 (Quote).
topic is also discussed above in chapter ii, pp. 21-24.

This

19Jack Witkowsky, "Education of a School Board Member,"
Saturday Review, LIV (November 20, 1971), 90-92. Chicago SunTimes, March 22, 1971, pp., 14, 42.
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representatives of minority groups who lived in the southeast area
of the city.

Mrs. David Gerta was of Latin-American origin and

lived in Calumet Heights-which contained three elementary schools
which had been designated as receiving schools in the defunct
South Shore plan.

Alvin J. Boutte, from Chatham to the west of

Avalon Park, was the third Negro on the Board.

Northwest and

southwest side organizations opposed the appointment of these two
new Board members on the grounds that they would not represent
the views of the white communities. 2 0
When Whiston died, Mrs. Catherine Rohter was appointed to
the Board.

The first member to be appointed from the northwest

side, she cast her crucial vote for Carey in his contest with
Bacon for the Board presidency.

Later in 1971, Murray died, and

Daley appointed Thomas J. Nayder to fill the vacancy.

While Nayder

came from the southwest side, he stated he intended to represent
the viewpoint of organized labor rather than his neighborhood.
Nayder had succeeded Murray as president of the Chicago Building
Trades Council and was also an officer of the Chicago Plan which
was created to find construction jobs for minority
2 0chicago Daily News, July 29, 1969, p. 16.

groups-~a
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project which was not particularly successful in Chicago.21
In the spring of 1971 Carey had announced that he was not
seeking reappointment to the Board.

The problem of finding a new

candidate for the presidency who would represent organized labor
interests seems to have been the major incentive for the mayor's
next action.

In June, Carey announced that civic leaders had

convinced him to seek another term.

Without waiting for the nomi-·

nation of his screening committee, Daley reappointed Carey.

The

mayor argued that Carey had been approved by the screening committee when he was first appointed, and stated, "After a man has once
been approved by the citizens' committee, it is up to the mayor of
Chicago to decide whether he has served well. 11 22

Busing supporters

certainly could not have interpreted the mayor's action to be
hostile, as Carey had been one of the most outspoken supporter3 of
the busing plan.
The mayor had no cause for alarm in the threats of angry
whites that they would move from the city.

Talk of the secession

of the northwest communities never passed the formulative stage.
Threats that white residents would move from the receiving
21 Chicago Sun-Times, March 22, 1971, pp. 1, 4; June 11,
1971, p. 2.
22 chicago Sun-Times, June 11, 1971, p. 2; June 25, 1971,
p. 4 (Quote).
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communities never materialized as fact.

Reference to Table 6-on

the following page shows the enrollment of white students in the
first three years of the busing program to be almost steadily
increasing in numbers in four receiving schools, the enrollment to
remain stable in two schools, and only two schools that experience
the loss of more than thirty-five students.

If 1967 is used as a

base year for computing percentage of increase or decrease by 1972,
then five schools experienced a decrease in enrollment between 2.1
percent and 9.8 percent while three schools experienced an increase
of between 1.3 percent and 15.2 percent.
However, if the total enrollment in the eight schools in
1967 is compared to the total enrollment in 1972 then there is an
actual percentage increase in white enrollment of about 0.4 percent.
If the Bridge School is dropped from the calculations because of
its.sudden increase in enrollment in 1969 (explained below), the
total enrollment over five years dropped only 1.03 percent.

The

stability of white enroliment is all the more significant in light
of the fact that the entire city lost a startling 35.7 percent
of its non-Negro elementary school enrollment during this

TABLE 6
KINDERGARTEN THROUGH EIGHTH GRADE CAUCASIAN ENROLLMENT
IN RECEIVING SCHOOLS: 1967--1972'1
Percent
Sept. Sept. Sept. Oct.
Sept. Oct.
Change, 5yr.
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
Period
Bridge

426

413

525

593

601

591

15. 2

"'

Burbank

390

393

396

413

390

382

2.1

"'

Dever

854

826

850

846

827

806

5.6

'1t

Locke

854

863

849

833

816

806

5. 6

Lyon

610

600

594

575

573

550

9. 8

.v
.v

Sayre

448

478

504

520

519

454

1. 3

1'

Smyser

560

554

567

573

602

598

6. 8

1'

762
4904

770
4897

764
5049

802
5155

771
5099

736
4923

3.4

~

-o:4

1'

4432

1. 0

.Jt

35.7

.it

O.A.Thorp
Total

Total Enrollment Without Bridge
4478
4484
4524
4562
4498
City-wide
1967

Non~Negroid

1968

196' 152 _194' 125

Elementary Schoul Enrollment

1969

1970

1971

1972

190 ,440

187 '795

180' 908

126, 362

aData compiled from Chicago Public Schools, Teacher Observation Headcount, (Hand tabulated Xeroxed copies, Chicago, 1967,
1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, District Four). Board of Education,
City of Chicago, Open Enrollment: A Progress Report (Chicago:
Board of Education, November, 1972), p. 17.
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period.23
The use of alternative schools in which white students could
escape integration was never a viable plan for northwest side residents.

The cost of the necessary resources and personnel would

have been beyond their lower-middle class means.

The enrollment

figures indicate they did not "escape" to suburban systems.

The

Catholic schools in the area could not accept a large increase in
enrollment, and it was evident that they would not.

The announced

Catholic school busing plan, while totally voluntary on both sides
in its final form, was nebulous enough in its early stages so that .
no one was certain how it would be developed.

Indeed, parishioners

talked of withdrawing their children from the Catholic schools to
enroll them in the receiving schools so that the empty·classrooms
would be filled with neighborhood students.

Again, the stable

23chicago Public Schools, Teacher Observation Headcount,
(Hand tabulated Xeroxed copies, Chicago, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970,
1971, 1972, District Four). Hereinafter referred to as Headcounts.
Board of Education, City of Chicago, Open Enrollment: A Progress
Report (Chicago: Board of Education, November, 1972), p. 17.
Hereinafter referred to as Open Enrollment Report. In 1970
Mexicans were counted separately. Before this year they were included in the Caucasian count. In compiling the statistics between
1967 and 1972, taking the non-Negroid city-count compensates for
the sudden drop in Caucasian enrollment that appears to occur in
1970. As a cursory glance indicates the Mexican enrollment has
increased since 1970, the actual decrease of Caucasian students may
be greater than the percentage indicated in this paper. That is,
the 35.7% drop in enrollment would represent the smallest possible
drop in Caucasian enrollment.

r
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enrollment figures show this did not occur.

The one apparent

exception is the large jump in enrollment at Bridge School in 1969.
Interviews with area parents indicate that this was caused by the
withdrawal of students from the local Catholic school.
opposition to busing was not a motive.

However,

In this year the local

Catholic school increased its tuition greatly and dropped the
kindergarten program.

Many parents, especially those with large

families, then enrolled their children in the public school. 24
While overt opposition from parents in the receiving conununities declined, there were still lingering protests.

Some state

legislators initiated an investigation of the school system and
prepared bills to prohibit school
promote integration.

bo~rds

from using state funds to

By June, 1968, it was apparent that two bills

designed to outlaw school busing were faltering when not a single
witness appeared at the hearing to urge their passage.

On the

other hand, the Chicago School Board president, the Chicago
Teachers' Union president, the executive secretary of the Illinois
24New World (Chicago), January 26, 1968, p. 1. Northwest
Times (Chicago), March 21, 1968, p. l; March 28, 1968, p. 6.
Mrs. Maureen Hickey, Bridge School parent, telephone interview,
Chicago, Illinois, January 6, 1974. Mrs. Donna Nabors, Bridge
School parent, telephone interview, Chicago, Illinois', January 6,
1974. Ex-officer of the Bridge School Parent-Teachers Association,
telephone interview, Chicago, Illinois, January 6, 1974.
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Federation of Teachers, and a representative of the Illinois Education Association testified against the bills.

When the State

Chicago School Board Study Commissiqn, dominated by opponents of
busing, issued its report in June, 1970, it received little
attention in the city.25
But anti-busing sentiment has grown in the state and has
certainly not died in the city.
in the courts.

The busing program was challenged

While the Illinois Appellate Court did not uphold

the protests, it did find the cases to be moot and dismissed them
without prejudice in 1969.
the door to further legal

Thus, the Illinois courts have not shut
ch~llenges

to busing.

Subsequent actions

by the state's Office of the Superintendent of Public Inst.ruction
outlining integration plans for Illinois raised the ire of numerous
state legislators.

In 197·3 two south suburban legislators intro-

duced an anti-busing amendment to the Illinois School Code which
became law during the year.

The legislation, which amends the

sections defining powers of the Chicago and other boards of education, states, "Nothing herein shall be construed to permit or
empower the State Superintendent of Public Instruction to order,
25chicago's American, March 4, 1968, pp .. 1, 7, 11. Chicago
Sun-Times, June 15, 1968, p. 22; June 9, 1970, p. 4; June 10, 1970,
p. 45. Chicago Daily News, June 14, 1968, p. 3. Northwest Times
(Chicago), September 4, 1968, p. 4.
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mandate or require busing or other transportation of pupils for the
purpose of achieving racial balance in any school."26
The Chicago Board of Education remained hesitant to expand
its involvement in busing

prog~ams.

As will be seen in the next

chapter, the Austin busing program has not been expanded since the
second year of its inception.

In late 1968 parents of students in

the Emmet· School, on the western edge of the city in Austin, asked
the Board to approve a voluntary busing plan to relieve overcrowding
in the school.

Black and white spokesmen for the predominantly

white school (73.8 percent in September, 1968) wanted a program
that would carry their children into northwest side schools.

Two

Board members, Friedman and Witkowsky, indicated their approval.
However, Witkowsky was reported to have said that funds were not
available for further busing programs and the pro-busing forces on
26 Illinois, Public Law 78-881 (passed September 19, 1973),
amending chapter cxxii, section 10-22.5 and 34-18.7 of The School
Code of Illinois. Section 10-22 deals with powers of boards of education in the state. Section 34-18 deals with powers of the Chicago
Board of Education. Telephone calls to offices of National Association of Colored People and the Chicago Urban League, February 22,
1974, indicated they had no plans to contest the state amendment.
Indeed, the office staff had no knowledge that the legislation
existed. One group indicated that the law had probably slipped
by their lobbyist as they were now concentrating on obtaining
positions for minority members in decision-making roles.
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the Board "didn't have the votes" to push the program through.27
In January, 1969, a busing proposal for the Emmet School
suggested by Friedman was defeated in a nonrecorded vote.

The

Board continued with its policy of erecting semi-permanent "relo- ·
eatables" while the school operated on a double shift.

In March,

1971, the five branches of the Emmet School had 3,562 students compared to its enrollment of 1,448 in September, 1968.
program was finally initiated.

A busing

However, the Emmet plan differed

considerably from the May and Spencer program.

Students from the

Emmet West School, then over 95 percent black, were not allowed to
decline to participate in the plan.

About 350 students, in eleven

classrooms containing grades two through five, were chosen to be
transferred as units to five elementary schools.

One receiving

school was on the west side about three miles from the Emmet West.
The other four schools were located on the near north side, about
nine miles from the sending school.28
Two of the receiving schools had almost totally black student
27chicago Daily News, October 23, 1968, p. 3.
Tribune, November 13, 19·68, p. 6 (Quote).

Chicago

28 Proceedings, January 22, 1969, p. 2509; March 1, 1971, pp.
2755-57. Headcounts, 1968, 1969, 1970, District Four. Chicago
Sun-Times, March 2, 1971, p. 14. See Table 8, p. 322 below for a
summary of the phenominal growth of the Emmet student body.
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bodies (95.2 percent and 99.1 percent in September, 1971).

One

receiving school was desegregated with about a 25 percent black
student enrollment.

The remaining two receiving schools had only

a few black students enrolled (2.4 percent and 5.3 percent).
Parents at the Lincoln Schools (5.3 percent Negro) had indicated
to the school planning staff their willingness to participate in
the program.

When announced, the Emmet busing plan was scheduled

only for the period from March until June, 1971.

Furthermore, it

was emphasized that the plan was not for purposes of desegregation.
Board member Bacon was quoted as observing, "This is really no
different from a boundary change to relieve overcrowding."

Mrs.

Malis remarked, "The fact that children will get there by bus is
incidental. 11 29
Despite the fact that the plan did not affect their areas,
residents from the northwest and southwest sides of the city
attended the Board meeting to protest the Board's decision.

Repre-

sentatives of organizations from these areas expressed their continuing opposition to busing programs and their fear that their
29 Proceedings, March 1, 1971, pp. 2755-57. Headcounts, 1971,
1972, Districts Seven, Eight. Chicago Sun-Times, March 2, 1971,
p. 14 (Quotes). Francis B. McKeag, past Assistant Superintendent,
School Planning, Chicago Public Schools, private taped interview
held in his office, Chicago, Illinois, August 30, 1971.
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children would be bused at some future date.

The hearings which

preceded the Emmet busing decision had disturbed Mrs. Malis.

She

had encountered opposition to the plan not only from lay people
but from some school staff members.

This encounter provoked an

attempt by Mrs. Malis to define the board-staff relationship.
She said:
I do not think that lay boards are supposed to be educators.
I think that we pay educators, that we are here to set policy .
. . . I think it is very, very difficult for those of us who
know that in some instances policies of the Board of Education
have been undermined by staff members at various levels, and
when I use the word undermined, I mean that they are not always
implemented according to the intent of the Board. When I read
an editorial in a community newspaper that accuses the Board
about poor planning, and, in fact, many times since I have been
on this Board, we, as members, have also said this to staff
. . . that you are not planning correctly, you are not projecting fast enough, you are not building fast enough, there
are too many delays . . . . I take exception to the fact that
Board members must take the brunt of this criticism since we
must depend upon the information supplied to us by the staff.
We, the members, have tried to respond to the needs of ou~·
schools and when an editorial says that it has become apparent
that the Board of Education, as now constituted, is inadequate,
incompetent, and worse, not terribly concerned. [sic] You can
understand, I think, why I am disturbed by a statement
such as this . . . . Therefore, Dr. Redmond, I think that it is
a very important thing for you to consider. I don't know how
many other Board members will agree with me, but I think it is
a very important thing for you to consider that it is time for
our staff at all levels, from teacher on up, to understand
that when this Board sets a policy it means for it to be
implemented according to the intent of the Board.30
30chicago Sun-Times, March 2, 1971, p. 14.
1, 1971, pp. 2755-57 (Quote).
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Within a month after the implementation of this short-lived
busing program, the staff submitted an interim evaluation of the
Emmet West busing plan.

This report emphasized that elements of

the receiving communities were amenable to the program.

Indeed,

one community was "developing plans for the cooperative exchange
of children" and "others wanted the bused children integrated into
their own student body."

All school staff members who were inter-

viewed were reported to have been enthusiastic about the plan.31
The parents of the bused children who also had siblings in
the sending school were reported to have noticed an "immediate and
extensive improvement in both academic progress and social behavior
in their children who remained at Emmet West and those who were
bused."

The sending school parents in all categories (those with

children only at the sending school, only being bused, or a combination) were asked, "Would you prefer to have your child bused
even after there is room for him at a neighborhood school?"

The

report found, "The overwhelming response was that they would prefer
a neighborhood school that is uncrowded, with quality education. 11 32
3 1Joseph J. Connery, District Superintendent, "Interim
Evaluation of Emmet West Busing Program'' (report presented to the
Ge.neral Committee of the Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, April,
1971), pp. 1, 2 (Quote), 3. (Typewritten.)
·
32 rbid .. , pp. 3 (Second, third quotes), 4 (First quote).
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Criticisms of the program were that the bused children were
isolated by being kept i11 the same class groups that they had
attended in the sending school.
school were inexperienced.

Some teachers from the sending

The most frequently mentioned complaint

was that the staff and community councils at the receiving schools
were not included in the planning stage.
them to express their concern.

There was no reason for

The Emmet busing program was sched-

uled to end by September, 1971, when "demountable" semi-permanent
structures were located in the overcrowded community.

Despite the

expressed desire of some parents of the Lincoln School, the program
was not extended into the next year.

It has been suggested that

the excessive travel time, about forty minutes each way, and the
availability of better facilities in their own neighborhood dampened
a.ny interest among black parents in continuing the program.33
Buildi°ng remained the major policy to relieve overcrowding
in community schools under Redmond, as it had been under Willis.
Mrs. Malis' comments on the Emmet School program indicate the
emphasis placed upon this type of program.

Every administrator

interviewed made reference to the building program.

Use of

3 3 Ibid., pp. 3, 5, 7. "Demountable" structures are prefabricated units which may be assembled or disassembled rapidly at a
site. A poured concrete slab on which the demountable is erected
is considered the only permanent site cost.
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temporary structures, additions to previous structures, the use of
nearby buildings which could be adapted for classrooms, and the
erection of entirely new schools have been the major means of combating overcrowding.34
A serious obstacle to building permanent structures, besides
the non-availability of funds, has been disagreement about the
location of sites.

Construction of the Austin Middle School was

delayed for years as black and white elements in the area fought
over its placement which would have affected desegregation in the
locality.

Another problem associated with permanent structures

has been the changing demographic equation.

Desegregating neigh-

borhoods have first experienced a rapid increase in public school
enrollment.

However, as the neighborhood facilities are subjected

to severe overuse, an area has tended to decay rapidly.

Thus, the

Board finds it has erected permanent structures to serve a population which disappears.35
These changes in population dispersion have also had repercussions on the effectiveness of the permissive transfer or open
enrollment program.

The· open enrollment plan is bound to the

34McKeag, August 30, 1971; Bell, June 22, 1972. (Above,
chapter ii~ offers a more detailed analysis of these problems.)
35 rbid.
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distribution of students throughout the schools.

Iri the 1960's,

the rapidly expanding black population of the city found its children were often crowded into schools built to serve a smaller
school-age clientele.

The white population of the city, usually

residing in stable neighborhoods, often had schools which became
underutilized as children grew up but their parents remained in
the area.

During this period a permissive transfer program could

have some effect on desegregation as black students could move from
overutilized schools to the less crowded schools in predominantly
white areas.

However, by the 1970's, the school capacity trend

has reversed itself.

The movement of the white population to the

periphery of the city has resulted in overcrowding in predominantly
white schools.

Many black neighborhoods, with facilities suffering

from overutilization, have lost a considerable segment of their
population and student bodies.

Thus, the permissive transfer

program is unlikely to result in any considerable desegregation as
white students have not transferred to predominantly black schools
very frequently.36
Indeed, the black· students had not utilized the permissive
transfer plan to any great extent.

The high school program, begun

36open Enrollment Report, pp. 19-23. Above: chapter iii,
pp. 100-01, 116-17; chapter iv, pp. 123-26; chapter v, pp. 172-74.
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in 1963, reached its maximum in 1966 when 1500 students participated.
In 1967 the number fell to 957 and has almost steadily dropped to
329 in 1972.

When the number of students who were eligible to

utilize this plan is compared to the number who have, the failure
of the program becomes more evident.

In 1968 the percentage of

students approved for transfers was 10.4 percent of the number of
students eligible to transfer from a sending school.
percentage had dropped to 4.4 percent.

In 1972 this

It must also be remembered

that not all the students receiving transfers were black.

Further-

more, not all the students accepted for transfer chose finally to
use the plan.37
In 1972 a Chicago Schools work-study report examined the
efficacy of the open enrollment program regarding desegregation.
It recognized numerous factors which have operated to prevent the
permissive transfer plan from becoming a viable factor in integration.

The report observed that many minority students have not

used the plan because of hostility in the receiving schools and the
onus placed on students and parents to initiate the transfer themselves.

The students who do choose to transfer often represent a

group strongly interested in education whose absence from the
3 7open Enrollment Report, pp. 20-22.
1968, p. 240.
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sending school may help to lower its morale and aspiration level.
The transferring students are often faced with a long trip from
their neighborhood to the school.

They may discover that it is

difficult to maintain strong bonds with peer groups both at the
receiving school and in their own neighborhoods; that is, they may
become disassociated from both groups.

While all these factors may

serve to discourage students from transferring, it is the demographic change which insures that there will be less utilization
of the, transfer plan.

The number of white schools designated as

underutilized is becoming smaller.38
The work study report stated to the Board that voluntary
transfer plans are ineffective in achieving integration.

The

report suggested that the "obvious alternative is the use of mandatory transfers in accordance with certain guidelines.''

These

guidelines were those suggested in the Redmond Report of 1967.
The Redmond Report had observed that voluntary "transfer programs
have had largely symbolic effects, for few Negroes transfer," and
the programs "do little or nothing to stem the flight of whites
from the 'threatened' neighborhood."

The work study report called

attention to the short-term (transfer programs, boundary changes,
38open Enrollment Report, pp. 7-9.
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site selection and school pairing), the intermediate-term (magnet
schools) and long-term (educational parks) suggestions of the
Redmond Report.

Issued in November,_ 1972, the work study report

observed, five years after the Redmond Report and over four years
after the Austin busing

p~an,

that the strategy of the Redmond

Report "has not been implemented to date. 11 39
Certainly, the educational park concept had progressed little
beyond the initial study stage.

The first feasibility study of a

cultural park project had been made in February, 1968.

This

involved a rather grandiose scheme to build a complex of both
educational and cultural plants at fifteen locations throughout the
city.

These centers would include facilities for educating children

from pre-school through the secondary level.
people would utilize the facilities each day.

From 10,000 to 25,000
The leading black

Chicago newspaper and the Urban League had called for about thirtytwo such units in a series of articles which appeared to be a
reaction to ex-Chicago School Superintendent Willis' neighborhood

3 9 Ibid., pp. 27 (Quotes), 28-31. Pertinent parts of the
Redmond Rej?Ort are considered in chapter v, pp. 176·-82.
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school policy.40
By 1971, another study expanded upon the educational cluster
concept.

It continued to advocate several models adapted to

Chicago's specific demographic problems.

These clusters were to

be more decentralized than the conventional educational park plans
and allow for specialized interests at each center.
would include:

The clusters

Schomes, which are neighborhood pre-school, cog-

natively oriented school-homes serving about 150 children between
the ages of three to six and intimately associated with an elementary school; Elementary Centers, which emphasize individualized
instruction; Middle Schools, which serve ages eleven through
fourteen, paying special attention to the developmental needs of
this age group; Modified Secondary Schools, which offer a diverse
and flexible set of alternatives for the student; Planning Centers,
which would offer diagnostic and preventive educational planning
for students and staff as well as providing liaison .services
between schools, communities and educational administrative
40 Donald J. Leu and I. Carl Candoli, A Feasibility Study of
the "Cultural Educational Park" for Chicago, Report Presented to
the Board of Education, City of Chicago, February, 1968 (Chicago:
Bo_ard of Education, 1968). Chicago Daily Defender, December 12,
14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 1967. Thomas S. Teraji, Past Director, Division
of Attendance Area Studies, Chicago Public Schools, private taped
interview held in his office, Chicago, Illinois, May 31, 1973.
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agencies.

These planning centers would also coordinate the efforts

of the cultural-educational clusters with art and cultural centers,
junior colleges, universities, parochial schools and the public
magnet schools.

An estimate of the construction costs of the long-

range program was set at about one and one-half billion dollars.41
While the educational park concept is far from becoming a
reality, the magnet school plan, suggested in the Redmond Report,
has been set in motion.
plated.

Three to seven magnet schools are contem-

Each school would emphasize a special program such as

performing arts, science, or business.

A school would serve about

1800 students equally divided into three age groups; three to six,
seven to ten, and eleven to fourteen years of age.

Th~

internally decentralized to minimize numbers and fear.

school is
Units

housing about 200 students will be assigned teacher teams.
groupings and individualized instruction will be emphasized.

Various
The

magnet school is designed to develop willing integration among
diverse economic and racial groups by offering a superior
4lnonald J. Leu and I. Carl Candoli, Planning for the Future:
A Recorrnnended Long-Range Educational and Facilities Plan for Chicago,
Report Presented to the Board of Education, City of Chicago, August,
1971 (Chicago: Board of Education, 1971), pp. 36-50, passim,
62-63.
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educational program. 42
Thus far the Walt Disney Magnet School on the northeast side
of the city is the only magnet school in operation.

However, a

"mini-magnet" school concept was the basis of the plan finally
submitted to the Board as a substitute for the intra-community
busing plan rejected for South Shore.

Two facilities, one located

in the Black School and another in a Hebrew school, both in South
Shore, were designated as receiving schools.

Three hundred pupils

in grades one through six were to be culled from twenty elementary
schools in Districts Seventeen, Twenty-two and Twenty-seven.
Attendance at the receiving schools was on a voluntary basis.

The

racial balance of the student body was deliberately managed by
choosing among the volunteers so that the student body was equally
divided among black and white students.

The plan was "to offer a

quality, integrated program of education superior to those now
offered at any school in the area so that parents will voluntarily
seek to enroll their children in the facilities. 1143
The plan was accepted unanimously by the members of the
Board.

The South East Community Organization approved the program.
42 Ibid., pp.40-43.

43 Proceedings, July 10, 1968, pp. 49 (Quote), 50-52;
September 25, 1968, p. 44.4.

Only a few dissenters appeared at the meeting to predict that there
would be no volunteers from the schools which had almost totally
white student bodies.

Of over 1600 students who applied for

admission about 300 volunteers were white.

The students were

chosen by factor of grade, sex, race, home school and then picked
by lottery.

In the first group 152 were white and 148 were black

while there were an equal number of boys and girls.
program was operating with 400 students.
months above the national average.

In 1971 the

Reading scores were seven

As the area has become

increasingly resegregated black, it has become more difficult to
recruit white students and the sending area has been expanded.

The

program still remains one of the most promising in Chicago.44
The mini-magnet plan was not designed to stabilize the South
Shore area.

Stabilization did not occur.

In September, 1968, the

total percentage of whites enrolled in the public schools of South
Shore District Twenty-two was 30.7 percent.

Two years later only

7.2 percent of the total enrollment in the district was Caucasian.
By 1974 it was estimated that 80 percent of the residents in South
Shore were black people.·

But if it were to be argued that the

44Proceedings, October 9, 1968, p. 684. Chicago Sun-Times,
July 11, 1968, p. 10; July 14, 1968, p. 11. Chicago Daily News,
September 27, 1971, p. 12. T. Teraji, May 31, 1973.
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implementation of the busing program would have hastened the exodus
of whites from the designated receiving schools to the south of
South Shore, it should be noted what happened in those schools
when the busing program was not initiated.

The Burnham School,

0.0% black in 1967, was 73.4% black in 1970.

The Anthony School,

0.4% black in 1967 was 49.4% black in 1970.

The Goldsmith School,

0.0% black in 1967 was 37.3% black in 1970.

The Hoyne School, 1.3%

black in 1967 was 89.1% black in 1970.

The Luella School, 3.2%

black in 1967, was 64.7% black in 1970.

The Warren School, 3.1%

black in 1967, was 58.6% black in 1970.

The Buckingham School,

· 0.0% black in 1967, was 36.7% black in 1970.
black in 1967, was 74.1% black in 1970.45

The Cole School, 6.1%

Obviously, other forces

than those which could be exerted by the Board of Education were
working in the southeast communities.

If the South Shore plan had

been implemented, how much faster could these schools have changed?
Would the Board's integration policy then have been blamed for the
rapid changeover almost totally accomplished by 1972?
Stabilization remains a major policy of the Board of Education.

The numerous failures of this policy encountered through-

out this entire study indicate that the Board has chosen an
45Headcounts, 1968, 1969, 1970, Districts Seventeen,
Twenty-two. Chicago Tribune, January 31, 1974, Section 4, p. 1.

TABLE 7
DESEGREGATION AND RESEGREGATION OF EIGHT ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS
IN SOUTHEAST CHICAGO WHICH HAD BEEN DESIGNATED
AS RECEIVING SCHOOLS IN THE REJECTED
INTRA-COMMUNITY BUSING PROPOSALa
School

September, 1967
% Negro

October, 1970
% Negro

September, 1972
% Negro

Anthony

0.4

49.4

92.6

Buckingham

0.0

36.7

84.4

Burnham

0.0

73.4

94. 9

Cole

6.1

74.1

89.4

Goldsmith

0.0

37.3

85.6

Hoyne

1.3

89.1

98.5

Luella

3.2

64.7

95.0

Warren

3.1

58.6

96.8

aData compiled from Chicago Public Schools, Teacher
Observation Headcount, (Hand tabulated Xeroxed copies,
Chicago, 1967, 1970, 1972, Districts Seventeen and Twentytwo).
.
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impotent method of dealing with desegregation problems.

The Real

Estate Research Corporation had argued that "stabilization of white
population . . . would probably just divert non-white population
growth to one or more other parts of the city . . . . For non-white
population expansion must, occur somewhere."

The corporation had

suggested that the Board's educational policy "must be directed in
part at shifting future non-white population growth to the
suburbs. 11 4 6
The Chicago Region Parent-Teachers Association recognized
that numerous factors which influence integration are outside of
the jurisdiction of the Board of Education.

While it suggested

many methods of helping to stabilize desegregating schools, the
association also recommended that the Board take actions which
would influence the total community on integration.

One such

action would be to support the passage of a strong open housinglaw.

But the enforcement of the law is not a function of the Board. 4 7

46Real Estate Research Corporation, Report Prepared for the
Board of Education, City of Chicago, December, 1967, Preliminary
Findings and Projections of Population and School Enrollments for
Chicago, Illinois: 1970-1980 (Chicago: Board of Education, 1967),
pp. 12 (Second quote), 13 (First quote). Above, chapter iv,
PP.· 134-39.
47 rllinois Congress of Parents and Teachers, Chicago Region,
"A Study of Stabilization of Integrated Schools," Chicago, April 6,
1967, pp. 1-9. (Mimeographed.)
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Philip Hauser, in his report, had observed that the schools
alone could not overcome the forces of segregation.

It would

"require the active participation of religious institutions,
business and labor organizations, civic and community groups, and
social and fraternal societies as well as of all agencies of
government."

Robert Havighurst agreed that the schools should

become 1nvolved in the communities and become agents of social
change.

While these men had elaborate plans for achieving their

goals, they could not give a formula to end the fear and prejudice
of numberous whites in changing neighborhoods.

As Board member

Scheffler observed of Havighurst's report, "He's trying to do a lot
of things that are impractical . . . . The difficulty is he's trying
to take care of school matters from a sociological point of view
instead of a practical point of view. 11 48
The stabilization policy has also been questioned by a
growing number of blacks who view it as based in a subtle white
racism.

Most stabilization programs have manipulated the movement

4 8Advisory Panel on Integration of the Public Schools, Integration of the Public Schools--Chicago, Philip M. Hauser, ~hairman,
Report to the Board of Education, City of Chicago, March 31, 1964
(Chicago: Board of Education, 1964), p. 12. Robert J. Havighurst,
The Public Schools of Chicago: A Survey for the Board of Education
of the City of Chicago (Chicago: Board of Education, 1964).
Chicago Daily News, November 13, 1964, p. 5 (Quote). Above,
. chapter iii, pp. 81, 84-92; 96-105.
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of black children.

Certainly, the busing program has been one-sided.

Black parents have begun to see stabilization as the responsibility
of the whole community--a responsibility which "should not be
placed as a burden on the backs of Negroes."

During the busing

controversy one black mother had exclaimed, "We will not allow our
children to become helpless pawns in a desperate scheme to forstall
the inevitable exodus of whites . . . nor do we particularly care
to stem that exodus."

Al Raby, a leading civil rights worker, had

attacked the quota plan as stigmatizing Negro children and implying
"that a black Chicago would be undesirable and that Negroes will
always be underpaid. 11 49
Of course, one may ask, "Who speaks for the community?"
Even acknowledged leaders are recognized to have taken positions
which are later proven not to have been supported by a majority of
the group for whom they assumed they were speaking.

Thus, during

the busing controversy, one speaker could exclaim that his acquaintances "take issue with certain organizations which are purporting
to represent this area, when in actuality, their intentions, philosophies, and programs do not represent the true feelings of the
49 southeast Economist (Chicago), February 8, 1968, p. 2.
Chicago Daily Defender, February 7, 1968, p. 24 (First quote);
February 15, 1968, p. 1 (Second quote). Chicago Daily News,
September 11, 1967 (Third quote). Above, chapter vi, p. 237.

316
majority of area residents and taxpayers. 11 50

Perhaps the only

question that should be asked is, "Who speaks for this group?"
To help determine who is speaking for a school community and
to open a dialogue between the Board and the communities, advisory
councils were organized i9 1971.

These councils were designed to

permit parents to share in the process of arriving at decisions.
In establishing these councils the Board developed a more direct
line of communication with the communities and, to some extent,
by-passed its traditional reliance upon the school staff as a
source of information.

Principals at all of the city's public

schools were required to hold well publicized meetings to set up
the councils, but their participation in the councils was limited.51
The guidelines, as they evolved for the councils, were
designed to keep control of the organizations in the hands of
parents of the local pupils.

Only parents and teachers could vote

at the first meeting in which the council was organized.
required that the chairman of the council be a parent.

It was
While the

school principal was required to attend meetings, he was later
disqualified from holding an office.
50

37.

Council members were to be

southeast Economist (Chicago), February 1, 1968, p. 1.

51Proceedings, December 9, 1970, December 9, 1970, pp. 1036Chicago Daily News, March 5, 1971, p. 46.
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residents in the school attendance district or representatives of
institutions in the district.

A minimum of 60 percent of the mem-

bership was to consist of parents of children in the school.

All

officers were to be parents.52
The Board granted the council the power to select a principal when a vacancy existed.

They could also make recommendations

regarding discipline, vandalism, pupil conduct, curriculum, safety,
physical condition of buildings, community problems, school policies
and procedures, selection of textbooks, and lunchroom problems.
While their powers were not limited to this list, the councils
were cautioned that the Board retained the responsibility for
fiscal policies, salaries of personnel, purchases and contracts,
real estate transactions and construction of buildings, certification and tenure of personnel and negotiations with employee
organizations.

The school principal was expected to comply with

council requests, but the councils were to recognize that a
principal might not have the administrative power to comply with
every resolution.53
The .possibility that these councils may obstruct the
52

Proceedings, July 28, 1971, pp. 11-13; November 24, 1971,
pp. 1067; October 25, 1972, pp. 1044-45.
5 3Proceedings, October 25, 1972, pp. 1044-45.
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operation of local schools in attempts to obtain parochial objectives is a real danger.

One of the receiving schools has been

without a principal for over a year, as the council has blocked
eligible applicants who apparently did not share their ideological
views.

In another community, representatives of an ethnic group

were influential in bringing about the resignation of a principal.
Their objective is obviously to choose a replacement from their
own ethnic group.

In Austin, a district council rejected a report

from one of its own committees calling for racial balance in west
and northwest side schools.

It was observed that young blacks

joined with whites to defeat the recommendation.
preferred neighborhood control of the schools.

The blacks
One member of the

council, who favored desegregation, lamented, "We feel this
[creation of councils] is a move to shift the burden of responsibility from the Board to community people who have no power."54
The problems the Board faces seem to be

mount~ng.

There

exists a diversity of agencies within the city which are not
coordinated in any attempt to bring the races together.

The

evidence indicates that there is a polarization of the races.

Sta-

bilization, a mainstay of the Board's integration policy, has an
54chicago Tribune, January 9, 1972, Section 10, p. 10
(Quote). Chicago Sun-Times, May 21, 1972, p. 76.
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almost incredible record of failures.

But, in fact, the Board has

no policy, except inaction, to substitute for the stabilization
concept.

As factions vie for power.within the city, the Board,

perhaps reflecting the traditional response of public decisionmaking bodies, mirrors the lack of unity which characterizes
this period.
While the Austin busing plan did not help stabilize the
south Austin community, it did not disrupt the receiving school
areas on the northwest side of the city.

The Redmond Report was

correct in predicting that an area not contiguous to the expanding
black ghetto would not be subject to the panic and flight associated with contiguous areas.

On the southeast side, where the

intra-community plan was not initiated, the designated receiving
schools experienced rapid change as they rested in the path of the
expanding Negro community.

It appears that the decisions and

policies of the Chicago Board of Education are only a minor factor
in the politico-socio-economic forces which are shaping the city.

CHAPTER VIII
APPRAISAL AND TERMINATION FUNCTIONS:
FOUR GOALS OF THE BUSING
POLICY APPRAISED
This evaluation of

~he

Chicago Austin busing program utilizes

the rationale offered by the Board in its "Fact" sheets issued
during the public hearings.

The four goals were:

to relieve

serious overcrowding at the May and Spencer Schools; to promote
stabilization throughout the Austin Area; to increase desegregation
in District Four; to improve educational experiences for all children.

While the attainment of these four goals becomes the cri-

teria for judging the success of the implementation of the Board's
decision, it should not be considered as a

judgem~nt

integration as a policy in any other circumstances.

on busing for
It is only the

fourth goal which reaches the essential principles outlined by the
Supreme Court in 1954.
The'Board's first expressed purpose for the busing program
was to relieve overcrowding in the May and Spence·r Schools.
Obviously, the transfer of about 600 students from two schools
·would serve to alleviate some pressure upon their facilities.

The

question becomes, "Was the number involved in the plan sufficient
320
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in magnitude to offer permanent relief to the schools?"

Evidence

indicates that the plan was not large enough in scope to stem the
rising enrollment for one-half a year.

Furthermore, the plan was

not sufficiently elastic to allow for the channelling of adequate
numbers out of the sending schools to relieve overcrowding at a
later date.
in September, 1967, the enrollment at May School was 1559
students.

The following year, after the busing plan was in effect,

the enrollment was 1586.

In 1969, a branch was opened, but the

enrollment at the main building was 1692.
the 1967 enrollment was 1325.
it rose again to 2076.

At the Spencer School,

In 1968, it rose to 1624 and in 1969

The enrollment at both schools has continued

to increase each year through 1971 as may be seen by the chart on
the following page.

To mitigate the overcrowding the Board built

modular units, added mobiles and remodeled rooms.

Construction was

begun on the Austin Middle School to draw off the upper grades.
In September, 1967, seventh and eighth grade pupils at the Spencer
School were transferred under a mandatory program to the newly
created Hay Upper Grade Center.

With the completion of a fourteen

room addition to the Spencer School in 1968, the program was soon
ended.

The withdrawal of the Spencer students from the Hay Upper

Grade Center helped to stabilize the white 'enrollment at the latter

TABLE 8

I

ENROLLMENT FIGURES FOR TWENTIETH DAY:
SOUTH AUSTIN SCHOOLS, 1967-1971
1970
1971
1968
1969
1967
Enroll- % Enroll- % Enroll- % Enroll- % Enroll- %
ment Negro ment Negro ment Negro ment Negro ment Negro

School
Byford

573

0.3

589

1.0

641

0.5

679

1.5

724

3.6

Emmet

ll86

1.1

1448

20.3

1288

67.0

1371

97.4

1012

99.7

Emmet N.Br.

476

70.2

450

97.6

351

98.3

Emmet S.Br.

494

78.1

368

95.9

416

98.3

s.

495

98.8

324

98.5

Emmet W.

565

92.5
691

99.3

Emmet

Emmet N.
Hay

437

0.0

410

0.0

387

o.o

450

0.0

557

1.8

Hay U.G.C.

404

58.9

474

73.6

257

65.0

236

45.4

293

53.9

Howe

583

0.2

589

0.5

618

5.7

761

17.5

1081

54.7

Key

508

0.0

514

0.8

551

8.0

410

20.1

651

50.8

Key Br.

102

6.9

106

8.5

99

4.0

122

4.9

131

5.3

Lewis

671

0.3

665

1.1

715

0.8

786

0.8

821

0.7

1559

83.9

1586

95.9

1692

99.1

1934

99.7

2336

99.8

388

97.9

347

May
May Br.
Nash
Spencer
Young
Total
Enrollment

100

993

1.2

990

1.3

1001

2.1

1088

8.0

1259

37.7

1325

82.4

1624

90.8

2076

97.1

2132

98.8

2282

99.3

845

13.3

874

13.0

865

12.0

890

10.1

996

9.0

9186

9869

11548

13084

13925

1) Overcrowding or segregation were not relieved at the May or Spencer Schools.
2) Continuing racial change may be seen in the above achoo.ls.

Data compiled from Chicago Public Schools, Teacher Observation Headcount
(Hand tabulated Xeroxed copies, Chicago, 1967, 1968, 1~69, 1970, 1971, District
Four).
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school, but in September, 1969, Mrs. Malis was complaining about
the severe overcrowding at the May, Spencer and Emmet Schools
in Austin.l
Two flaws existed in the busing plan which prevented it from
relieving overcrowding at the sending schools.

First, the 15

percent maximum quota limited the number of students who could be
transferred to a fraction of the residential enrollment at the
receiving schools.

Second, the permissive feature in the transfer

program created problems in establishing exact numbers as many
parents had refused the transfer of their children.

Furthermore,

these flaws are magnified by the inability of the school staff to
establish a program which would continue to draw off a maximum
number of students from the sending schools.
In establishing the basis for the quota system the original

lchic~go Public Schools, Teacher Observation Headcount, (hand
tabulated Xeroxed copies, Chicago, 1967, 1968, 1969, District Four.)
Hereinafter referred to as Headcounts. Joseph J. Connery, District
Superintendent, District Four, "Austin-Area Project. The Pupil
Busing Program in District Four: A Fourth Report: (report presented to the General Committee of the Chicago Board of Education,
Chicago, Illinois, August, 1971), pp. 7-8. (Typewritten.)
Hereinafter referred to as D.E., 1971. Board of Education, City
of Chicago, Proceedings: Board of Education, City of Chic'ago,
(Chicago: Board of Education, August 28, 1968), p. 237; (October
23, 1968), p. 763. Hereinafter referred to as Proceedings, date
of meeting, page number. Austin News (Chicago), December 11, 1968,
p. 1. Chicago Sun-Times, September 25, 1969, p. 3.
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proposal adopted by the Board stated:
• • . that initially the percentage of pupils received will
not exceed 11% of the total enrollment of the receiving school.
As grades 7 and 8 are added this figure should not exceed 15%.2
Numerous factors are involved in setting the quota.

First,·

a base of enrollment for the receiving school must be established.
When the plan was initiated, a special count was taken in each
school to determine the number of students in the building.

In

the following two years, the teacher observation headcount, taken
on the twentieth school day served as the base for the enrollment
in the school.

Second, a question centers on interpretation of

"total enrollment" in the Board directive.

In the initial plan,

total enrollment was computed as the sum of the residential mernbership in the kindergarten through eighth grades, plus any special
education class enrollment, ·plus the number of bused students.
This sum, which represented virtually every student in the building,
was then divided into the number of bused (Negro) students to
obtain the percent of integration in the school.

This method of

computing the percent of racial integration was used in the first
two district evaluation -reports for the school years 196 7-68 and

L968-69.

It is alluded to in the third report also, although the

2Proceedings, January 10, 1968, p. 2431.
inserted by author.

Underlining
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basis for calculations in this report is vague.3

Before the

question of the interpretation of "total enrollment" is considered
further, it is important to apply the total residential enrollment
criterion to establish the maximum allowable number of students
which could be bused in accord with the original directive.
If we use the twentieth day teacher observation headcount
figures as a basis, we may establish the maximum number of students
which could be bused based on the established quotas.

This would

follow the formula:

Where:

Z11

= llx

Z15

=

for the 11% quota;
and
3x + 17 for the 15% quota.
f

89

z = number to be bused in order to establish a total stu-

dent body of which the Negro bused group would be at the percentile
quota established; and x = number of the total residential student
3Ibid., p. 2433. George W. Connelly, Associate Superintendent, Area C, "Austin-Area Project: A Pupil Busing Program in
District Four. An Evaluation" (report presented to the General
Connnittee of the Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois,
July 24, 1968), pp. 5-6. (Typewritten.) Hereinafter referred to
as D.E., -1968. Robert M. Bell, District Superintendent, District
Four:-"Austin-Area Project: The Pupil Busing Program in District
Four. A Second Report" "(report presented to the General Connnittee
of the Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, August 15,
1969), pp. 4a, 8. (Typewritten.) Hereinafter referred to as D.E.,
1969. George W. Connelly, Associate Superintendent, Area C,
"Austin-Area Project: The Pupil Busing Program in District Four:
A Third Report" (report presented to the General Connnittee of the
Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, September, 30, 1970),
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body in kindergarten through eight plus special education students.4
The formula will yield a maximum number of students that
could be bused based on the calculations which were used when the
busing plan was established.

That is, the number of the total

student body including bused students is taken as the divisor and
the number of bused students is the dividend.
The first set of figures in Table 9 records the total residential enrollment (kindergarten through eighth plus special education classes) of the receiving schools based on the twentieth
day headcount.

The stability of the residential enrollment in the

receiving schools may be seen by comparing the twentieth day
September, 1967, figures to the April, 1968, figures which were
reported when the busing program was begun.

The second set of

figures records the number of students being bused during the
particular month of the year that the busing program reached its
optimum.

This period of busing of the maximum number of students

occurred after the twentieth day headcounts were taken.

Thus, the

percent of desegregation recorded by the headcount was inaccurate
pp. 5, 6, 8. (Typewritten.) Hereinafter referred to as D.E.,
1970. Headcounts, 1969, District Four.
4The formulas were derived by establishing
and Z15 = .15 (x+Z) and solving.

z11 =

.11 (x+Z)
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in establishing the most favorable ratio of black to white students.
The figures on the chart establish the optimum operation of the
plan.
By applying the quota formulas to the total residential
enrollment (x in the formula), the maximum number of students which
could be bused to achieve an 11 percent and a 15 percent quota is
shown on lines Z11 = llx

f

89 and Z15 = 3x

f

17.

The chart assumes

an 11 percent quota for the period ending in June, 1969.

When all

eight grades were being bused, beginning in September, 1969, the
15 percent quota is applicable.

In comparing the maximum number

of pupils actually bused to the maximum number allowable under the
quota, it may be seen that the actual percent of desegregation has
reached 10 percent during only the first twc years of full operation.

During the 1969-70 school year the number of students was

318 less than the possible maximum.

In the 1970-71 school year

the number of students being bused was 385 less than. the possible
maximum, and in the 1971-72 year the deficiency was 349 students.
The drop below 10 percent would negate the desegregation
aspect of the busing program by the lowest established criterion.
Beginning in 1971 the district evaluations adopted a method of
computing total enrollment and percent of desegregation which
differed from the original-method of calculation.

Residential

TABLE 9
COMPARISON OF MAXIMUM NUMBER OF STUDENTS ACTUALLY BUSED
TO NUMBER OF STUDENTS REQUIRED TO REACH
LIMITS OF QUOTA PLAN
Total Residential Enrollment (Kg--8 + Special Educ. Classes)
Based on Twentieth Day Headcount
Sept.
Apr.
Sept.
Sept.
Oct.
Sept.
1967a
1968b
1968a
197oa
197la
1969a
School
Bridge
428
Burbank
393
Dever
857
Locke
856
Lyon
616
Sayre
448
Smyser
564
O.A. Thorp
765
Total Residential
Enrollment (x) 4927

419
391
846
858
616
456
560
782

413
393
827
865
606
479
558
774

525
396
850
851
599
505
570
772

593
425
850
837
584
525
576
808

601
397
834
823
577
523
616
784

4928

4915

5068

5198

5155

Maximum Number of Students Required to Reach Limits of Quota
z11 = llx f 89
llio Quota
(608)
608
607
Z15 = 3x f 17
15% Quota
867
893
917
9J9
x = Total Enrollment of Receiving Schools
Z = Quota Based on Receiving School Enrollment
aChicago Public Schools, Teacher Observation Headcount,
(hand tabulated Xeroxed copies, Chicago, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970,
1971, District Four).
bGeorge W. Connelly, Associate Superintendent, Area C,
"Austin-Area Project: A Pupil Busing Program in District Four. An
Evaluation" (report presented to the General Connnittee of the
Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, July 24, 1968), p. 5.
(Typewritten.)
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TABLE 9--Continued
Maximum Number of Students Being Bused in Austin Plan
Apr.1968b Nov.1968C Nov.1969d Oct.1970e Oct.197lf
School
Bridge
Burbank
Dever
Locke
Lyon
Sayre
Smyser
O.A. Thorp
Total Bused
Quota Limit

45
47
86
84
72
52
58
75
519
608

51
56
99
106
78
65
74
92
621
607/867

56
54
87
101
73
60
64
80
575
893

53
53
73
93
59
69
57
75
532
917

55
51
80
100
57
59
61
97
560
909

Actual Percent of Desegregation Achieved by Busing Students
11.2
10.2
9.8
9.4
9.3
CRobert M. Bell, District Superintendent, District Four,
"Austin-Area Project: The Pupil Busing Program in District Four.
A Second Report" (report presented to the General Corrnnittee of the
Chicago Board of ·Education, Chicago, Illinois, August 15, 1969),
pp. 4, 6. (Typewritten.)
dGeorge W. Connelly, Associate Superintendent, Area C,
"Austin-Area Project: ·The Pupil Busing Program in District Four.
A Third Repoit" (report presented to the General Corrnnittee of the
Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, September, 1970),
pp. 5, 6. (Typewritten.)
eJoseph J. Connery, District Superintendent, District Four,
"Austin-Area Project: The Pupil Busing Program in District Four:
A Fourth Report" (report presented to the General Corrnnittee of the
Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, August, 1971),
pp. 5, 12. (Typewritten.)
fJoseph J. Connery, District Superintendent, District Four,
"Austin-Area Project: The Pupil Busing Program in District Four:
A Fifth Report" (report presented to the General Corrnnittee of the
Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, August, 1972),
pp. 4, 13. (Typewritten.)
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enrollment for grades one through eight rather than kindergarten
through eight was used as the base for computing the ratio.

This

was explained on the grounds that the busing program did not
involve kindergarten children.

A second change occurred in that

the residential membership of grades one through eight, rather than
the sum of the residential membership and the bused membership,
was used as the divisor.5
Thus, in computing the percent of desegregation under the
new method of calculation, the number 4286, representing the residential students in grades one through eight in April, 1971, would
become the divisor, and the number; 496, representing the number
of bused students in April, 1971, becomes the dividend.

The new

formula yields (496 + 4286)·(100) = 11.57 as the percent of desegregation.

If the total enrollment in grades one through eight was

used as the divisor, the formula yields [496 + (4286 + 496)] · 100
=10.37 as the percent of desegregation.

If one returns to the

original method of calculation the figures for April, 1971, are
not available, but the September, 1970, residential enrollment
would be relatively accurate.
· 100.

We would obtain [496 + (5198 + 496)]

= 8.71 as the percent of desegregation.
5n.E., 1971, pp. 4-5.

It may be seen that
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the new method of calculating the percent of desegregation results
in a substantial and important alteration of the statistical data
derived. 6
This data imposes definite qualifications upon an assessment
that the school system was successful in achieving its stated goals
of relieving overcrowding and increasing desegregation.

Undoubt-

edly, the busing of over five hundred students each school year
must have relieved overcrowding at the sending schools to the
extent that the bused students were no longer adding to the congestion in their neighborhood facilities.

However, the over-

crowding could have been relieved to a considerably greater extent
if the plan had operated at its optimum figures rather than the
greatly reduced numbers actually involved.

Certainly, desegre-

gation was furthered to the extent that black children were attending previously all-white schools which would not have had any
black students if the busing program did not exist. ·But it is
evident that the desegregation remained so minimal that it was
necessary to change the method of calculating the percent of integration in order to conform with the lowest statistical criterion
for desegregation.
6rbid.

Headcount, 1970, District Four.
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An analysis of the community pressures to which the Board
has been subjected helps explain the slackened pace of the busing
program.

While the busing plan was being initiated, emphasis in

the black communities was shifting from integration to black selfdetermination.

Over 55 percent of the parents of students eligible

for busing refused permission for their children to participate.
School-administrators emphasized smaller class sizes and educational
opportunities, rather than integration, when explaining the plan to
black parents.

Thus, as facilities and programs have been expanded

in the south Austin area, there has been less motivation for
parents to involve their childrea in the busing program.

Dr.

Redmond, in considering the limitations of the permissive transfer
program, has observed " a decreased interest in integration as a
result of the black consciousness movement."7
In contrast, the residents of the receiving community and a
large segment of the white population in general, have remained
opposed to busing as a means of integration.

The American Insti-

tute of Public Opinion in late 1971 found 79 percent of the white
7stanley Ptak, Past Principal of the May School, private taped
interview held in his office, Chicago, Illinois, August 14, 1972.
Francis B. McKeag, Past Assistant Superintendent, School Planning,
Chicago Public Schools, private taped interview held in his office,
Chicago, Illinois, August 30, 1971. D.E., 1968, p. 2. Chicago
Tribune, January 11, 1972; p. 3 (Quote).
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population surveyed to be against busing.

The plurality of sur-

veyed blacks, 47 percent, also expressed opposition, although 45
percent of the Negroes questioned indicated their favor.

The

ambiguity in the black response was matched by the performance of
the national government after the 1968 elections.

While the fed-

eral courts have continued to press for desegregation, the federal
administration has equivocated and disavowed ambitious busing
proposals.

In Chicago no court action designating that busing be

utilized for integration has been initiated.

The attention of

federal authorities has turned to the integration of school faculties.

There has been no pressure to expand the busing program and

covert pressure to keep from expanding it.8
A third goal of the busing program had been "to promote
stabilization throughout the Austin Area."

When the plan was

initially implemented, the percentage of white students at the
May and Spencer Schools rose from 13 percent to 17.2 percent and
from 11.9 percent to 16.4 percent respectively.

For the few months

left in the 1967-68 school year, and using the 15 percent quota
guidelines, both schools· had been reintegrated.

But this increase

Bchicago Sun-Times, November 1, 1971, p. 8. Ivor Kraft,
"1970-The Year of the Big Sellout on_ Integration," Phi Delta
Kappan, LI (June, 1970), 523-26. Chicago Tribune, August 4, 1971,
p. 4; August 15, 1971, p. ·s, January 11, 1972, p. 3.
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in percentage represented the drop in black enrollment rather than
any influx of white students.

The schools were well beyond the

tipping point at which the white enrollment historically had
rapidly declined.

The following September, 1968, only 45 white

students, representing 2.8 percent of May's enrollment, and 120
'

white students, representing 7.4 percent of Spencer's enrollment,
attended the two schools.

By 1971 only 11 white students were

counted in attendance at the two schools.9
Indeed, the dramatic changeover of the Austin community raced
ahead of the predictions made by the Real Estate Research Corporation.

The white enrollment at Austin High School dropped from

58 percent in.1967 to 49 percent in 1968 aqd 25 percent in 1969.
Only 7.4 percent of the school's enrollment was Caucasian in 1970.
By the end of 1969 it was evident that the block by block white-toblack change had reached the western edge of the city as the Emmet
School changed from 20.3 percent Negro to 67 percent· Negro in one
year.10
The district evaluations of the busing program recognized
9Proceedings, April 10, 1968, p. 1730.
1971, District Four.

Headcounts, 1968,

lOHeadcounts, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, District Four. Chicago
Daily News, November 17, 1969, pp. 1, 10. The dynamics of the
community change is considered in chapter iv of this study.
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that "it is possible that stabilization of the Austin Area, as a
goal, should not have been an original consideration of the Austin
busing plan because, historically, stabilization has occurred
infrequently."

The studies did observe that families of bused

Negro students may not have moved as frequently as other families
which did not have their children involved in the busing program.
This hypothesis was based on the fact that most of the families
of the bused children remained in the May and Spencer School
neighborhoods. 1 1

The search for the reason that the families of

bused students were more stable introduces one of the unresolved
problems in analyzing the busing program.

As the decision to

allow children to be bused was an option of the parents, to what
extent did this freedom of choice serve to separate out a group of
students with backgrounds which would be more stable and, indeed,
more academically motivated?
The fourth stated purpose of the busing plan was to "improve
the educational experiences of all children."

Improving educa-

tional experiences must be viewed not only in terms of providing
optimal conditions for academic achievement, but also in terms of
providing optima.! conditions for social adjustment.
11
D.E., 1969, p. 35.

The United

D.E., 1971, pp. 9, 10, 11 (Quote), 12.
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States Supreme Court had succinctly stated the case for integration
when it observed of Negro children, "To separate them from others
of similar age and qualifications salely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect

th~ir

hearts and minds in a way unlikely

ever to be undone. 11 12
Two factors separate the Chicago busing plan from Brown Case
rationale:

the segregation the Board had moved to correct was not

de jure; the major motive black parents had in accepting the plan
was escape from the overcrowded conditions in their local schools.
Indeed, one could question whether the psychological factors
involved in the Brown decision would not really work to the detriment of the children's hearts and minds.

While desegregation was

being achieved to the extent that Negro children were attending
previously all-white schools, what would be the reaction of these
children to the hostile reception members of the white community
had extended?

In terms of academic achievement the evidence indi-

cates that the black children being bused would perform better than
their counterparts who remained in the sending schools. ·
The scholastic achievement of the bused students has been
12Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1959).
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evaluated through four sources; parents, teachers, principals and
comparative test scores.

The parents of the bused students were

asked to evaluate the scholastic prqgress and study habits of their
children.

The number of responses was considerable--461 survey

questionnaires,

represen~ing

80 percent of the total number distrib-

uted, were returned in 1969, and 340 questionnaires, representing
64 percent of those distributed, were returned in 1970.

Comments

were tabulated according to categories of; Satisfied, In-Between,
and Not-Satisfied.

The high degree of satisfaction expressed by

parents can be examined in Table 10 which follows this page.
parents comments were:

Some

"We are for the busing program 100 percent.

My son's interest in learning bas been stimulated by a fine teacher
and more desirable surroundings."
good education at
her school work."

---

School. 11

"I think my son is getting a
"She has taken more interest in

"She is doing a lot better than when she

started. 11 13
Parents of students residing in the immediate area of the
receiving schools were asked the same questions.

In 1969, 2628 of

the questionnaires were returned representing 65 percent of those
13n.E., 1968, pp. 10-12, 23, 24. D.E., 1969, pp. 11-13, 20,
21 (First quote). D.E., 1970, pp. 10-12:-ZO, 21 (Second, third,
fourth quotes).
--

,

TABLE 10
TOTAL RESPONSES OF PARENTS OF BUSED PUPILS:
1968--1969--1970
1968a
Question

Satisfied
No.
%

Scholastic Progress

256

88

20

10

11

2

Study Habits

251

88

22

10

10

2

Social Relationships

245

88

26

9

8

3

Comments

197

87

21

10

9

3

In-Between
No.
%

Not-Satisfied
No.
%

1969b
Scholastic Progress

358

92.5

16

4.1

13

3.4

Study Habits

362

89.3

25

6.1

18

3.4

Social Relationships

299

88.4

23

7.0

16

4.6

Comments

294

90.l

18

5.5

14

4.4

1970c
Scholastic Progress

242

92.4

15

5.7

5

1.9

Study Habits

242

88.3

27

9.8

5

1.8

Social Relationships

235

91.8

18

7.0

3

1.1

Comments

207

95.4

8

3.7

2

.9

aGeorge W. Connelly, Associate Superintendent, Area C, "Austin-Area Project:
A Pupil Busing Program in District Four. An Evaluation" (report presented to the
General Committee of the Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, July 24,
1968), p. 12. {Typewritten.)
bRobert M. Bell, District Superintendent, District Four, "Austin-Area Project:
The Pupil Busing Program in District Four. A Second Report" (report presented to
the General Committee of the Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, August
15, 1969), p. 13. (Typewritten.)
·
CGeorge W. Connelly, Associate Superintendent, Area C, "Austin-Area Project:
The Pupil Busing Program in District Four: A Third Report" (report presented to the
General Committee of the Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, September,
1970), p. 12. (Typewritten).
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sent out.

In 1970, 2102 questionnaires, representing 45 percent of

those sent out, were returned.
indicates the responses.

Table 11 on the following page

The 1969 response is interesting in that

well over one-half of the responders expressed satisfaction with
the academic progress of their children, but in their open-ended
comments they expressed great dissatisfaction with the program.
In 1970, the number of responses indicating satisfaction with the
scholastic progress of the children fell considerably.

The movement

to an "In-Between" position indicates the continuing apprehension
white parents had about the busing program.

The vast majority of

comments on busing were opposed for social or administrative
reasons, but some expressed academic objections such as "Enlarged
class size is detrimental. 11 14

As will be shown later, there was

no evidence to support any fears that the academic advancement of
white children suffered as a result of the busing program.
Teachers were asked to evaluate the bused students' academic
progress.

The standards of the receiving school served as the

criteria for an appraisal of progress as:

Good, Fair, or None.

Beginning with the 1969-70 school year, "Poor" was substituted for
"None."

It can be seen in Table 12 that this change of nomenclature

14D.E., 1969, pp.
23 (Quote), 24.

14~16,

21, 22.

D.E., 1970, pp. 13-15,

TABLE 11
TOTAL RESPONSES OF PARENTS OF PUPILS
IN RECEIVING AREA
1969--1970

Question

Satisfied
No.
%

In-Between
No.
%

Scholastic Progress

890

56.2

95

6.0

601

37.9

Study Ha.bits

972

60.9

72

4.5

552

34.5

Social Relationships

696

48.8

62

4.3

667

46.8

Comments

241

13.5

125

7.0

1410

79.3

Not-Satisfied
No.
%

197ob
Scholastic Progress

185

15.0

541

44.0

503

40.9

Study Habits

179

15.3

519

44.5

468

40.1

Social Relationships

202

17.1

461

39.0

517

43.8

Comments

159

11.0

275

19.1

1005

69.8

aRobert M. Bell, District Superintendent, District Four,
"Austin-Area Project: The Pupil Busing Program in District Four.
A Second Report" (report presented to the General Committee of the
Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, August 15, 1969),
p. 16. (typewritten.)
bGeorge W. Connelly, Associate Superintendent, Area C, ''AustinArea Project: The Pupil Busing Program in District Four. A Third
Report" (report presented to the General Committee of the yhicago
Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, September 1970), p. 15.
(Ty/itten.)
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was accompanied by an increased use of the "Poor" classification.
The chart does not show the wide variation in teachers' responses
from school to school.

While over 41 percent of the students at

five schools were classified in 1968 as "Good" in Academic Progress,
only 20 percent were classified as "Good" at one school.

Under

"Study Habits" six schools classified between 30 percent and 50
percent of the bused students as "Good," but only 17 percent of
the students at one school and no students at another school were
classified as "Good. 11 15
This deviation in range closed somewhat in the next two
years.

In 1969 between 29 percent and 48 percent were classified

as "Good" in "Academic Progress" and between 35 percent and 61
percent were classified as "Good" in "Study Habits."

In 1970 the

variation in "Academic Progress" was ten points between 32 percent
and 42 percent, while the percent classified as "Good" in "Study
Habits" varied between 29 percent and 50 percent.

This variation

reflects the subjective criteria used by the teachers.

However,

over the four year period the total percentage evaluated in "Academic Progress" as "Goodl' in any year has varied only four points-between 36.5 perzent and 40.5 percent.
/

15n.E., 1968, pp. 13-16.

Only in 1970 did the

TABLE 12
TEACHER RESPONSES: EVALUATION OF BUSED STUDENTS
1968--1969--·1970--1971
Good

Question
1968a
Academic Progress
Social Progress
Study Habits
Connnents
1969b
Academic Progre~s
Social Progress
Study Habits
Comments
1970C
Academic Progress
Social Progress
Study Habits
Comments
1971d
Academic Progress
Social Progress
Study Habits
Connnents

Fair

None

No.

%

No.

%

No.

156
171
145
106

38'
41
35
37

181
170
155
132

44
41
37
46

75
71
112
52

18
18
28
17

226
313
298
76

40.0
55.3
53.3
56.2

276
175
173
29

48.8
30.9
30.9
21.5

63
78
88
30

11.2
13.8
15.8
22.3

186
260
184
114

36.5
51.4
37.3
34.7

172
129
115
85

33.8
25.5
23.3
26.0

151
117
194
129

29.7
23.1
39.3
39.3

200
256
189
134

40.5
52.3
38.4
37.5

215
145
145
132

43.6
21.4
29.5
36.9

78
88
157
91

15.8
17.9
31. 9
25.4

%

aGeorge W. Connelly, Associate Superintendent, Area C, "Austin-Area Project:
A Pupil Busing Program in District Four. An Evaluation" (repor~ presented to the
General Committee of the Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, July 24,
1968), p. 16. ('l:ypewritten.)
bRobert M. Bell, District Supe~intendent, District Four, "Austin-Area Project:
The Pupil Busing Program in District Four. A Second Report" (report presented to
the General Conrrnittee of the Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, August
15, 1969), p. 19. (Typewritten.)
cGeorge W. C~nnelly, Associate Superintendent, Area C, "Austin-Area Project:
The Pupil Busing Program in District Four. A Third Report" (report presented to
the General Committee of the Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois,
September, 1970), p. 19. (Typewritten.)
dJoseph J. Connery, District Superintendent, District Four, "Austin-Area
Project: The Pupil Busing~ogram in District Four: A Fourth Report" (report
presented to the Genera 1 Co i ttee of the Chicago Board of Education, ,Chicago,
Illinois, August, 1971), p. 9. (Typewritten.)
.
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percent of students evaluated below "Fair" rise above the 20th
percentile.

Teacher evaluation of "Study Habits" of the bused

students, however, indicates that this area has consistently represented a major concern for the teachers.

In only one year were

less than one-fourth of tpe bused students ranked in the lowest
category.16
The number of bused students that have been retained in the
same grade for another year has been small.

To some extent the

policy of allowing bused pupils to return to their sending school
at the request of parents may have influenced the number of nonpromotions.

Several returns were based on the appraisal of parents

that their children could

not~eep

up with their studies in the

receiving schools.

Table 13 in\iicates the failure rates in the

receiving schools.

In the year ending in June, 1968, ten of the

thirty students not promoted came from the busing program.

However,

when the percentage of non-promotions is computed for each
receiving school, no pattern may be discerned between the rates
before and after the busing program.

When the failure rate for the

combined enrollment of the receiving schools is computed, no jump
in- the percent of failures occurs until the end of the second full
16D.E., 1969, pp. 10, 17-19, 24.
D.E., 1971, pp. 27-29.

D.E., 1970, pp. 16-19, 22.

TABLE 13
COMPARISON OF FAILURE RATES IN RECEIVING SCHOOLS:
JUNE, 1967--JUNE, 1972
Total Enrollment and Failure Comparisona
Receiving Schools
Total Enrollment
Sept, 1966
April, 1968
Sept-Nov, 1968
Sept-Nov, 1969
Sept-Oct, 1970
Sept-Oct, 1971

4750
5447
5546
5609
5730
5715

Number Failed
June,
June,
June,
June,
June,
June,

1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972

% of Failure

28b
31
31
56
37
24

0.57
0.57
0.56
1.00
0.65
0.42

Failure Rates at Individual Receiving Schools
School

Jun,1967 Jun,1968 Jun,1969 Jun,1970 Jun,1971 Jun,1972
% No.
% No.
% No.
% No.
% No.
% No.

Bridge
Burbank
Dever
Locke
Lyon
Sayre
Smyser
Thorpe

.00 (O) .00 (O) .65 (3) .17 (3) .76 (5) .30 (2)
.85 (3) .45 (2) .69 (3) 2.60(12) .45 (2) .67 (3)
. 11 ( 1) . 53 (5) .78 (7) .43 (4)
1.10(10)
.00 (O) .21 (2) .20 (2) 2.13(20) 1. 51(14) .33 (3)
1.10 (6) 1.20 (8) .75 (5) 1.51(10) 1. 39 (9) .84 (5)
.00 (O) .30 (2) 1.48 (8) .34 (2) .68 (4) .00 (O)
1. 95 (10) 1. 10 (7) .32 (2) .16 (1) . 32 {2) .00 (O)
1.00 (8) .60 (5) .11 (1) .47 (4) .11 (1) .11 (1)

aJoseph J. Connery, District Superintendent, District Four,
"Austin-_Area Project: The Pupil Busing Program in District Four:
A Fifth Report" {report presented to the General Committee of the
Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, August, 1972),
appendix.
bChicago Public Schools, Teacher Observation Headcount
(Hand tabulated Xeroxed copies, Chicago, 1966, District Four).
Estimate based upon using reported percentage of failure for each
school, and multiplying this by enrollment reported in September,
1966. The whole number was ta1n as the true number failed and
fractions were dismissed on the assumption that the June, 1967,
enrollment would be lower' than he initial enrollment.
.
.
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year of busing, but the rate drops below the pre-busing percentage
by the end of the fourth year.17
When the bused students are compared academically to the
resident students at the receiving schools, they do not fare well.
The median reading scores,for the sixth and eighth grade bused
students fall a.lmost consistently within the lowest quartile of
reading scores computed for the entire tested student body of the
receiving school.

Furthermore, the rate of progress between the

sixth and eighth grade is considerably lower for the bused students
than for the resident students of the receiving schools.

The drop

in the rate of progress for bused students graduating in 1971 i.s
indicated in Table 14.

An initial drop in the progress of students

was also observed in a Berkeley study at the beginning of their
desegregation plan.

A retesting of the sixth grade class later

indicated that the loss was, however, almost entirely recovered
within six months.

Studies of desegregation projects in Berkeley,

California, and Hartford, Connecticut, indicate that gains in
17D.E., 1968, p. 17. D.E., 1969, pp. 28-29. D.E., 1970, p.
29. D.E:-:-T971, p. 24~seph J. Connery, District Superintendent,
District Four, "Austin-Area Project: The Pupil Busing Program in
District Four: A Fifth Report" (report presented to the General
Committee of the Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois,
August, 1972), appendix. Hereinafter referred to as D.E., 1972.
Headcounts, 1967, 1968, 1969, District Four. Data compiled in
Tables 3 and 4.

TABLE 14
COMPARISON OF MEDIAN READING SCORES OF BUSED PUPILS IN 1971
GRADUATING CLASS WITH MEDIAN SCORES OF NATIONAL,
SENDING, AND RECEIVING SCHOOL STUDENTS
IN SAME YEAR AND GRADEa
Reading Score

8.0

7.0

6.0

5.0
4.0

3.03
1965-66
test before
busing

4

6
5
1967-68 1968-69
busing
test
begun 3/68

National Median Scores
Bused Students Scores
Sending Sch~ Scores
Receiving Sc ool Scores
Including Bu ed Students

7

3rd
3.5
3.3b
3.3b
3.9b

8
1970-71
test
6th
6.7
5.4
4.5
6.8

Grade
and
Year
8th
8.1
6.2
5.1
8.3

aJoseph J. Connery, District Superintendent, District Four,
"Austin-Area Project. The Pupil Busing Program in District Four:
A Fourth Report" (report presented to the General Committee of the
Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, August, 1971),
pp. 19, 20, 22.
bApproximation made from interpreting graphs and data supplied.
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achievement for the upper elementary grades noticeably depreciate.
This tendency, evident in the Chicago 1971 bused graduate group,
may very well reflect the fact that students in the lower quartile
achievement group tend to continue to slip at an accelerating rate
behind their peers who are in the higher quartiles.

However, there

is no evidence that the resident students are regressing.

Table 14,

showing reading scores for the 1971 receiving school graduating
classes, indicates a close parallel to national median increases
in achievement.18
A comparison of the reading scores of the bused students to
those of the students at the sending schools reveals that the bused
students did better than their neighbors who attended the sending
schools.

As may be seen in Table 15, for the 1971 sixth grade,

there was little difference between the median scores of the bused
pupils and those of the students who remained at the sending
schools at the third grade lever:---Rowever, by the sixth grade
level the bused students have progressed about one-half grade
18chicago Public Schools, Report of the 1968-69 City-Wide
Testing Program (Chicago·: Board of Education, 1969), pp. 48, 55,
121, 286, 292, 421, 445, 475. D.E., 1970, p. 32. D.E., 1971, pp.
18-23. Arthur Satz and Martin Hoffman, Project Concern: Hartford
Connecticut (New York: Center for Urban Education, 1971), pp. 3035. Keith Melville, School Desegregation Plan: Berkeley, California (New York: Center for Urban Education, 1970), pp. 59-64.

TABLE 15
COMPARISON OF MEDIAN READING SCORES OF BUSED PUPILS IN 1973
GRADUATING CLASS WITH MEDIAN SCORES OF NATIONAL AND
SENDING SCHOOL STUDENTS IN SAME YEAR AND GRADE
Reading Score

7.0
6.0

3.0
2.0

'

3
1967-68
test just
prior to
beginning busing

4

5

Key

6
1970-71

3rd

National Median Scores
Bused Student Scores
Sending School Scores

Grade
and
Year

6th

3.5

7)-:J

2.8
2.9

5.2
4.6

aJoseph J. Connery, District Superintendent, District Four,
"Austin-Area Project. The Pupil Busing Program in District Four:
A Fourth Report" (report presented to the General Committe~ of the
Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, August, 1971),
p. 21.
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beyond the level of the sending school pupils.

This was the case

for the graduating classes of both 1971 and 1973.
students in the eighth grade class

~f

The bused

1971 had outdistanced the

students at the sending schools by almost a full grade.19
The significance of, these observations is clouded by numerous
factors.

The permissive aspect of the busing plan may have served

to select a group of students whose parents would be more likely
to encourage them to achieve.

One of the most common observations

made by principals of the receiving schools was that "those bused
children who achieved in the receiving school would have achieved
anyway. 11 20

This observation is not supported by the test data for

the 1967-68 third grade class (Table 15).

These students had just

been tested before the busing program was begun.

As has already

been established, there was only a small difference in the test
scores of those students who were recruited into the busing program
and those students who remained at the sending schools.

Indeed,

19n.E., 1971, pp. 20-21.
20Ibid., p. 26. Studies of parental motives for declining
to allow their children to be bused have indicated that the
refusers value education for their children as much, or more, than
those who opted for busing. See Laurence T. Cagle and Jerome Beker,
"Social Characteristics and Education Aspirations of Northern LowerClass, Predominantly Negro Parents Who Accepted and Declined a
School Integration Opportunity," Journal of Negro Education, XXXVII
(Fall, 1968),·406-17, passim.

350
the median scores of the bused students in 'the class of 1973 were
a bit lower than the scores of the remaining students.
However, due to the turnover of students in the south Austin
.
area it may well be that the characteristics of the student body
at the sending schools were changing.

Certainly, the third grade

classes at May and Spencer Schools, recorded in Table 14 for
1965-66, did not consist of the same students as the eighth grade
classes of those schools in 1970-71.

In 1965 no Negro students

attended May and only 103 students, representing 10.1 percent of
the student body attended the Spencer School.

However, by 1967-68,

when our data for comparison is becoming more significant, only
12 percent of the combined student bodies of the two schools consisted of Caucasians.

In 1968-69 the percentage of whites at the

two schools had dropped to 5 percent.

By 1971, the enrollment of

May School ir.creased by 777 students, about 50 percent over its
1967 enrollment.

The Spencer School experienced an increase of

\
857 students, about 65 percent over its 1967 enrollment.21
Thus, the bused student$ of the class of 1971 were about
equal in reading achievement with a student body at May and Spencer
Schools in 1965-66 which was on a par with the national median.
By 1968-69 the student bodies of the May-Spencer. Schools had fallen
2lneadcounts, 1965, 1967, 1971, District Four.
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considerably below the national median and so had the bused students.

While the scores of the bused students remained higher

than the changing student body of the sending schools, the scores
of the bused students showed no significant gain in comparison to
what might have been predicted to be their progress.

However, the

nature of the 1971 bused graduating class was also experiencing
some change.

The retention rate among the bused students at the

receiving schools was 61.6 percent in 1968-69 and 89.9 percent in

i969-7o. 22
While the student bodies being compared were obviously in
great flux, the fact that the bused students were residents of the
area from which the sanding schools drew their student bodies
indicates a common social environmental background.

Thus, the

data in the graphs may be significant. but there is room to question
whether the student body being compared is sufficiently homogeneous
in character to allow comparisons.

Some conclusions are warranted.

The 1971 graduating class, according to the data in the
District Evaluation, showed less progress than should be expected
between third and sixth grade.

However, as the majority 0£ this

period was spent at the sending school, theiinfluence of the busing

22 D.E., 1969, p. 7.

D.E., 1970, p. 7.
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program must have been minimal.

Between sixth and eighth grade

the bused students' reading level reached 6.2 as compared to 5.1
for the sending school students.

However, the spread between the

reading scores increased from 0.9 to 1.1 during the two year period.
This represents a difference of only 0.2 between the median scores
of the bused students and the students in the sending schools in
the two year period, 1968-69 to 1970-71.

This difference between

the scores of the two groups is not large enough to justify any
speculation on the effect of the busing program.
Data on the 1973 graduating class requires different conclusions.

The classes were tested just prior to the beginning of

the busing program.

The group of students which began busing in

third grade scored just slightly lower than the student bodies of
the sending schools (2.8 compared to 2.9).

Three years later when

the students were tested again, the bused students scored 5.2 on
the reading test compared to 4.6 for the students in' the sending
schools.

This difference indicates that the bused students of the

1973 graduating class have progressed at a more rapid rate than
their counterparts in the sending schools.

While the evidence is

conflicting, there are good reasons for considering the 1973
graduating class data to be more valid than the data for the 1971
graduating class.

Students in the 1973 class began busing at an

353
earlier age when they would be more impressionable.

The three

year period between tests of the 1973 class was spent in the receiving schools compared to only a two year period for the 1971
eighth grade class.

The student body at the sending school in

1968 was more homogeneous in comparison to the 1973 class than
was the 1965 sending school body to the 1971 class.
Data concerning the attendance of the bused students also
lends itself to contention that the busing program has been academically advantageous to the bused students.

When the transfer

program was being proposed, an argument against busing contended
that the attendance of the bused students would suffer due to the
inconveniences of the time consumed by the transportation.

In

analyzing Table 16 it can be seen that the attendance of the bused
students in school year 1968-69 was better than the attendance of
the students in the sending schools in seven months of the year.
The attendance of the receiving school students, however, was
noticeably better than the attendance of the bused students.
In the 1969-70 school year the attendance of the bused students has improved as compared to the attendance of a year earlier.
However, the attendance of the students at the sending schools has
declined from the previous year.

The bused students' attendance

is consistently higher thah the attendance of the sending school

TABLE 16
PERCENT ATTENDANCE OF BUSED STUDENTS COMPARED TO
SENDING AND RECEIVING SCHOOL STUDENTS:
SEPTEMBER, 1968--JU~E, 1971
Sept.
1968-69a
M.P.
91.47

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

90.92

90.36

89.18

88.35

88.10

86.89

86.71

86.88

87.12

S.P.

93.47

92.76

92.61

9'1.17

90 .. 15

89.29

88.21

88.02

88.00

88.34

B.P.

88.68

93.21

92.29

88.75

89.78

92.51

91.35

92.43

92.33

92.84

R.S.P.

96.05

95.88

91.90

94.45

94.19

93.94

92.39

92.84

93.29

93.79

1969-70b
M.P.
89.41

86.86

87.72

87.84

79.17

85.04

85.27

85.71

85.98

86.83

S.P.

86.12

89.50

87.94

86.50

76.00

85.31

85.33

85.30

85.71

87.30

B.P.

94.61

94.21

95.36

94.48

86.75

90.11

88.48

92.08

92.73

93.37

R.S.P.

96.39

94.91

94.41

94.21

91.43

92.15

92.46

93.98

95.33

94.75

1970-71C
M.P.
93.14

92.03

90.77

90.03

88.89

87.74

87.92

88.36

88.50

88.46

S.P.

93.28

91.81

90.67

89.77

88.63

88.29

88.26 ·88.49

88.67

88.90

B.P.

96.38

96.24

95.15

93.30

94.88

95.02

95.80

93.80

96.73

95.10

R.S.P.

96.55

96.22

95.53

95.17

94.82

93.95

93.88

94.43

94.48

94.69

Key
M.P.--May Pupils
S.P.--Spencer Pupils

B.P.--Bused Pupils
R.S.P.--Receiving School Pupils

aRobert M. Bell, District Superintendent, District Four, "Austin-Area Project:
The Pupil Busing Program in District Four. A Second Report" (report presented to
the General Committee of the Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, August
15, 1969), p. 27. (Typewritten.)
hGeorge W. Connelly, Associate Superintendent, Area C, "Austin-Area Project:
The Pupil Busing Program in District Four. A Third Report" (report presented to
the General Committee of the Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois,
September, 1970), p.28. (Typewritten.)
CJoseph J. Connery, District Superintendent, District Four, "Austin-Area
Project: The Pupil Busing Program in District Four: A Fourth Report" (report
presented to the General Committee of the Chicago Board of Education, Chicago,
Illinois, August, ~971), p. 14, (Typewritten.)
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pupils, and it is in closer accord with the attendance of the
receiving school.

In 1970-71 while attendance at the sending

schools has improved, the attendance of the bused students has
increased so that it is not only consistently higher than the
percent attendance of the sending schools, but has also surpassed
the attendance rate of the receiving schools during six months of
the ten month year.
These figures show that although the bused students as a
group were usually better in attendance than the students in the
sending schools, the bused students' attendance continued to
improve and drew closer to the attendance rate of the receiving
schools.

It is indicated that the bused students were developing

attendance habits similar to the students in the receiving schools.
As attendance at school is an important element in obtaining a
quality education, this factor must be considered as a possible
bonus in this particular busing plan.
Certainly, the social aspects of the educational experiences
of all the students involved are an important goal in education.
For the vast majority of the parents of the bused children the
improvement of social relationships was clear.

Table lO(page 338)

shows the overwhelming percentage of parents who expressed satisfaction regarding the social relationships of their children.
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Comments regarding this relationship were, "He has gained new
strength and knowledge of people of other races."
a lot of extra curricular activities."

"Her school has

"There were some hard times,

but they have passed. 11 23
The parents of

stud~nts

living in the receiving area did not

perceive the social relationships of their children to be improved.
Table 11

~ndicates

that a majority of parents were less than

satisfied with the social relationship aspect of their children's
education.
faction.

Their open end comments espressed even more dissatisSome parents expressed concern about the expansion of

the program in such comments as, "Continued influx of busing
students will eventually overcrowd our neighborhood schools to the
point where we shall have to transport our neighborhood children
to another school, long distances, and without busing privileges."
"I will try to change schools or move anywhere where there is not
so much tension since this last year. 112 4
Other parents felt the racial encounters were detrimental to
their children.

They observed:

"They [Negro children] are very

arrogant and seems they like to bully the children at recess, or

20-21.

23n.E., 1969, pp. 12-13, 21 (Quote).
-

D.E., 1970, pp. 13,

24n.E., -1969, pp. 14.;.16, 22-23 (Quotes).
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in line, or in the washroom."

"I do not approve of the four

letter words and worse that are used by the bused children.

It

has been necessary at least once a week to explain the meaning of
foul language and signs and why they should be ignored and not
used."

"It can be seen very clearly that these children have no

respect for adults or their schoolmates."

Some parents felt no

social interaction was occurring and expressed this belief with
comments such as:

"My child plays only with white boys and doesn't

mingle with the black children.

From my own observations, they

stay in their own group showing their own partiality."
has not achieved integration."

"Busing

Some parents expressed a neu-

trality with such comments as, "My son has no complaint."

"The

busing program has not affected my daughter in any way that is
evident· to me.

My daughter has never complained or felt that it

affected her in any situation."

It was an unusual parent who

commented, "We are most grateful that our daughter has attended the
School for more reasons than one--but I know of no better
reason than the wholesome experience she gained as a result of the
busing program. 11 25
25Ibid., pp. 22-23 (First, second, fourth, seventh, eighth
quotes). D.E., 1970, pp. 13-15, 23-24 (Third, fifth, sixth quotes).
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There was a wide variability among the evaluations of individual teachers.

When their reports are tallied in Table 12

(page 342) it may be seen that they ranked the bused students
highest in social progress in every year.

In only one year were

more than 18 percent of the students placed in the lowest category
and in only one year did less than 51 percent rank in the highest
category.

Teachers also indicated that generally they received

support from the parents of the bused pupils.

However, they did

express a desire that the program be designed to better screen the
students being sent.

In the 1968-69 school year twenty-four

students were returned for reasons other than transfers from the
sending district,

In the 1969-70 year twenty-nine were returned.

While these students were not returned for disciplinary reasons,
the existence of the possibility of returning must have served to
alleviate some of the most serious social problems.26
When the conduct grades assigned by teachers in the receiving
schools are compared with the conduct grades received by the same
students when attending the sending schools, an interesting disparity can be noted.

Of forty- eight bused graduates in 1970,

twenty-four had been graded "Excellent,"
26 D.E., 1969, pp. 4, 4a, 24.
1971, p.12.'"

fourteen received "Good,"

D.E., 1970, pp. 4-5.

D.E.,
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eight were marked "Fair" and two were considered "Unsatisfactory."
In 1967 when these forty-eight were graded as students at the
Spencer or May Schools, only fourteen students were graded
"Excellent,"

twenty-seven received "Good," five were marked "Fair"

and two were considered "Unsatisfactory."

This improvement in

deportment grades is evident again when the 1971 bused graduates
are studied.27
Two interpretations may be put forth to explain this discrepancy.

The teachers at the receiving schools may have used a

double standard in evaluating the bused students.

They may have

expected less acceptable behavior and therefore graded the bused
students higher when they performed "normally."

On the other hand,

the change in environment may have resulted in an actual improvement
in overt behavior on the part of many students.

As the focus of

a good deal more attention at the receiving school than at the
sending school, the students may have had a greater incentive to
conform to normally acceptable school behavior.

The latter inter-

pretation finds support in the observation of receiving school
principals that "since most of the upper grade bused pupils have
been in the school for three years, their behavior conforms more
27 D.E., 1970, pp. 33, 37.

D.E., 1971, pp. 23, 25.

360
to that of the residential pupils. 11 28
The choice of high schools may indicate some perceptions of
the bused students regarding their social and academic adjustment.
The program allowed bused students to choose between their home
high school or Steinmetz High School which served the receiving
schools.

Classes of bused students began graduating from the

receiving schools in 1970.

As the chart on the next page shows

there has been a steady increase in the number of students who
have chosen to attend the receiving area school over the period
1970-72.

This increase is rather significant, the percentage of

students choosing to attend Steinmetz jumping from 45 percent to
84 percent within two years.

The most obvious explanation is that,

as students have attended the receiving schools for longer periods
of time, they tend to prefer going on to the receiving area school
with their classmates.

Whether the peer group influencing them

is black or white is not evident.

One effect of this choice is

that Steinmetz High School, which had only four Negro students in
1967, was 3.2 percent desegregated in 1972.29·
28D.E., 1971, p. 26.
29 D.E., 1970, p. 31. D.E., 1971, p. 30.
11, 15. J'.ie'adcounts, 1970, 1971, 1972.

D.E., 197 2 , pp. 10-
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TABLE 17
CHOICE OF HIGH SCHOOLS BY BUSED STUDENTS:
Year

Austin
(Home Area
School)

Steinmetz
(Receiving
Area School)

. Lane
(AcademicEngineering)

1970

21

22

1971

18

34

1

1972

4

41

2

(

1970-1972
Vocational
Type

Other

5

1

1

1

2

The evaluations of the busing program by principals of the
receiving schools tend to reflect the negative aspects of the plan
that they have encountered.

On the positive side, principals saw

signs of academic improvement among the bused students, especially
at the lower grade levels.

They could see no signs that the

achievement level of residential students was falling.

They also

found the parents of bused students to be cooperative when contacted, although these parents seldom participated in school
programs and activities.30
Early principal evaluations emphasized the need for more
services to cope with the new situation.

Every year they have

observed that the bused students are performing at a lower academic
level than the majority of resident students.
30

One of the most

D.E., 1968, p. 18. D.E., 1969, pp. 25-26. D.E., 1970,
pp. 25-2~n.E., 1971, pp. 25-26. D.E., 1972, p. 2-z;:--
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frequent observations made by all the principals has been that
those children who achieved well in the receiving school would
have achieved well in the sending school, and children who did not
achieve well in the receiving school would not achieve well in
the sending school.
In social adjustment the principals observed that the transportation schedules did limit the opportunity for bused students
to participate in after school events.

But one might question the

number of events in which the children would stay to participate.
The covert and sometimes overt opposition of the receiving community was mentioned in every report.

While most black parents

were reported to be pleased with the plan, there were numerous
accusations of racism and prejudice..

The principals' concern with

discipline problems was evident in that most continually called
for better screening of the children chosen for busing and the
establishment of a set of criteria for returning maladjusted
children to their sending schools.

Most of the discipline problems

originated with a few children and usually during lunch or play
periods.
The principals noted that the children in the primary grades
played together more freely than the older children.

Polarization

of the races became more promounced in the later grades.

One
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principal observed that this was especially true of the girls who
reach puberty sooner than the boys.

As the children moved up in

the grades, discipline problems were reported to increase.

How-

ever, it was generally concluded that these problems were more
related to the difficulties of preadolescence than to race
relations.
In conclusion, it may be observed that the objectives set
for the busing program by the Board of Education have either not
been achieved or can not be verified by this study.

Severe over-

crowding at the May and Spencer Schools was not immediately
relieved by the initiation of the plan.

Indeed, overcrowding was

not alleviated until numerous other measures were taken to create
more space for the rapidly expanding south Austin school population.

However, to the extent that between five and six hundred

students were moved to schools with empty seats, the overcrowding
problem was ameliorated.
Stabilization of the Austin community and the May and Spencer
Schools in particular was not accomplished by any but the most
modest criterion.

The s·outh Austin colllIIlunity experienced rapid

desegregation and resegregation.

The only stabilization that may

have occurred rests in the possibility that some families of
children in the busing program\may have chosen not to move in
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order to remain in a sending area.

On the other hand, the receiving

neighborhoods remained stable despite the protests of many opponents
of the plan that there would be a white exodus from the area.
=---;-~

In considering desegregation as a goal, we must distinguish

it__.from integration.

De.segregation may be considered to be an

almost mechanical intermingling of people according to some prescribed quota.

In achieving the quota, which may be as low as 10

percent, it is often assumed that certain positive educational and
social effects will result from the proximity of the races.
However, the achievement of desegregation as a goal does not
require the attainment of the.educational and social goals.

Deseg-

regation refers to the attainment of the prescribed quota.
Even when we assume this limited definition of desegregation,
the busing program has still fallen short of attaining the 15
percent maximum designated in the original plan.

Indeed, the

administration has found it necessary to calculate the percent of
desegregation on a different basis than in the original plan in
order to obtain a minimal 10 percent quota figure.

Three factors

help to explain the stagnation of the busing program.

Black

parents originally saw the busing plan as an alternative to the
overcrowded May and Spencer Schools.

As new facilities and programs

became available in south Austin, there has been less reason for

365

parents to turn to busing as a method of seeking quality education
for their children.
Furthermore, Negro leaders in Chicago have been inclining
toward black power positions which placed less emphasis on integration.

Thus, school officials have encountered little pressure

from the black communities for an expansion of the busing program·
On the other hand, there has been a continuing, if covert, opposition to busing in a large segment of the white community.

Given

the existing community sentiments, it would indeed be startling
to discover the Board exerting pressure to expand the program.
Finally, the goal of improving educational experiences for
all children must be considered.
the residential students.

The evidence remains moot for

Their test scores indicate no signifi-

cant improvement or decline since the initiation of the program.
No tests have been given to evaluate their perception of ·themselves
or their bused peers.

A majority of their parents who have

responded to questionnaires have indicated less than a satisfied
attitude toward the social and academic aspects of their children's
education.

These negative attitudes must have an undesirable

effect on their children's conceptions of the bused students.
The effects of white prejudice have not been overt.

Some

parents of the bused students have complained of prejudice, but an
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overwhelming majority of black parents have indicated that they are
satisfied with the academic and social progress of their children.
Their evaluation is supported by the teachers' reports for most
of the students.

Over two-thirds of the bused students have almost

consistently scored fair or above in the teacher responses.

The

failure rate has been small among the bused pupils, although the
bused students as a group remain academically at the bottom of
the class.
Certain decisions of the bused students indicate their
growing adjustment to their situation.

Their attendance rate has

continued to improve over that of their peers in the sending
schools and has reached and even surpassed the attendance patterns
of the residential pupils in the receiving schools.

It is unlikely

that a discontented group of students would have such an excellent.
attendance record.

The improvement in the conduct grades of the

bused students may indicate their adjustment to their receiving
schools.

This interpretation does fit in with the matrix of data

indicating the social adjustment of the black pupils.

The growing

number of students choosing, Steinmetz High School with its segregated white student body is further evidence of the social adjustment of the bused students.
The significance of the data regarding the reading scores of
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the bused students is questionable.

The data for the graduating

class of 1971 is inconclusive as numerous factors cloud the
validity of the comparisons which are made.

However, the data

indicates that the bused students in the 1973 graduating class made
academic gains beyond the level achieved by their counterparts in
the sending schools.

There is no evidence to indicate that the

rate of achievement of residential students in the receiving
schools was affected positively or adversely by the busing program.
Although the first three goals established for the busing
plan were not achieved, there is evidence that educational experiences have been improved for some children.

This evidence is

certainly sufficient to justify the continuance of the busing program.

There are other reasons for continuing the program.

The

threat of renewed concern on the part of federal authorities if the
Chicago Board of Education reversed its action on busing is an
obvious factor in the continuance of the program.

But there is a

more valid reason for integration.
While a large segment of the Negro community may disdain
busing for numerous reasons, a significant number of blacks are
concerned with integration.

Indeed, if we are to avoid the polar-

ization warned against in the Kerner Report, positive action toward
integration is a necessity:

The strength of black separatism rests
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in white rejection of integration.

The underlying premise of

black separatism is, "If you are going to have an entirely black
community, then black people ought to control their life in it."31
School administrators and board members cannot use a lack of black
interest in desegregation.as an excuse for inaction.

It has been

the failure to act which helped slacken the black interest.
Within this context the Chicago busing plan nrust not fade away,
although a realistic appraisal indicates it is unlikely that the
Board of Education will expand the plan.

31Benjamin E. Mays, "Integration as a Matter of Heart," The
Christian Science Monitor, March 21, 1970, p. 11. The 1973 Gallup
Poll found 58 percent of the nonwhite population responded that
more should be done regarding school integration compared to the
same response by only 26 percent of the white· population. See
George H. Gallup, "Fifth Annual Gallup Poll of Public Attitudes
Toward Education," Phi Delta Kappan, LV (September, 1973), 47.

CHAPTER IX
SUMMARY IN WHICH THE ANALYTIC QUESTIONS DEVELOPED
IN THE LASSWELL DECISION-MAKING MODEL
ARE CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO
THE 1968 BUSING DECISION
In this concluding chapter the dissertation returns directly
to the analytic questions presented in the seven functions described by Harold Lasswell.

A description of each function will

be followed by the analytic questions it suggests and a brief
answer to these questions.
The intelligence function considers information, prediction,
and planning.

The first question asked is, "How is information

that comes to the attention of the decision-makers gathered and
processed?"

A definite evolution of sources may be discerned in

answer to this question.

Under Benjamin Willis, the Superintendent

of Schools was the major source of detailed information.

However,

this hegemony was challenged by the demands for special reports
in which information was gathered by agents outside of the school
administrative

system~

The conflict over this power of exami-

nation was one of the factors which led to the retirement of the
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superintendent.

When the new superintendent took office, he found

a Board which was more inclined than it had previously been to
turn to other sources in seeking information.
lenge this propensity of the Board.

He did not chal-

Indeed, when he presented

the busing plans, he recommended that the Board members defer
consideration until they met the public.

The introduction of

community councils created a direct line of communication between
spokesmen for local groups and the Board members.l
The second intelligence question asks, "What studies,
reports, laws, judicial decisions, and community needs were known
or available to the decision-makers?"

This question expands on

the first by drawing attention to the numerous sources outside
the school administration which serve to influence Board members.
In this dissertation a number of fedeial and state laws, court
decisions, and reports are shown to have required that Board members be informed of problems related to integration.

Reports

commissioned by the Board, directed by Hauser, Havighurst, and
Redmond, provided considerable information. · Special studies by
universities, the Chicago Parent-Teachers Association, and the
Real Estate Research Corporation were available to Board m~mbers.2
lAbove, pp. 40-64, 219, 316-18.
2Above, pp. 67-117, 176-82.
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The third intelligence question asks, "What formal or
informal channels were being utilized in reaching the decisionmakers?"

The influence of the press upon Board members is noted.

The personal contacts of Board members with members of their own
neighborhoods is not explored, but some factions in the city
deduced from the positions taken by Board members that information -gained from personal contacts may have influenced them.
Residents of the northwest and southwest areas of the city felt
that the number of Board members residing in the southeast section
of the city was a factor in the decision not to implement the
busing plan in South Shore.
the negative decision.

This study found other reasons for

However, the demand by residents of the

western periphery of the city that members of the Board be
appointed from their.area indicated the conviction of these
people that a Board member would be more informed about problems
in his own neighborhood.

The age of the Board members served

as an indicator of their position on the busing program.

All

the members who were over seventy were opposed to the plan.3
Other factors which affected the Board members in their
decision-making have been considered.
3Above, pp. 25-40, 286-90.

Conflicts between the
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mayor and his Commission on School Board Nominations regarding
the appointment of Board members indicate the control the mayor
has retained over the composition and character of the Board.
No direct influence of the mayor on Board members was established
in this dissertation.

The indirect influence he exerted in

public announcements was considered.
politicians was evident.

The influence of other

Their pressure was directly responsible

for the Board's decision to hold hearings on the busing proposals
in various connnunities.

These public hearings served to further

the Board's knowledge that large segments of the public were
bitterly opposed to the proposed plans.4
The fourth intelligence question asks, "To what extent did
the decision-making body control the source of its information?"
The Board of Education had expanded its sources of information
during its conflict with Willis.

When the new superintendent

took office, the area boundary committees were actively engaged
in meetings with community representatives.

Thus, when Redmond

made a reconnnendation that the South Side Boundaries Committee
reconsider a decision, he was rebuffed with a reminder that theconnnittee had already gathered as much information as it deemed
necessary.

Prior to the introduction of the busing reconnnendation

4Above, pp. 17-25, £17-62, 285-88.
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the Board considered alternate plans for the South Shore and
Austin areas and was in direct contact with connnunity organizations in these areas.5
The reconnnendation function considers promotion of policy
alternatives.

The first question asks, "How are recommendations

made and promoted?"

This function is considered in conjunction

with "Whose duty is it to recommend?"

The recommendation function

has been definitely established as the prerogative of the Superintendent of Schools.

This power has been guarded by Redmond, who

reminded the Board on numerous occasions that it is the superintendent's duty to act as an adviser.

The access of the superin-

tendent through his staff to details of the operation of schools
must give considerable weight to his recommendations.

However,

the Boa:rd remains the prescribing body and may call upon the superintendent to supply further information or alternative recomrnen.
6
d ati.ons.

The second recommendation question asks, "What alternative
decisions were considered?"

This dissertation studies numerous

alternatives which were utilized or considered as alternatives
to busing.

The neighborhood school policy, the stabilization

policy, the adjustment of boundaries, the selection of new school
SAbove, pp. 39-64, 171-72.

6Above, pp. 64, 196, 263-64, 267.
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sites, the voluntary permissive transfer program, the development
of magnet schools, and the consideration of educational parks are
noted.

The development of a

mini-m~gnet

school in South Shore as

an alternative to the intra-corrnnunity busing proposal is examined.7
The third reconnnend,ation question asks, "Who advocated these
alternatives?"

Geographical, racial, and ethnic factors are

considered in answering this question.

The division of the black

corrnnunities on the use of various alternatives is noted.

The

futility of singling out certain ethnic groups as being more
resistant to change is discussed.

The dissertation studies the

positions that various city-wide and local organizations took
regarding the alternatives.

City-wide organizations tended to

support the plan while local organizations in the receiving areas
were often opposed.8
The fourth reconnnendation question asks, "Why were they
rejected, accepted or compromised?"

The reasons for the rejection

of the South Shore intra-connnunity busing plan are seen in the
inability of the various factions to accept any compromise, the
lack of facilities within the schools involved, and the rapid
7Above, pp. 52, 66, 75-80, 131-37, 304-15 ..
8Above, pp. 201-10, 228-58.

375
racial change already occurring in the areas concerned.
accepted plan for the Austin area was a compromise.

The

Black parents

residing in designated sending areas were no longer required to
send their children but were required to decide whether or not
their children should be bused.

The compromise was a concession

to fear of white parents that their children might be forced into
a two-way busing program in the future.

It also recognized the

anger of a faction of black parents who felt their children
should not be singled out to enforce an integration plan.9
The fifth recommendation question asks, "What audiences were
reached by the recommendations?"

Prior to the announcement of the

busing recommendations, the school administration had contacted as
few groups as possible in order to minimize the development of
resistance.

The dissertation shows that the segments of the public

which became concerned extended beyond those areas which were ::.mmediate ly involved in the plan.

Some vocal opponents of the busing

plan were members of organizations which had been created to defend
segregationist positions in earlier conflicts.

Many residents of

the areas in which schools were designated to receive bused students sought membership in community organizations for the first
time.

Organizations which opposed the busing plans sought out each
9Above, pp. 237-47, 258-70.
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other and these consolidated groups continued to remain united in
their opposition to future recommendations regarding integration.
Politicians from every level of government were called upon to
represent the various factions.

Church organizations became

involved as the use of their schools became an issue in the
debate.

Newspapers took editorial positions on the issue.

Only

one city-wide newspaper opposed the busing plan.10
The sixth question has been considered above in conjunction
with the first recommendation question.
The seventh recommendation question asks, "What values were
considered in performing the function?"

Undoubtedly, the United

States Supreme Court in the Brown decisions provided the basic
value requiring action.

Another value must have operated to

motivate Board members who wished to escape various forms of
punishment the federal government could mete out if some action
were not taken to indicate the good faith of the Board regarding
integration policies.

The Redmond Report considered many values.

It expressed the democratic principle that people must understand
and believe in policies which they are expected to support.
restated the positions taken by the Board of Education which
10Above, pp. 339-58.

It
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supported racial integration and stabilization as policies to be
pursued by the Chicago School System.11
Stabilization was a goal which reflected values.

Inte-

gration could not be accomplished if white residents did not
remain in a racially changing area.

The tax base in the city

would decline if middle-class whites continued to leave the city.
A plan was offered to minimize white opposition and allay any
fear which might result in whites fleeing from the city.

A quota

was established placing a fifteen percent limit upon the proportion of black students who would be admitted to any receiving
school.

This plan would appeal to many citizens with a pragmatic

view toward accomplishing desegregation.

However,• many people

considered it to be a violation of their principles to bus only
black students and to guarantee whites that only a limited number
of black people would be sent to "their" schools.12
The eighth reconnnendation question asks, "To what extent
did the information made available disclose threats or opportunities pertinent to the present or potential value positions of
the decision-makers?"

The position of federal authorities repre-

sented a threat to those whose values opposed desegregation.
llAbove, pp. 176-83.

12Above, pp. 78, 95, 177-82.

For
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.those whose values favored desegregation an opportunity appeared
in a Real Estate Research Corporation study which indicated that
the South Shore and south Austin
rapid racial change.
Board members.

co~unities

were experiencing

Stabilization was a policy endorsed by the

It was im.perative that action be taken immediately

for any stabilization policy to succeed in these corrnnunities.
The relief of overcrowding offered by the busing plan, when
considered alone, offered an opportunity to achieve a value
position held by all of the Board members.

Indeed, this aspect

of the plan was emphasized in presentations to the various concerned parties.

The busing plan goal, to improve the educational

experiences of all children, was nebulous.

As the dissertation

establishes, quality education was defined in different ways by
various individuals.

Desegregation was a goal which struck most

poignantly at the values held by the decision-makers.

For those

who advocated the neighborhood school policy, desegregation by
busing was a violation of their values.

For those who advocated

integration, tbe desegregation goal was a welcome policy.13The ninth recorrnnendation question asks, "Did the information
made available to those concerned with the decision alter their
13Above, pp. 52, 127-40.
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views?"

The Austin busing proposal was finally accepted by an

eight to one vote with two members absent.

There was no evidence

to indicate that information gained from the hearings in the communities had influenced the decisions of the Board members.

The

vote on the porposal had been deadlocked until a compromise was
finally accepted.

Value positions, rather than additional infor-

mation, were the crucial factors in the decision.

When the final

decision was made, it was emphasized that Board members saw the
main issue to be the relief of overcrowding.

The dissemination of

information to the various factions of the public had little
influence on their views.

The public hearings and the continuing

high percentage of opposition expressed in local public opinion
polls make the lack of influence perfectly clear.14
The tenth reconn:nendation question asks, "Did pressure groups
demand a greater participation in the recommending function as a
result of the decisions being considered?"

The busing contro-

versy evoked numerous demands for greater participation in the
decision~making

process.

Established organizations such as

the South Shore Commission expressed definite demands for specific
policies.

Ad hoc groups also emerged to make their demands known.

14Above, pp. 201-06, 269.
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These groups, once formed, remained active in their opposition
to other proposals which might have affected integration policy.15
The prescription function considers the enactment of general
rules.

The first question asl<s, "How are the rules prescribed?"

This may be considered in conjunction with the fourth question
which asks, "What group really made the final prescription?"
Rules are prescribed by a majority of the members of the Board
of Education.

They are prescribed at the reconunendation of the

Superintendent of Schools, although the Board may initiate a
reconnnendati.on by requesting information and plans from the
superintendent.

The busing prescription was made in response to

problems that arose in specific areas.

These problems could be

remedied by the application of four stated Board policies.

These

policies called for the relief of overcrowding in schools, the
promotion of stabilization in neighborhoods, the increase of
desegregation, and the improvement of educational experiences
for all children.
Board of Education.

The decision was made by the members of the
While many pressures were exerted on the

Board, there is no doubt that the final decision was the
sibility of elev.en individuals who finally resolved their
lSAbove, pp. 83-84, 201-10, 232-38, 298.

r~spon
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differences although not the differences in the communities.16
The second prescription question asks, "What was the final
decision?"

The busing prescription was part of a series of

decisions made by the Board of Education.

These decisions may

be seen as a part of a continuing succession of choices which the
Board members must make regarding the implementation of the four
policies stated above.

However, when the final decisions were

made on the South Shore and Austin busing proposals, they were
to reject the South Shore plan and accept a compromise version
of the Austin plan.17
The third prescription question.asks, ''What group or agency
appears to be most favored by the decision?"

The compromise

proposal represented concessions to both the segregationist and
0

integrationist elements in the communities.

Mrs. Malis saw the·

compromise, allowing parents the option of taking their children
out of the program, as an appeasement to anti-busing· opposition.
No effective massive busing program could be implemented when
parents were allowed the option of keeping their children in the
neighborhood school.

The busing of black children to schools

with student bodies which were previously all-white may be
16Above, pp. 224-28, 261-70.

17Above, pp. 260-70.
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considered a victory for desegregationists.

But the victory was

tempered by a quota guaranteeing that only a limited number of
children would be bused.

Both

blac~

and white citizens found

objectionable features in the busing plan.

Both segregationists

and desegregationists found objectionable features in the plan.
However, the prescription was most favorable to desegregationists.18
The fourth prescription question has been considered in
conjunction with the first question.
The.fifth prescription question asks, "Did any groups invoived in the decision seek prescriptions of their own in order
to redress their,grievances as they saw them?"
were

e~pecially

Alternative plans

abundant in the South Shore district.

The ina-

ability of the various pro-integration groups in the area to win
wide-spread support for their alternative plans, when combined
with their own incapacity to compromise_ their positions, left
no one to support the Board's busing plan.19
In the northwest side districts the busing proponents
sought relief for overcrowding and were willing to accept a
compromise.

The opponents of busing offered no alternatives

except a continuation of the building program and the establishment
18Above, pp. 263-70.

19Above, pp. 235-40.
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of quality education programs.

These two prescriptions were not

viable alternative solutions to the innnediate problem facing
the Board.20
The invocation function considers provisional characterizations of conduct according to prescriptions.

The first question

asks, "In reference to whom is the prescription invoked?"

The

prescr1ption had been explicit that students would be bused only
from the overcrowded May and Spencer Schools into seven underutilized schools.

The neighborhoods selected from the attendance

areas of the May and Spencer Schools contained only black residents.

When parents of a large number of the children eligible

for busing refused to allow their children to participate in the
program, supplementary geographic blocks were added to make more
black children available for busing.

These preparations insured

that the plan would operate with black children whose parents
approved of the busing program.21
The second invocation question asks, "Who was responsible
fol;:' administering the decision?" ,The staff of the school system
was directly responsible for administering the decision.

Board

member Bacon specifically asked School Superintendent Redmond to
20Above, pp. 240-48.

21Above, pp. 272-77.
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watch for.any signs of staff sabotage in implementing the plan.
The administrative staffs of School District Four and the two
sending schools were basically responsible for the selection and
transportation of students who were to be bused.

The administra-

tive staffs and faculties of the receiving schools were responsible for establishing a professional and cordial environment for
the new students.

The compromise plan also created a responsi-

bility for many parents who were forced to decide whether they
would allow their children to be bused.22
The third invocation question asks, "Was the prescription
invoked for all cases possible or only for selected cases?"

The

Austin busing program has remained unique in the Chicago School
System.

While students are conunonly bused within the system,

only one other program has resulted in the desegregation of
schools, and that program lasted only about four months.

The

substitute plan for the rejected South Shore busing proposal
offered a mini-magnet school as an alternative rather than another
form of a busing plan.

The.Austin busing prescription called only

for the involvement of the specified schools and the administration
exempted none of those schools in implementing the plan.
22Above, pp. 269, 271-73, 299.
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non-contiguous assignment program suggested in the Redmond Plan
could have been implemented in other non-threatened white residential areas.

The extension of this prescription to other areas

has not been considered by the Board.23
The fourth invocation question asks, "Was the decision
challenged?"

This may be considered in conjunction with the

fifth question, which asks, "How was the decision challenged?"
The dissertation considers the numerous forms that protesters
used to challenge the busing decision.

The development of new

organizations and the increased participation in established
groups such as the local Parent-Teachers Associations were noted.
Picketing.and boycotting, challenges in the courts, threats to
defeat a school bond referendum, and attempts to influence the
legislature to terminate or limit busing were among the forms of
challenges to the decision.

Protesters also sought to change the

nature of the Board of Education.

They called for the election

rather than the appointment of School Board members and demanded
that Board members be chosen to represent geographical areas of
the city. 24
23Above, .pp. 296-301, 309-10.
24Above, pp. 232-58, 284-96.
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The application function considers the final characterization of conduct according to prescriptions.
asks, "How was the prescription applied?"

The first question

This question may be

considered with the second question which asks, "How were those
affected reached and informed?"

The plan was implemented within

a week of the final decision by the Board.

The specific details

of the-plan were followed when the program was begun in March,
1968, although the staff was unable to obtain a sufficient number
of students for busing to meet the initial specifications.

The

dissertation considers the administrative problems involved in
implementing the program.

The method of informing parents of the

students designated for busing and the staffs of the schools
involved is examined.25
The third application question asks, "Did any groups turn
to other agencies for changes in the enforcement of the prescriptions?"

Some citizens who questioned the decision to imple-

ment the Austin busing plan turned to the courts and to legislatures
in attempts to alter or negate the prescription.

The courts

refused to interfere with the prescription on technical grounds
but made no precise comment on the status of busing programs or
25Above, pp. 271-84.
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the grounds on which the programs could be challenged.

The state

legislature has been less ambivalent, but not more effective, in
challenging the busing prescription.. A cormnission established to
investigate the Chicago School System received little attention
in the city.

It was not µntil 1973 that an anti-busing law passed

the legislature, and this act merely restricted the power of the
State Superintendent of Public Instruction to require school systems to use busing for the purpose of achieving racial balance
in any school. 26
The fourth application question asks, "Was the prescription
violated any individuals· or by the agency responsible for- the
application of the prescription?"

There was no evidence that any

individual or agency involved in applying the function had
attempted to violate the prescription.

Indeed, in the face of

hostility from some members of the cormnunities designated to
receive the bused students, numerous agencies took steps to see
that the plan was implemented in accordance with the prescription.
As the program entered its second full year, the number of students being bused did not reach the maximum number allowed under
the quota system imposed by the plan.
2 6Above, pp. 294-96.

This aspect of the

388
application of the prescription is developed under the appraisal
function below.27
The fifth application question asks, "Did the prescribed
policy lead to changes in values?"

There is no evidence that

opponents of the busing program altered their views as a result
of application of the busing prescription.

There is evidence

that few parents altered their value system after the plan was
in operation.

Questionnaires were sent home with children who

lived in the innnediate area of the receiving schools.

The re-

turned responses, in 1969, indicated that 86.5 percent of the parents were less than satisfied with the busing plan.

In 1970, the

percentage indicating a lack of satisfaction was 89.0 percent.
In 1971, the opposition which arose in the northwest side when
another busing plan was suggested for the Ennnet School in Chicago
indicates

th~t

a considerable number of citizens remained opposed

to busing.28
A national polling agency in 1971 found 79 percent of white
persons interviewed to be opposed to busing as a method of
achieving integration.

During the busing controversy over 95

percent of the respondents to a local newspaper poll taken on the
27 Ab ove, pp. 271-8 4 , 323-31.
.
28Above, pp. 296-301-, 337-39.
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northwest side of Chicago indicated their opposition to busing.
But there is no reason to suspect that the lower percentage figure
established by the later national poll reflects a change in values.
The national poll was not interviewing people who thought they
were being directly involved in a busing plan.

While the evidence

is incomplete or indirect, it indicates that the operating busing
plan had little or no influence on the values of most white
citizens who were opposed to busing as a means of achieving
integration.29
There is reason to state that bused students as a group
had experienced attitudinal changes.

Questionnaires filled out

by parents of bused students would r.eflect the parents' knowledgeable views of their children's progress.

The comments made

by these parents indicated an increasing degree of satisfaction
with almost every aspect of their children's development in the
succeeding years, 1968, 1969, and 1970.

If these comments were

the only evidence of changes in the bused students' values, there
would be reason to doubt the sufficiency of data ind1cating the
validity of the conclusion, but there is more evidence.30
An analysis of reading test scores indicates that students
29Above, pp. 205-06, 339-40.

30Above, pp. 337-39.
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who had been bused for a few years were performing at a higher
level than their counter-parts who remained at the sending school.
Further evidence of changed values is found in the steadily
improving school attendance of bused students.

At the third

year of operation of the busing program the bused students'
attendance had become considerably better than the attendance of
students who remained at the sending school.

Teachers at the

receiving schools also assigned conduct grades to the bused students which indicated an improvement in deportment when compared
to conduct grades assigned to the bused students before they
entered the program.

The growing number of bused students who

chose to attend the predominantly white high school over other
alternatives indicated a changing set of values.

Any one of these

indicators was open to varying interpretations regarding the
motive for changed behavior.

However, when considered together

they presented a matrix of evidence which strongly suggests that
bused students were experiencing value reorientations which were
more academically acceptable.31
The appraisal function considers the assessment of the
success and failure of policy.

The first question asks,

the working of prescriptions appraised?"
3 1Above, pp. 340-62~
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How is

The second question

391
asks, ' 1Whose activities were appraised?"
"Who did the appraising?"

The third question asks,

During each year of the operation of

the plan either the district superintendent of District Four or
the associate superintendent for Area C connnissioned a study of
the busing program as a report to the Board of Education.
teachers, and principals were asked to complete
the first three reports.
uated.

Parents,

questi~nnaires

for

The performance of pupils was also eval-

Later reports used the four goals for the busing program

expressed by the Board as criteria for judging the success of the
busing plan.

The studies were usually lucid and factual.

However,

· as the reports were basically self-evaluations by the administration of one of its duties, they are considered as biased infor-mation in the development of the dissertation.

Figures and data

are accepted as being correctly recorded, but the .interpretation
of the data is scrutinized and altered when evidence exists that
other explanations appear possible.

Thus, new interpretations

or data are interposed throughout the analysis of the appraisals.32
The fourth appraisal question asks, "How effectively and
efficiently was the prescription executed?"

The fifth que.stion

asks, "Did the structure of the agency lead to inefficient or
3 2Above, pp. 271-368 are primarily an analysis of the
reports.
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indifferent administration of the prescription?"

The evidence

indicates that the school administration during the opening stage
of application was relatively efficient in executing the prescription.

No child was harmed.

Damage to facilities was limited

to the fire-bombing of one receiving school off ice and some
broken windows.

The major difficulty rested with obtaining

enough students for busing to fill the prescription.

Classroom

reorganizations during the first months of the operation of the
plan were disruptive, and recruitment of more students for busing
was halted before the desired number of pupils was obtained.33
In terms of achieving the four stated goals of the busing
program, the school system was not particularly effective.

Over-

crowding in the sending schools was not relieved as a result of
the busing program.

This failure reElected an unrealistic goal

established in originally presenting the plan.

The diversion of

six hundred students from the overcrowded schools was unable to
alleviate the crowding brought about by the rapid racial change
occurring in the area.

However, the busing plan, after the first

full year of operation, was not operated to obtain the maximum
number of students which was permitted under the quota plan.
Indeed, the school administration resorted to using revised
33Above, pp. 271-84~
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methods of computing the percentage of desegregation in order to
meet a minimum desegregation standard.

The failure to bus a

sufficient number of students to achieve a desegregation goal was
due both to the nature of the prescription and to the structure
of the school agency.

The decision to allow parents to deny per-

mission for their children to be bused increased the difficulty
of obtaining a sufficient number of pupils to participate in the
plan.

The decision, however, reflected the nature of the Board

of Education as a decision-making body which was responsive to
the demands of many factions of the public.

The lack of any action

to increase the number of bused students to the maximum indicated
by the original plan reflected the lack of pressures being exerted
upon the Board to utilize busing for integration.

While the

pressures to increase the busing program hav:e been few, the P.ressures to refrain from further action have been many.34
The goal of achieving stabilization was achieved neither
in the south Austin sending schools nor in the COIImlUnity.

Again,

the goal was too ambitious, especially in light of the past lack
of success of stabilization as a policy.

The final goal,

~m

proving educational experiences for all children, appeared to
34Above, pp. 320-32, 364-66.
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have been achieved with moderate success.

This success did reflect

an aspect of the structure of the school agency.

Teachers and

administrators applied the prescription with an even hand.

While

there were some complaints of prejudiced treatment, the overwhelming majority of parents of bused students indicated satisfaction with the program.' The $Chool staffs obviously performed
in a truly professional manner.35
The sixth appraisal question asks, "Did the admj.nistration
of the prescription lead to significant changes in the administrative agency?"

There were no changes in the administrative

agency that could be traced to the application of the prescription.
There was evidence that appointments to the Board of Education
eventually reflected a broader geographical distribution throughout the city.

Demands that Board members be chosen from areas on

the western perimeter of the city had been initiated during the
busing controversy.

However, in appointing a Board member, it was

evide.nt that in the mayor's considerations other factors still
took pre-eminence over the geographical residence of an appointee
to the Board.36
The termination function considers the final arrangements
entered into within the framework of the prescr~ption.
35Above, pp. 333-67.~

The first

36Above, pp. 243-46, 186-90.
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question asks, "How was the prescription integrated into the
framework of the organization?"

The Austin busing plan has been

operating continually since its inception in 1968.

The number

of students involved reached a maximum of 621 in its first full
year of operation and then dropped to a number around 550 in
the following years.

The program appears to have become an inte-

gral part of the operations of District Four.

While the plan has

not been expanded to bus the possible maximum number of students,
it has never been contracted to involve fewer students than were
bused during the first months of operation.37
The second termination question asks, "Did expectations
change?"

It is considered in conjunction with the third question

which asks, "What aspects of the prescription, if any, were
abandoned or revised?"

Stabilization of schools and neighborhoods

was not a factor in continuing the busing program.

It became evi-

dent almost immediately that the plan would not stop the rapid
racial change which occurred in the south Austin area.

Relief

of overcrowding continued to be a factor in the continuation of
the program.

No one could have contended that the busing program

was relieving overcrowding in the sending schools, but the relief
of overcrowding had been the major argument used by Board members
37Abpve, pp. 320-31, 364-68.
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to justify _the program.

Consistency required that the program be

continued as long as overcrowding was a reality in the sending
schools of south Austin.38
Opponents of the Austin busing program experienced changing
expectations.

Their challenges to the prescription had not ter-

minated its operation.
not materialized.

Their threats of dire consequences had

The receiving area neighborhoods remained sta-

ble, and few programs of the busing opponents were successful.
However, the expectations of many black people were changing.
Integration through busing was no longer a primary goal of the
black organizations.

Government agencies also became less inter-

ested in busing for desegregation.

Desegregation remained an

expected result of the Austin program; however the degree of
desegregation was minimized as the expectations changed regarding
the necessity of desegregatiofi.39
In conclusion, this smmnary establishes the validity of the
hypothesis that Lasswell's seven categories of functional analysis
yield a comprehensive and exceptionally intelligible view of the
decision-making process when related to the Chicago busing
3 8Above, pp. 320-31.

39Above, pp. 285-96, 301, 314.
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decision of 1968.

The analytic questions suggested by the

seven functions direct research to pertinent and valuable observations.

This dissertation has tried to establish the value of

an analytic approach to the decision-making process which directs
our scrutiny to the background of the decision and the myriad of
repercussions to the decision, as well as the decision itself.
It has, at least, indicated the need for more investigation of
the decision-making process and of the use of busing to obtain
quality education for all of our children.

'
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